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                                                Abstract 
 
The financial market in Kuwait has existed for longer than the financial markets in the 
other Gulf countries. However, there has been limited regulation of stock exchange 
activities. This gap in the legislation was highlighted in the Suq al-Manakh crisis, when 
the absence of regulation resulted in heavy losses for large and small investors. This led 
the Government of Kuwait to enact a series of Acts from the late 1970s to 2010. 
 
The securities market was built around this legislation, which helped to stimulate the 
economy by attracting investors. However, the practical application of these laws 
brought to light some shortcomings in the regulation of the stock exchange and 
specifically the need for the legal protection of investors against the risk of loss due to 
market abuse (manipulation and insider dealing) of securities, irresponsible actions or 
poor corporate governance by firms.  
 
This research will trace the historical development of the legislation relating to the stock 
exchange up to the enactment of the new law (The Kuwait Capital Markets Act 2010 
No. 7). The latter will be compared with similar legislation in the other markets of the 
GCC (as well as those in the USA and the UK when necessary) in order to evaluate its 
potential effectiveness in averting future problems and failures such as those that 
impacted Kuwait when it faced a financial crash in the early 1980s.   
 
Hence, the main aim of this thesis is to evaluate the extent to which the Kuwaiti 
securities legislation (the Act) is effective in protecting individual investors in terms of 
insider dealing, unfair disclosure and poor corporate governance by the issuer of the 
securities.,  and to suggest any amendments. Apart from this aim, the thesis will 
hopefully help to improve the knowledge of the Kuwaiti people about securities and it is 
also hoped that the research will be a useful addition to the body of literature in this 
field and will open a new avenue of research for other Kuwaiti students to follow for the 
improvement and development of the national economy.  
 iv 
 
                                Table of Contents 
 
Acknowledgments ...………………………………………………………..i                                 
Abstract.........................................................................................................ii 
List of Legislation……………………………………………………...…xii 
List of Cases and Enforcement Decisions……………………………….xvii 
List of Abbreviations……………………………………………………..xix 
List of Tables ............................................................................................ xxi  
List of Figures ..........................................................................................xxii 
 
Chapter One 
Introduction 
 
1.1The aims of the thesis ..............................................................................1 
1.2 The benefits of the thesis ........................................................................8 
1.3 Methodology ..........................................................................................8 
1.4 Organisation of the thesis ……………………………..……………10 
1.5 Difficulties ............................................................................................13 
1.6 Scope of the Research ………………………………………………..14 
   1.6.1 Shares ….........................................................................................15 
   1.6.2 Stock Exchange …………....…………………..………………….17 
     1.6.2.1 Is Regulation of a Stock Exchange Necessary? …….………... 17 
     1.6.2.2 How Should the Stock Exchange be Regulated? ...………..….22 
 v 
 
1.7 The Historical Development of the Kuwait, Saudi and Qatar Stock 
Exchanges.........................................................................................25 
   1.7.1 Kuwait ............................................................................................27 
   1.7.2 Saudi Arabia....................................................................................36 
   1.7.3 Qatar………………………………………………...........……….38 
1.8 The historical development of the legal systems in Kuwait, Saudi and 
Qatar  ................................................................................................39 
1.9 Conclusion ............................................................................................45 
 
Chapter Two 
The Concept of Protecting Investors under Securities Law 
 
2.1 Introduction …………………………………………………..………47 
2.2 Who are Investors? …………………..…………………………….…48 
2.3 What are Securities? ……………………………...…………………..54 
2.4 Securities Law and Financial Regulation ……………...……………..59 
   2.4.1 What is Securities Law? ……….…………………….…………...59 
   2.4.2 Financial Regulation …………………………..……….…………64 
2.5 Protection of Investors under Securities Law.......................................68 
   2.5.1 Fair Trading Prices..........................................................................69 
   2.5.2 Fair Disclosure................................................................................70 
   2.5.3 Misbehaviour by Managers.............................................................70 
   2.5.4 Finding Sound Financial Regulations.............................................71 
2.6 Protection under Other Laws ................................................................71 
 vi 
 
   2.6.1 Fraud and Bribery Legislation ........................................................72 
   2.6.2 Protection under Company Law......................................................76  
   2.6.3 Protection under Accounting Law...................................................79 
2.7 Conclusion……………………………………...……………………..83 
 
Chapter Three 
Insider Dealing 
 
3.1 Introduction ..........................................................................................85 
3.2 Background of insider dealing .............................................................86 
3.3 Definition of insider dealing .................................................................88 
3.4 Debate over insider dealing ..................................................................91 
   3.4.1 Manne argument .............................................................................92 
   3.4.2 Moral principles argument .............................................................94 
     3.4.2.1 Unfairness and harm ..................................................................94 
     3.4.2.2 Fraud ..........................................................................................95 
     3.4.2.3 Easy Money ...............................................................................96 
3.5 Developments in the United States against insider dealing .................97 
   3.5.1 Pre-Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) .................................98 
   3.5.2 The SEC Era ...................................................................................98 
     3.5.2.1 The Disclose or Abstain Rule ....................................................99 
     3.5.2.2 Rule 14e-3 ...............................................................................101 
     3.5.2.3 Misappropriation .....................................................................102 
 vii 
 
     3.5.2.4 Tipping ....................................................................................104 
     3.5.2.5 Rule 10b5-1 and rule 10b5-2 in 2000 ......................................105 
3.6 Developments in the United Kingdom against insider dealing...........108 
   3.6.1 1980-1993......................................................................................108  
   3.6.2 2000...............................................................................................109 
   3.6.3 2005...............................................................................................111 
3.7 Insider dealing under Kuwaiti, Saudi and Qatari laws .......................115 
   3.7.1 Regulation ....................................................................................116 
   3.7.2 Definition ......................................................................................118 
     3.7.2.1 Kuwaiti law ...........................................................................  118 
     3.7.2.2 Saudi law ...............................................................................  120 
     3.7.2.3 Qatari law ..............................................................................  122 
3.8 Dealing with insider dealing  in Kuwait............................................. 123 
   3.8.1 A Sound Definition ......................................................................123 
   3.8.2 Sanctions...................................................................................... 127 
   3.8.3 Criminal or civil enforcement …..………………..……………. 130 
3.9 Conclusion ……………..……………………………………………131 
 
Chapter Four 
Disclosure of Inside Information by Listed Companies 
 
4.1 Introduction ………………………………………………………....133 
4.2 The Regulatory Framework for Disclosure ………...................…….135 
 viii 
 
   4.2.1 United Kingdom ...........................................................................136 
   4.2.2 Kuwait, Qatar and Saudi ..............................................................138 
4.3 Listing Rules........................................................................................139 
   4.3.1 What are Listing Rules? ...............................................................139 
   4.3.2 Sanctions for Breach of Listing Rules...........................................143 
     4.3.2.1 Cancellation  ............................................................................144 
     4.3.2.2 Suspension  ..............................................................................145 
4.4 What is Disclosure of Inside Information? .........................................147  
4.5 Control of the Disclosure …………………………………….……..150 
4.6 Delay and Extent of Disclosure ……………………..………………152 
   4.6.1 Delay in Full Disclosure ………………………………….……..152 
   4.6.2 Limited Disclosure .......................................................................154 
   4.6.3 Initial and Final Disclosure ..........................................................155 
   4.6.4 Exemption from Disclosure ..........................................................156 
4.7 Dealing with Rumours ........................................................................157 
4.8 Improving the Disclosure Regime in Kuwait......................................159 
   4.8.1 Listing Principles ………………………………………….…….159 
   4.8.2 Directors’ Responsibilities for Controlling Disclosure ................160 
   4.8.3 Insiders’ Lists ...……………………………………...………… 162 
   4.8.4 An Adviser ………………………………………….…………..163 
   4.8.5 The Reasonable Investor Standard ………………………….…..164 
   4.8.6 Weekend Disclosure .....................................................................165 
   4.8.7 Form of the Disclosure .................................................................166 
 ix 
 
4.9 Sanctions ……………..……………………………………………..167 
   4.9.1 Administrative (civil) fines …......................................................167 
   4.9.2  Criminal  Sanctions  ....................................................................168 
4.10 Conclusion ........................................................................................170 
 
Chapter Five 
Corporate governance of listed companies 
 
5.1 Introduction ........................................................................................172 
5.2 What is Corporate Governance? .........................................................176 
   5.2.1 Definition ......................................................................................176 
   5.2.2 Aim of corporate governance .......................................................178 
   5.2.3 Corporate Governance principles .................................................180 
5.3 The Effect on Investors of  Failures of Corporate Governance  ....... 181 
5.4 No One Size Fits All ………………………………………………..184 
5.5 Corporate Governance in the UK .......................................................186 
5.6 Corporate Governance in Kuwait, Qatar and Saudi............................189 
   5.6.1 Existing Corporate Governance Provisions relating to Listed 
Companies ......................................................................................189 
   5.6.2 Kuwait, Qatar and Saudi Codes....................................................190 
     5.6.2.1 Corporate Governance Principles in Kuwait, Qatar and Saudi........192 
     5.6.2.2 Corporate Governance Sub-Principles in Kuwait, Qatar and 
Saudi................................................................................................193 
 x 
 
     5.6.2.3 Corporate Governance Provisions in Kuwait, Qatar and 
Saudi................................................................................................195 
5.7 Enforcement of Corporate Governance ..............................................197 
5.8 Conclusion ..........................................................................................203 
 
Chapter Six 
Sound Regulatory Authority 
 
6.1 Introduction …………………………………………………..……..204 
6.2 Sound Independent Regulatory Authority……………………...……205 
   6.2.1 Regulatory Authority in the UK…………………………………206 
     6.2.1.1 No-Statutes Era ……………………………………………....206  
     6.2.1.2 Period Between 1986 and 2001 …...……………………..…..206 
     6.2.1.3 Period between 2001 and 2012  ………………………….….207 
     6.2.1.4 Period after 2012  ………….……………………………..….209 
   6.2.2 Regulatory Authority in Kuwait, Qatar and Saudi........................212 
     6.2.2.1 Composition ………………………………………………....212 
     6.2.2.2 Funding Arrangements…………………………………….…216 
     6.2.2.3 Accountability …………………………………...…………..218 
6.3 Sound Legal Framework ………………………………………..…..220 
   6.3.1 How can a Regulatory Authority help to Improve the Law? ........222 
   6.3.2 Rule Making by a Regulatory Authority  ………………...……..225 
   6.3.3 Comply or Explain Regime  ……………………………….……227 
 xi 
 
6.4 Creating Strong Investors ………………………………………...…231 
   6.4.1 Investors’ Complaints and Education in the UK ………………..232 
     6.4.1.1 Financial Complaint in the UK ………………………….…..233 
     6.4.1.2 Financial Education in the UK  …………………………..….235 
   6.4.2 The Situation in Kuwait, Qatar and Saudi.....................................237 
     6.4.2.1 Individuals’ Dispute Resolution in Kuwait, Qatar and Saudi  .......237 
     6.4.2.2 Education in Kuwait, Qatar and Saudi   ………..................…240 
6.5 Conclusion ………………………………………………………..…241 
 
Chapter Seven 
Conclusion and Recommendations 
 
7.1 Findings of the Study....……………………………………….…….243 
7.2 Recommendations for Reform in Kuwait………………………...…261 
7.3 Recommendations for Further Research………………………….....268 
7.4 Final observation.................................................................................272 
Bibliography……………………………………………………………..273 
Appendix 1……………………………………………………………....291  
Appendix 2………………………………………………………………294 
 xii 
 
List of legislation 
Acts 
UK  
Bank of England Act 1998 
Bribery Act 2010 
Consumer Protection from Unfair Trading Regulations 2008 
Companies Act 1947 
Companies Act 1980 
Companies Act 2006 
Companies (Audit, Investigations and Community Enterprise) Act 2004 
Criminal Justice Act 1993 
Financial Services Act 1986 
Financial Services Act 2010 
Financial Services Act 2012 
Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 
Fraud Act 2006 
Investment Act 1958 
 
USA  
Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act 1988 (ITSFEA)  
Sarbanes Oxley Act (SOX) 2002 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 
Securities Act 1933 
 
 
 xiii 
 
European  
Directive 2006/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 June 2006 
amending Council Directive 78/660/EEC in the annual accounts of certain types of 
companies, 83/349/EEC on consolidated accounts, 86/635/EEC on the annual 
accounts and consolidated accounts of banks and other financial institutions and 
91/674/EEC on the annual accounts and consolidated accounts of insurance 
undertakings. 
Directive 2013/34/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 
on the annual financial statements, consolidated financial statements and related 
reports of certain types of undertakings, amending Directive 2006/43/EC of the 
European Parliament and of the Council and repealing Council Directives 
78/660/EEC and 83/349/EEC.  
Regulation (EC) No 1606/2002 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 
July 2002 on the application of international accounting standards. 
Directive 2004/109/ EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 December 
2004 on the harmonisation of transparency requirements in relation to information 
about issuers whose securities are admitted to trading on a regulated market and 
amending Directive 2001/34/EC. 
The second one is the directive No. 2014/57/EC on the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 16 April 2014 on Criminal Sanctions for Market Abuse 
Directive No. 596/214 (Regulation No.596/2014 the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 16 April 2014 on Market Abuse (Market Abuse Regulation) and repealing 
Directive 2003/6/EC of the  European Parliament and the Council Commission 
Directives 2003/124/EU, 2003/125/EC, 2004/72/EC) 
Directive 2004/39/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 April 2004 
on markets in financial instruments amending Council Directives 85/611/EEC and 
93/6/EEC and Directive 2000/12/EEC of  the European Parliament and of the 
Council and repealing Council Directive 93/22/EEC. 
Council Directive 89/592/EEC of 13 November 1989 coordinating regulations on 
insider dealing.  
 xiv 
 
Directive 2003/6/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 28 January 2003 
on insider dealing and market manipulation (market abuse).  
Directive 2014/56/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 April 2014 
amending Directive 2006/43/EC on statutory audits of annual account and 
consolidated accounts.   
Directive 2006/43/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 May 2006 
on statutory audits of annual accounts and consolidated accounts, amending Council 
Directives 78/660/EEC and 83/349/EEC and repealing Council Directive 
84/253/EEC. 
 
Kuwait  
Companies Law No 97 of 2013 
Law No.116 of 2013 regarding the Promotion of Direct Investment in Kuwait. 
Companies Law No 25 of 2012 
Kuwait Capital Markets Act 2010 
Kuwaiti Criminal Law enacted 1960, amended 1970 and 2010 
Law Decree No 2 of 2009 with Regard to Reinforcing the Financial Stability in the 
State 
Law No 30 of 2008 with Regard to Guaranteeing the Deposits at Local Banks in the 
State of Kuwait  
Emiri Decree No 158 of 2005 concerning the amendment of some articles of the decree 
organising the Kuwait Stock Exchange 
Law 35 of 2002 Regarding Combating Money Laundering Operations 
Law No. 8 of 2001 regarding the regulation of Direct Investment of Capital in Kuwait. 
Law No 20 of 2000 allowing non-Kuwaiti investors to own shares in Kuwaiti 
shareholding companies 
Law No 2 of 1999 Requiring the Disclosure of Significant Shareholdings  
Law No 11 of 1998 Associated Laws Licensing Investment Companies 
 xv 
 
Law No 41 of 1993 Concerning State Purchase of Select Debts and Collection 
Procedure 
Emiri Decree No 124 of 1992 concerning degrees and salaries of judges, prosecutors, 
and the Fatwa and Legislature.    
Emiri Decree No 43 of 1992 concerning establishing Youth and Sport Public Authority 
Law No 31 of 1990 Regulating the Trading of Securities and Investment Funds 
Law No 42 of 1984 Regulating Share Dealing and Securities Trading 
Emiri Decree of 1983 Organising the Kuwait Stock Exchange 
Emiri Decree No 47 of 1982 establishing the Public Authority for Investment 
Emiri Decree No 47 of 1982 concerning establishing the Public Authority for 
Investment 
Law No 32 of 1970 Regulating the Negotiation and Transaction of Company Securities 
Law No 32 of 1968, concerning currency, the Central Bank of Kuwait and the 
Organisation of Banking Business 
Law No 30 of 1964 concerning establishing the Audit Bureau 
Law No 15 of 1960 concerning Companies law 
Kuwaiti Constitution 1960 
 
Saudi Arabia 
Saudi Capital Market Law 2003 
Saudi Arabia Anti Bribery Regulation 1991 
Saudi Company Law 1965, amended in 1978 by royal decrees 
Companies Act 1965 
 
 
Qatar  
Law No 8 of 2012 regarding the Qatar Financial Markets Authority 
 xvi 
 
Law No 33 of 2005 regarding Qatar’s financial markets authority, as amended by Law 
No 10 of 2009 
Qatari Law No 11 of 2004 issuing the Penal Code 
Companies Act 2002 
Qatar Constitution 1970 
 
Rules  
UK  
Disclosure and Transparency Rules (DTR) are part of the listing rules in the Financial 
Conduct Authority Handbook  
Principles for Businesses (PRIN) in the Financial Conduct Authority Handbook 
Listing Principles (LP) in the Financial Conduct Authority Handbook 
Listing Rules (LR) are part of the listing rules in the Financial Conduct Authority 
Handbook. 
 
USA 
Rule 10b5-1 and rule 10b5-2 in 2000 
The Disclose or Abstain Rule 
Rule 14e-3  
Rule 10b-5 promulgated in 1942  
 
Kuwait  
Rule No. 2 of 2012 relating to disclosure  
Rule No. 3 of 2011 relating to listing  
Executive Regulations of Kuwait Capital Markets Act 2010 
 
 xvii 
 
Saudi  
Listing Rules 2012  
Market Conduct Regulations in Saudi Arabia 2004 
 
Qatar 
Offering and Listing Rulebook of Securities (Listing Rules) 2010 
 
Codes 
UK 
UK  Corporate Governance Code 2012 
Code of Practice for Ministerial Appointment to Public Bodies 2012 
Stewardship Code 2010 
Combined Code 1998 
Cadbury Code 1992 
 
Kuwait, Saudi and Qatar codes  
Kuwait Corporate Governance Codes 2013  
Qatar Corporate Governance Codes 2009         
Saudi Corporate Governance Code 2006  
 xvii 
 
List of Cases and Enforcement Decisions 
 
Cases  
USA 
Arthur Andersen LLP v United States 544 US 696 (2005) 
Cady, Roberts & Co 40 SEC 907 (1961) 
Chiarella v United States 445 US 222 (1980) 
Dirks v SEC 463 US 646 (1983) 
SEC v Adler 137 F 3d 1325, 1337 (11
th
 Cir 1998) 
US v O'Hagan 117 S Ct 2199, 2211 (1997) 
US v Teicher 987 F 2d 112, 120-21 (2d Cir) cert denied, 510 US 976 (1993)   
United States v Chessman, 947 F 2d 551 (2d Cir 1991) the Second Circuit 
US v Newman 664 F 2d 12 (2
nd
 Cir 1981) 
 
UK 
R v (1) McQuoid (2) Melbourne ([2009] Southwark Crown Court) 
R v Holyoak, Hill and Morl (unreported)  
R v Rigby and Bailey (2005) EWCA Crim 3487 
 
Enforcement Decisions  
UK 
FCA 20/1/2015 an enforcement decision was taken by the FCA 
FSA/PN/024/2013 an enforcement decision was taken by the FSA. 
FSA/PH/031/2013 an enforcement decision was made by the FSA 
FSA/PN/104/2012 an enforcement decision was taken by the FSA. 
 xviii 
 
FSA/PN/015/2011 an enforcement decision taken by the FSA 
FSA/PN/072/2011 an enforcement decision was taken by the FSA 
FSA/PN/036/2010an enforcement decision was made by the FSA 
FSA/PN/102/2010 an enforcement decision was made by the FSA 
FSA/PN/011/2009 an enforcement decision was taken by the FSA 
FSA/PN/015/2009 an enforcement decision was taken by the FSA 
FSA/PN/056/2008 an enforcement decision was made by the FSA. 
49(TCC) UKUT [2011] Upper Tribunal reference FIN/2009/0024 David Messey and 
The Financial Services Authority 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 xix 
 
List of Abbreviations 
 
AIM                                         Alternative Investment Market                                                                   
BCBS                                      Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 
BIS                                          Bank of International Settlements 
BITs                                        Bilateral Investment treaties 
CBK                                        Central Bank of Kuwait 
CFEB                                      Consumer Financial Education Body  
CISs                                        Collective Investment Scheme 
CJA                                         Criminal Justice Act 
DTR                                        Disclosure and Transparency Rules  
FRC                                        Financial Reporting Council  
FCA                                        Financial Conduct Authority 
FINRA                                 Financial Industry Regulation Authority  
FOS                                        Financial Ombudsman Services 
FSMA                                     Financial Services and Markets Act 2000  
FSA                                         Financial Services Authority 
FSB                                         Financial Stability Board 
FSCS                                       Financial Services Compensation Scheme  
FPC                                         Financial Policy Committee             
G20              Group of twenty finance ministers and central bank governors 
GAAP                                     Generally Accepted Accounting Principles                                              
GCC                                        Gulf Cooperation Council  
IASB                                       International Accounting Standards Board 
IFRSs                                      International Financial Reporting Standards    
IMF                                         International Monetary Fund 
 xx 
 
IOSCO                                    International Organisation of Securities Commissions  
KCMA                                    Kuwait Capital Markets Authority 
KFIB                                         Kuwait Foreign Investment Bureau  
KSE                                          Kuwait Stock Exchange 
LSE                                          London Stock Exchange  
LR                                            Listing Rule 
MC                                           Market Committee  
MiFID                                      Markets in Financial Instruments Directive 
MOCI                                       Ministry of Commerce and Trade 
OECD                                       Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
PRA                                          Prudential Regulation Authority 
QCA                                         Quoted Companies Alliance 
QFMA                                      Qatar Financial Markets Authority 
RIS                                           Regulatory Information Service 
SCMA                                      Saudi Capital Markets Authority 
SEC                                          Securities and Exchange Commission  
SIB                                           Securities and Investment Board  
SROs                                        Self-regulatory Organisations 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 xxi 
 
  List of Tables  
 
(Table 1.1)     Types of Shares…………………………………….….......15 
(Table 1.2)   The percentage of GDP growth and the year of passing capital 
markets laws related to the GCC countries….....................27 
(Table 1.3)     Stock Market Indicators........................................................39  
(Table  2.1)    Comparison of Securities and Commercial Paper................58 
(Table 2.2)    Investment Types...................................................................58 
(Table  2.3)    Differences Between Traditional and Securities Markets....61 
(Table 3.1)  Milestones in the Development of Insider Trading in the 
USA..................................................................................108 
(Table 3.2)       Milestones in the Development of Insider Dealing in the 
UK……………………………………………………….115 
(Table  5.1)    Comparison of the Corporate Governance Codes..............197 
(Table 7.1) Comparison of Regulatory Authorities in the UK and 
Kuwait...............................................................................268 
 
 
 
 
 
 xxii 
 
List of Figures 
(Figure 1.1)    Stylised diagram of types of risks facing investors .............20  
(Figure 1.2)     Stylised diagram of the Stock Market Investors’ Direct 
Risks and Protection Methods ...........................................21 
(Figure 2.1)     Stylised diagram of investor types in stock market ………50 
(Figure 2.2)      Stylised  diagram of the parts of the Financial System......52 
(Figure 2.3)  Stylised diagram of the main responsibilities of Kuwait 
Capital Market Authority (KCMA) and the Central Bank of 
Kuwait (CBK) ....................................................................63 
(Figure 6.1)   Milestones in the Development of the Regulatory Authority 
System in the UK..............................................................209 
(Figure 6.2)     Regulatory System in the UK............................................211 
(Figure 7.1)     Types of investor ..............................................................245 
(Figure 7.2)     Investors as a type of financial consumer in the UK ........246 
(Figure 7.3)    Stylised diagram of Key Improvement in Financial Market 
Regulation in the UK........................................................248 
(Figure 7.4)    Stylised diagram of an independent regulatory authority..257 
(Figure 7.5)     Stylised diagram of enforcement powers .........................259 
(Figure 7.6)     Shows a regulatory model for a sound financial system...266 
 1 
 
Chapter One 
Introduction 
 
1.1 The aims of the thesis 
 
In 1982, Kuwait experienced a financial crash which had a profound impact on 
investors and the economy. This was caused by securities trading in an anarchic way in 
a market devoid of regulation. Following the crash the government embarked on a 
programme of regulatory involving the introduction of several pieces of legislation over 
the years culminating in the Capital Market Act 2010. The events of 1982 prompted this 
research into whether the government’s measures to afford better protection to investors 
compare favourably with the measures in place in other jurisdictions. 
   
The research question which this thesis will try to answer is as follows. Does the 
Kuwaiti Capital Market Act 2010 adequately protect individual investors in shares of 
listed companies on the secondary market
1
 of the Kuwaiti Stock Exchange (KSE) from 
insider dealing, unfair disclosure and poor corporate governance by the issuer of the 
securities? 
 
In order to answer this question, the thesis will (a) examine the legal provisions of the 
Act aimed at regulating the above activities (b) examine other relevant  legislation 
which also contains an element of protection for individual investors such as accounting 
law, company law and, fraud and bribery legislation (c)examine the operation and 
powers of the regulatory authority responsible for monitoring compliance with the 
legislation. 
                                                 
1
 Securities markets can be divided into two markets. The first is a primary market; the second is a 
secondary market. The former deals with the issuers’ transactions (selling of securities by issuers), while 
the latter has trading transactions (buying and selling issued securities); Alan Palmiter, Securities 
Regulation: Examples and Explanations (6
th
 edn, Aspen Publishers 2014) 1. 
 2 
 
This thesis will not address the following areas of regulation:
2
 
 Other forms of market abuse such as manipulation. 
 Regulation of financial intermediaries and brokers. 
 Other types of securities such as bonds and derivatives. 
 Other types of financial markets and the primary capital market. 
 Other types of investor such as institutional investors,  
  
One of the aims of the law is to protect people and their property by regulating the 
conduct of individuals, businesses and other organisations in society.
3
 Paul Nelson said 
that ‘law is not a search for the truth. The latter is the province of physical sciences. 
Law, as a social science, is all about understanding and assisting people in their social 
relations’.4 
 
Having social rules is one of the most important differences between human societies 
and animal groups.
5
 The law in the community serves as the heart in the body. Without 
the law, the human community collapses. The strong will control everything regardless 
of whether they have the right to do so, and the weak will have nothing.
6
 In general, law 
aims to protect people, ensuring that all citizens are subject to the law, and the law 
controls the state’s actions.  
 
There are different ways of investing funds. The company or consumer who deposits 
money into an interest bearing account in a bank makes the simplest form of 
investment. After that investments range in complexity.  Investors in shares face 
numerous risks from the conduct of companies, individuals within these companies or 
                                                 
2
 This will be explained in more detail later. 
3
 Henry R Cheeseman, The Legal Environment Of Business and Online Commerce: Business Ethics, E-
Commerce, Regulatory and International Issues (7
th
 edn, Pearson 2013) 3. 
4
 Paul Nelson, Capital Markets Law and Compliance: The Implications of MiFID (Cambridge University 
Press 2011) 7. 
5
 Phil Harris, An Introduction to Law (7
th
 edn, Cambridge University Press 2007) 1. 
6
 Tamer Saleh, Legal Protection for Securities Markets (Dar New University 2011) 9. 
 3 
 
other individuals whose behaviour can harm investors. This will be discussed in more 
detail in chapter two.  
 
This thesis will only consider the risk arising from actions that either affect the traded 
share price or those which affect an investor’s decision to buy or sell. The categorisation 
of this behaviour is jurisdiction specific. The actions or behavior which this thesis will 
deal with are insider dealing and unfair disclosure of inside information which are key 
targets for regulation in virtually every country. It would have been  logical for 
completeness  to consider manipulation as well as insider dealing. However the 
treatment of manipulation by the 2010 Act has already been adequately researched
7
 and 
the Act has not changed since the data of that research. Moreover, there has not been 
any case law in Kuwait which tests the adequacy of the Act in this area. 
 
So  this thesis will consider only the regulation affecting the two activities mentioned 
above . Moreover this thesis will not consider the risk to investors from the mis-selling 
of financial products or services by institutions or intermediaries or the risks from the 
lack of financial or commercial prudence on the part of any financial institutions or 
deposit takers. Nor will this thesis consider other types of financial crime such as money 
laundering, accounting fraud, dishonesty or corruption which have been at the root of 
corporate collapses and scandals in the late 1980s and 1990s. However the thesis will 
examine the measures, in the form of regulatory corporate governance provisions put in 
place to improve corporate accountability of listed company boards in the wake of these 
scandals. This will be discussed in more detail in chapter two. 
 
Most, if not all, countries have regulation in place in order to try to protect investors 
from the various risks. Although shares are corporate financial instruments, corporate 
law alone has been found over the years to be inadequate for the purpose of protecting 
                                                 
7
 A PhD research by Fatemah Al Shuruiain entitled ‘Market Manipulation In Kuwait Stock Exchange: An 
Analysis of the Regulation of Market Manipulation Prior and Under Law 7 of 2010’( PhD dissertation, 
University of Leicester 2013) Available 
at:<https://lra.le.ac.uk/bitstream/2381/28831/1/2013ALshuraianFPhD.pdf> accessed 17 November 2015 
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investors. It has therefore been necessary to introduce specialised securities legislation 
to try to remedy any shortcoming in corporate law. Furthermore, the enforcement of 
such legislation is in the hands of a regulatory body responsible for policing the 
securities legislation and for bringing any civil or criminal actions. 
 
 How civil
8
 and criminal liabilities are underpinned by legislation varies from country to 
country depending on the regulatory framework. For example, in the UK, insider 
dealing is criminalised in the criminal justice Act 1993 and civil sanctions for insider 
dealing and other financial crimes are contained in the Financial Services and Markets 
Act 2000 (FSMA). On the other hand in Kuwait, both civil and criminal liability are 
contained the Capital Market Act 2010. This thesis will only consider civil and criminal 
liability imposed by securities law but not liability incurred under private and criminal 
law in general.  
 
To assist in this the law in Qatar, Saudi, the UK
9
 and/or the USA
10
 will be examined in 
order to see how Kuwait’s Act could be improved. It might be argued that one only 
needs   to compare Kuwait with more industrialised  countries such as the UK which has 
a long history and experience of financial regulation. However  Qatar and Saudi have 
also been included in the comparison since they are broadly at the same level of 
development as Kuwait, so they might have  some things which are implemented 
differently to the UK taking into account the local culture and law. Moreover, including 
Qatar and Saudi has contributed further to the originality of the research which could be 
of interest not only to the Kuwaiti authority but also to the Qatari and Saudi authorities.  
 
                                                 
8
 This thesis will not consider civil or tortious liability of a company to an investor by reason of the 
former’s breaches of securities or other law.  
9
 The UK has a long history of dealing with these problems. Moreover, since 2000 the UK has adopted 
European Directives in this area therefore it is felt that the situation in the UK would be representative of 
the whole of the EU. 
10
 The USA will be considered only in connection with insider dealing (Chapter Three) because the 
history of insider dealing there is much longer than in other jurisdictions.  
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The primary aim of this thesis is to seek a detailed understanding of the Act in terms of 
protecting individual investors
11
 focusing on whether it offers them appropriate 
protection 
12
 and, if applicable, suggesting amendments to the law. It is hoped that the 
research will be a significant addition to the body of literature in this field and of value 
to Kuwaiti legislators when considering amendments to the law. 
 
Major economies, such as those in the United Kingdom (UK) and the United States 
(US), have legislation to ensure that investors are adequately protected. This legislation 
has evolved over the years in an effort to increase the level of protection. For example, 
in the UK, the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) has two kinds of objectives. The first 
is a strategic objective to ensure that the relative markets
13
 function well. The second 
are operational objectives to secure an appropriate degree of protection for consumers, 
                                                 
11
 Article 3 of the Act concerning the establishment of capital markets provides: 
The Authority aims to: 1. Organise the securities business in line with the principles of 
equity, efficiency, competitiveness and transparency. 2. Make the public aware of the 
security business and its benefits, risks and obligations associated with the investment 
in securities, and urge for the development thereof. 3. Provide protection for those 
involved in the securities business. 4. Minimise the standard risks expected to arise in 
the securities business. 5. Implement the full disclosure policy in a way to realise equity 
and transparency and to prevent conflicts of interest and insider trading. 6. Seek to 
ensure compliance with the laws and regulations related to securities activity.  
It is important, therefore, to discover the protection provided by this law mentioned in Article 3, part 3. 
12
 The word ‘invest’ comes from the Latin verb ‘investire’, which means to clothe and adorn. By 1613, as 
a result of developments in using the English Language, the word bore a financial connotation. Another 
meaning of the verb ‘to invest’ was used to point out the expectation of interest or profit from the 
employment of money, according to the Oxford Shorter English Dictionary; Jonathan Fisher, Jane 
Bewsey, Malcolm Waters, Elizabeth Ovey, The Law of Investor Protection (2
nd
 edn, Sweet & Maxwell 
2003) 5. 
13
 According to part 1A, section 1F of the Financial Services Act 2012, relative markets are ‘1- the 
financial markets; 2- the markets for regulated financial services; 3- the markets for services provided by 
persons other than authorised persons in carrying on regulated activities but provided without 
contravening the general prohibition’.  
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to protect and enhance the integrity of the UK financial systems,
14
 and to promote 
effective competition in the interest of consumers.
15
 By comparison with the UK and the 
US, the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries are still at the beginning of their 
evolutionary process to improve investor protection.  
 
In Kuwait, during the financial crash period, there was limited regulation of stock 
exchange activities, although the financial market in Kuwait had existed longer than the 
financial markets in the other gulf countries. This gap in legislation was highlighted by 
the Suq al-Manakh crisis, when the absence of regulation resulted in heavy losses for 
large and small investors. This led the Government of Kuwait to enact a series of Acts 
from the late 1970s to 2010 as follows:
16
 
 Law No 32 of 1970 Regulating the Negotiation and Transaction of Company 
Securities; 
 Emiri Decree of 1983 Organising the Kuwait Stock Exchange;17 
 Law 42 of 1984 Regulating Share Dealing and Securities Trading; 
 Law 31 of 1990 Regulating the Trading of Securities and Investment Funds; 
                                                 
14
 According to part 1A, section 1I of the Financial Services Act 2012, the UK financial systems includes 
‘a) financial markets and exchanges; b) regulated activities; c) other activities connected with financial 
markets and exchanges’.  
15
 Financial Services Act 2012, pt 1A s 1B.  
16
 The explanatory memorandum to the Act states that the legislation that preceded the Act became the 
cornerstone in establishing the Kuwait Stock Exchange, contributed to the market’s revitalisation and 
economic development, and, over the past few years, led the market to become a leading regional market 
and the focus of attention of investors. Yet, several reasons were offered for changing the law. The first 
reason was to keep up with global developments in financial markets, such as, for instance, the fall of 
barriers and obstacles that hindered the movement of capital, from which emerged features of the new 
world order with competition and free trade. The second reason was to adapt to developments in the 
Kuwaiti stock exchange. Finally, the stock market operation revealed some shortcomings in the legal 
system and the legislative framework governing the stock exchange, especially the need to develop 
monitoring, to provide greater flexibility in dealing, to enhance procedures, to provide legal protection in 
the market, especially for small investors, and to reduce manipulation to make a profit illegally. It is 
important, therefore, to explore the protection afforded by this law by discussing and analysing the legal 
framework in the form of a comparative study. 
17
 The legislative basis regulating the stock exchange until the issuing of the Act.  
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 Law 11 of 1998 Associated Laws Licensing Investment Companies; 
 Law 2 of 1999 Requiring the Disclosure of Significant Shareholdings;  
 
The securities market was built around this legislation, which helped to stimulate the 
economy by attracting investors. However, the practical application of these laws 
brought to light some shortcomings in the regulation of the stock exchange
18
 and 
specifically the need for the legal protection of individual investors against the risk of 
loss due to market abuse of securities (manipulation and insider dealing). Accordingly, 
the 2010 Act was passed to regulate the administration of the stock exchange and the 
trading of securities. 
 
The 2010 Act was passed to protect all investors local and foreign. However foreign 
investors have additional protection. First there are 80 Bilateral Investment treaties 
(BITs) between Kuwait and other countries around 28 of which are not in force and 
three have been terminated
19
. Secondly in 2013 Kuwait established a new independent 
body
20
 called the Kuwait Direct Investment Promotion Authority
21
 that aims to improve 
the investment climate, fostering competitiveness and adding investment opportunities 
for local and foreign investors.
22
 This regulation provides other types of protection such 
as non discrimination between local and foreign investors, how to use, enjoy or disposal 
of investments and maintain a favorable environment for investment. These types of 
additional protection are beyond the scope of the thesis because the thesis will just focus 
on securities law.  
 
                                                 
18
 The Kuwaiti legislature has defined Stock Exchange as follows: ‘A Stock Exchange Market is the place 
where stocks and other securities are bought and sold. A Stock Exchange Market follows the procedures 
applicable to trading and carries out the usual functions of a stock market in accordance with the 
standards and regulations issued by the Authority’ Kuwaiti Capital Markets Act 2010, Article 31. 
19
 <http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/IIA/CountryBits/112>  accessed 4 October 2015 
20
 This authority replaced the Kuwait Foreign Investment Bureau (KFIB) which was established under the 
Law No. 8 of 2001 regarding the regulation of Direct Investment of Capital in Kuwait. 
21
 <http://www.kfib.com.kw/> accessed 4 October 2015. 
22
 Law No.116 of 2013 regarding the Promoting of Direct Investment in Kuwait. 
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The research will trace the historical development of the legislation relating to the stock 
exchange up to the enactment of the Act and will evaluate that law and generate 
recommendations and amendments required to enhance its effectiveness. Therefore, the 
research mainly aims to assist the legislature of Kuwait in reforming legislation to 
benefit those who invest their savings in the stock market, so as to revitalise investment 
by protecting investors against sudden fluctuations due to fraud in the market and other 
threats. Indirectly, the thesis also aims to improve the Kuwaiti people’s knowledge 
about securities, to enhance their general knowledge and understanding of securities 
law, and to open a new field of research to be explored by other students for the 
improvement and development of the national economy. 
 
1.2 The benefits of the thesis 
 
Stock exchanges are at the same time important and dangerous, possessing the potential 
to develop a country or to destroy it. A clear example of the potential danger is shown 
by the Suq al-Manakh Crisis, which will be discussed in detail later. 
 
There are two potential benefits of this research. First to highlight any weaknesses in 
detail of the 2010 Act in terms of the protection which it affords individual investors in 
securities so that the Act can be improved.  Secondly to  provide original research which 
will be of interest and benefit to scholars, policy makers, government officials, law 
enforcement and others with an interest in this area in Kuwait. 
 
 
1.3 Methodology 
 
There are a number of legal research methodologies, and one tries to select a 
methodology to suit a particular thesis. In addition, arguably, a piece of research can 
include more than one type of methodology. Therefore, it is difficult to find a single, 
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perfect or correct methodology. Moreover, ‘there is no wrong or right methodology’.23 
Rather, a methodology is chosen to achieve the aims of a thesis.  
 
Solving legal problems and finding the best way to apply special laws can be 
highlighted by using a comparative legal analysis. This type of methodology helps 
scholars to look outside of a country’s laws to understand how other jurisdictions deal 
with similar problems and how they develop their laws and rules.
24
 The significant 
increase in the importance of comparative law in the present era is well documented. 
Comparative law means the comparison of diverse laws of different nations around the 
world. According to Zweigert and Kotz, the use of a comparative approach to the study 
of law started to develop in Paris around 1900 and it is still an approach which is now 
widely used.
25
 
 
The use of a comparative law approach is appropriate when people are at similar stages 
of economic development and culture. This can be found in the GCC countries, which 
share the same language, customs and history and are located near to each other. 
However, a comparison with more developed countries is beneficial in order to learn 
from their experience. As a result, the use of a comparative law approach in this thesis 
helps to determine which laws and regulations are the best. The use of a comparative 
law approach can produce a wide range of model solutions, because the different laws 
can provide a variety of answers to difficult issues. This variety enriches and expands 
the supply of solutions, increases the opportunity to discover the best solution, and is 
beneficial for legal reform. Without the assistance of a comparative law approach, it 
would be difficult to reform legislation and to develop new laws.
26
  
 
This thesis will be underpinned by a comparative legal analysis of the laws and rules of 
the GCC countries relating to securities in an effort to improve Kuwaiti law and 
                                                 
23
 Caroline Morris and Cian Murphy, Getting a PhD in Law (Hart 2011) 40. 
24
 ibid 37. 
25
 K Zweigert and H Kotz, An Introduction to Comparative Law (3
rd
 edn, OUP 1998) 3. 
26
 ibid 15. 
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regulation. Accordingly, the study will attempt to identify the shortcomings in the Act 
that need to be remedied by comparison with similar securities laws of the GCC. In 
some areas within this thesis, the comparative law approach will be extended to some 
developed countries, such as the US and the UK. For example, the US has a long history 
and good experience of banning insider dealing. Therefore, it is wise and useful to 
discuss the American regime in connection with insider dealing. In addition, the UK has 
passed legislation in this area, such as the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 
(FSMA) and the Criminal Justice Act 1993. In the field of financial regulation, both the 
UK (common law system)
27
 and the Gulf (civil and Shari’ah legal system) have clear 
rules despite having different legal systems, which has made a comparison easier. 
 
Extensive use will be made of primary sources, such as legislation and regulatory rules, 
to achieve the objectives of this thesis. These laws and rules will be compared and 
analysed as well as reports from international institutions, and, where applicable, legal 
precedents established by the courts. Textbooks, journals and relevant websites 
published by legal experts and other scholars relating to the subject of this thesis will 
also be discussed to enrich the search. The Oxford Standard for the Citation of Legal 
Authorities (OSCOLA-Fourth edition)
28
 has been adopted with regard to thesis style, 
bibliography and footnotes. .    
 
1.4 Organisation of the thesis 
To achieve the aims of this study, this thesis is divided into seven chapters. 
 
The first chapter covers the aims of the thesis, its benefits and the methodology used. It 
also addresses the difficulties and limits of the thesis, the historical developments of the 
                                                 
27
 For example, in the UK, an act of parliament is higher than case law. In common law system countries 
such as the UK, parliament can be described as the highest law-making court above any other. Ulrike 
Muessig, ‘Superior Court in Early-Modern France, England and the Holy Roman Empire’ in Paul Brand 
and Joshua Getzler (eds), Judges and Judging in the History of the Common Law and Civil Law (CUP 
2012) 220. 
28
 <www.law.ox.ac.uk/oscola> accessed 24 December 2012. 
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Kuwait Stock Exchange, the Suq al-Manakh Crisis, the historical development of the 
stock exchange in the Arabian Gulf Region and the historical development of legal 
systems in Kuwait, Qatar and Saudi Arabia. Chapter Two will discuss the concept of 
protecting investors under securities law, which has four elements: the investors, the 
securities, the securities law and the protection of investors. Each of the elements will 
be introduced. Some countries, such as the UK, regulate securities as a part of the whole 
financial system called ‘Financial Regulation’, while other countries, such as the GCC, 
regulate securities in separate and special laws called ‘Securities Laws’. An introduction 
to financial regulation and other laws that protect investors will be presented. This 
chapter will discuss the protection of retail investors and small, private and individual 
investors on stock exchanges in secondary markets. The ways of protecting the 
securities market differ from the ways of protecting the traditional market. This chapter 
will consider how to protect investors in securities markets and the areas of protection, 
because there is no clear definition of ‘protecting investors’. This chapter will outline 
the risks that investors face. The first task is to find a fair share price that has not been 
influenced by market abuse (insider dealing). The second task is to give investors access 
to information on which they can make informed buying or selling decisions. The third 
task is to protect investors from bad behaviour by managers. The body of law dealing 
with this is known as corporate governance law and it spans different pieces of 
legislation. This thesis will only consider the corporate governance provisions contained 
within securities legislation. The fourth is to have sound securities regulation in place.  
 
Chapter Three considers insider dealing as an example of market abuse on the stock 
exchange. The background to and the debate surrounding insider dealing will be 
discussed. The existing legal framework for the regulation of insider dealing in the 
Kuwait, Qatar and Saudi stock markets will also be discussed in this chapter. It will 
look at the experience of the US and the UK in this field with a comparison between the 
American and the British regimes. There are three important issues which must be 
addressed to deal effectively with insider dealing: the definition of insider dealing, the 
sanctions which should be available and the method of enforcement of these sanctions 
under securities law. 
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Chapter Four will focus on the disclosure of inside information by listed companies, 
because fair disclosure is one way to protect investors by ensuring that all investors 
have equal opportunity to access and be aware of information that is likely to affect the 
share price in an appropriate time and way. This chapter will examine the existing 
disclosure rules which apply to equity shares in Kuwait compared to the disclosure 
regime in Qatar, Saudi and the UK as an example of developed countries. This chapter 
will define inside information in each jurisdiction studied  and will set out a suitable 
time for information disclosure. Delay in full disclosure, limited disclosure, initial and 
final disclosure, exemption from disclosure, and dealing with rumours will all be 
addressed. Ways to improve the disclosure regime will be analysed in this chapter. 
Since laws must punish those who breach the information disclosure regime, the 
criminal sanctions  and the administrative sanctions under securities law available will 
also be considered. 
 
Chapter Five is about corporate governance of listed companies under securities law. 
This chapter will define corporate governance and review some of its better known 
failures. It will review some of the corporate governance principles in existence in the 
UK, Saudi and Qatar, and the enforcement methods in the UK, to compare them with 
measures in place in Kuwait with a view to determining whether the latter adequately 
protect investors. 
 
Chapter Six will focus on having a sound regulatory authority. For a regulatory 
authority to protect investors effectively, it must be independent, introduce sound 
regulation and create strong investors, all of which will be discussed. This chapter will 
look at the regulatory authority in the UK, because securities authorities in Kuwait, 
Qatar and Saudi were established only recently. To assess their adequacy, it is helpful to 
compare them with a system such as the UK, which has existed for much longer. The 
soundness and independence of the regulatory authority in Kuwait will be assessed in 
terms of its composition, funding arrangements, accountability and freedom of action 
from political and commercial interference. A regulatory framework that protects 
investors must have laws, rules and codes. This chapter will consider how a regulatory 
authority can help to combat more effectively the crime of insider dealing. It will study 
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what is sometimes referred to as ‘Hard Law’, which includes rule making, and so-called 
‘Soft Law’, which refers to statements of principles, codes of conduct, codes of practice 
and guidance. A regulatory authority can play a significant role in ensuring that 
investors receive clear and adequate information about the market, the risk and their 
rights. This will be discussed in this chapter. Chapter Seven will conclude the thesis. 
 
1.5 Difficulties  
 
Undertaking the research for this thesis was made more complicated for three reasons. 
First, securities law is among the most complex and misunderstood areas of law. There 
are a lot of conflicting ideas about securities law. Not surprisingly, some describe 
securities law as a puzzle.
29
 Secondly, in GCC countries, this subject is poorly 
documented. These factors have made this study more complicated. Nevertheless, 
investors in these countries need be aware of the law and the limited protection that it 
affords them, which requires that securities law be studied and analysed by students and 
experts. 
 
Another difficulty of this research is that financial laws and regulations in the markets 
under consideration namely the UK and the Gulf have been continually changing during 
the course of this research, especially because of the global financial crisis of 2008. 
Many laws have been passed by governments and global institutions to make financial 
regulation more effective. For example, the financial regulatory system in the UK was 
restructured and some of the Gulf countries, notably Qatar, passed a new law in 2012 
which repealed the law of 2005.  
 
 
 
                                                 
29
 Securities law has a reputation for being one of the most difficult areas of law. In particular, the 
Securities Act 1933 in the US is so complex that students and lawyers cannot master it on their own; 
Larry Soderquist and Theresa Gabaldon, Securities Law (5
th
  edn, Foundation Press 2014)1.  
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1.6 Scope of the Research 
 
This thesis will concentrate on how best to protect an individual investor who buys 
shares in a listed company on a stock exchange on a secondary market and not on a 
primary market where shares are initially offered. It is beyond the scope of this research 
to look at protection in the primary market because the protection techniques are 
different from those of a secondary market. The research will not address the protection 
of individual investors from the risk associated with the purchase of financial products 
offered by deposit takers, insurance companies and any other financial services 
companies, nor will it address any compensation mechanisms such as the Financial 
Services Compensation Scheme (FSCS) in the UK. This thesis will also not cover the 
methods of protection of investors from the actions of financial advisers. Therefore, the 
scope of this thesis will be limited to five points: shares, stock exchange, secondary 
markets, listed companies and individual investors. 
 
The major share of market trading in GCC countries is by individual investors. For 
example, in Kuwait,
30
 the volume traded by individual investors is approximately 60% 
of the whole official market trade,
31
 while in developed countries the major share of the 
market is held by institutional investors. For example, in the UK individual shareholders 
own approximately 11.5% of the equities, while in the 1960s the percentage was 
approximately 54%.
32
. 
 
Individual investors and listed companies will be discussed in Chapters Two and Four, 
respectively. The following sets out the definition of shares and some ideas about stock 
exchanges and secondary markets.  
                                                 
30
 <http://www.kuwaitse.com/A/KSE/TradeVolReport.aspx> accessed 23 April 2014. 
31
 For the trading period from 1/1/2013 to 30/11/2013. 
32
 The Key Review of the UK Equity Markets and Long Term Decision Marking: Final Report 
<https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/31544/12-631-kay-
review-of-equity-markets-interim-report.pdf> accessed 20 May 2014. 
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1.6.1 Shares  
Although there are many different types of shares, this thesis will focus on ordinary 
shares known as ‘equities’. In the UK, stocks means the same as shares. The table below 
(Table 1.1) shows different types of share.
33
 
 
Name Definition 
Ordinary shares Each ordinary share has an equal stake in the company and 
one equal vote. 
Preference shares Investors receives a set rate of interest like loans. 
Their dividend should be paid before ordinary shares. 
In the event of liquidation, preference shares should be paid 
off before ordinary shares. 
Ordinary shares with 
additional rights  
These different classes carry differing rights to vote or for 
dividends or to participate in the surplus on a winding up. 
Convertible shares Convertible to debt in some circumstances. 
Golden shares Outvote all other shares put together. 
Used by the government when the national interest is at risk 
in a privatised company. 
Vendor shares
34
 In an acquisition matter, instead of paying cash, a company 
issues new shares to be given to the seller. 
Table 1.1 Types of Shares 
 
The main benefits derived from buying shares include capital gain (growth),
35
 income 
(dividends),
36
 and the ability to convert shares to cash quickly
37
.
38
 Owners of ordinary 
                                                 
33
  Rodney Hobson, Shares Made Simple: A Beginner’s Guide to the Stock Market ( 2nd edn, Hamman 
House 2012)  3-8. 
34
 ibid 10. 
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shares share profit (dividends), vote in company decision-making, and have the right to 
attend an annual meeting.
39
 Usually, the buyers of ordinary shares in particular 
companies will be the part-owners of those companies.
40
 However, there is a debate 
about whether the shareholder just owns the profit while the company owns itself, but 
this is outside the scope of the thesis. 
 
On the other hand, although shares have a better return over a long period of time than 
other main investment types (namely bonds, cash, and property), there are three risks. 
There is no legal right to receive a dividend. The company can either distribute profits 
or reinvest them in their business or use them for an acquisition.
41
 The second risk is the 
economic risk arising when the share price drops if people change their ideas about the 
company and they no longer want to invest in it, or when a company does not perform 
as expected. In recent years another type of risk has arisen known as a legal risk against 
                                                                                                                                               
35
 This means when the companies increase in value, the share price will usually go up and they will be 
worth more. 
36
 Dividends are an income similar to interest. However, interest is paid to depositors who place their 
money in a bank, while dividends are paid to shareholders who buy shares of a company. Deposits in a 
bank pay an income which depends on interest rates. It is automatic. No one needs to approve it. While 
dividends from shares are not automatically paid if the company makes a profit. It is up to the board.  
37
 This means owners of shares have the right to sell their shares at any time during the listing period  in a 
stock exchange in an easy way. 
38
 Thomas Anthony Guerriero, How to Understand and Master Securities Laws & Regulations (E- Books 
2012, iPad) 78. 
39
 Rodney Hobson (n 35) 3. 
40
 It is generally accepted that the separation of ownership and control of the company is at the root of the 
corporate governance problem. How owners and managers interact with each other is the subject of 
different theories, the most popular of which is the agency theory. Agency theory describes the relation 
between shareholders and managers as a contractual one similar to that between a principal and an agent 
where the latter has a fiduciary duty to the former. However, it is debatable whether shareholders are 
actually owners of the company. Lynn Stout stated that shareholders own a share but the company owns 
itself. It is a separate legal unit and according to company law, directors owe a fiduciary duty to the 
company. Lynn Stout, ‘Corporate governance- what do shareholders really value?’ (YouTube) 
<http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=s5Eoy988728> accessed 20 May 2014. 
41
 Iain G Macneil, An Introduction to The Law on Financial Investment (2nd edn, Hart Publishing Ltd 
2012) 134. 
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the company, which can be defined as a risk of legal action and the fining of a company, 
all of which affects the share price.
42
 The three previous risks are beyond of the scope of 
the thesis because they cannot be avoided.    
 
There are also risks associated with the method of buying shares. There are two ways to 
buy shares, namely direct or indirect purchase. When a person wants to buy shares 
directly, they usually do it through a traditional broker, online broker, or through a 
financial adviser or investment manager who will in turn go through a traditional 
broker.
43
 Indirect buying is when people pool their money with other people so the 
shares will be chosen by a professional fund manager. Indirect investment is known as a 
fund. Fund investment and other types of collective investment scheme is beyond the 
scope of the thesis because it carries different types of risks which need different types 
of protection.   
 
1.6.2 Stock Exchange  
 
An ‘exchange’ is defined as ‘a marketplace in which securities, commodities, 
derivatives and other financial instruments are traded’.44 Shares are traded at a stock 
exchange. Stock markets differ significantly from other commercial markets, as a result 
the effective performance of stock markets demands the implementation of a regulatory 
framework in the form of securities regulations. These are unlike the laws that govern 
other ordinary, non-securities related commercial dealings. The question here is: why do 
stock exchanges need to be regulated? 
 
 
1.6.2.1 Is Regulation of a Stock Exchange Necessary? 
 
                                                 
42
 ibid 24-25. 
43
< https://www.moneyadviceservice.org.uk/en/articles/investing-in-shares> accessed 17 January 2015. 
44
 Thomas Anthony Guerriero (n 40) 58. 
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Whether regulation is necessary or not depends on one’s point of view. People who are 
against market regulation believe in the co-called ‘Efficient Markets Theory’, which 
holds that ‘the stock prices always reflect all available information and are efficient 
prices’.45 This means that no one can achieve extraordinary profits at the expense of 
another party. Prices are always equal to the true value of the assets. The prices are the 
outcomes of the views of all investors. The Efficient Markets Theory is based on the 
laws that describe the behaviour of markets where the price is set by supply and demand 
and by external shocks, which, in financial markets, means new information.
46
 This 
theory does not take into account price movements that might result from market abuse, 
for example. 
 
One critic of this theory is Robert Shiller, who says that the Efficient Markets Theory is 
only half true. He questions the assertions that securities prices reflect the true value of 
assets.
47
 Another critic, George Cooper, also criticised the Efficient Markets Theory as 
more faith than fact and asserted that it does not work for all markets.
48
 In financial 
markets, a power pushes the markets away from equilibrium that causes ‘financial 
markets to behave in a way that is inconsistent with the theory of efficient markets’.49 In 
financial markets, the forces pushing the price are not explained by the Efficient 
Markets Theory. For example, in financial markets lack of supply leads to an increase in 
demand, and asset prices move because of increased demand.
50
 He blames the academic 
community for promoting the Efficient Markets Theory to self-regulate markets.
51
 The 
reality is that regulation is necessary. 
 
                                                 
45
 ibid 156. 
46
 George Cooper, The Origin of Financial Crises: Central Banks, Credit Bubbles and The Efficient 
Fallacy (Harriman House 2010) 9. 
47
 Robert Shiller, Efficient Markets (Open Yale Courses, iPad, itunes U).  
48
 George Cooper (n 48) 4. 
49
 ibid 158. 
50
 ibid 14. 
51
 ibid 175. 
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George Cooper cites Hyman P. Minsky’s theory known as the ‘Financial Instability 
Hypothesis’ as a reason why regulation is necessary. The most important difference 
between this theory and the Efficient Markets Theory is the forces that cause the prices 
to move. The latter theory mentions that any change of price is a result of external 
shocks, which, in financial markets, is new information. However, the former theory 
states that, in addition to external forces, there are internal forces that do not lead 
financial markets to stability, to self-optimising or toward a natural optimal allocation of 
resources.
52
  
 
Economists spend their lives formulating theories about things: in this case, markets and 
their regulation. This thesis is not an academic discussion about such theories. The need 
for regulation is obvious, as evidenced by numerous financial crises and scandals, from 
which Kuwait is not immune. Regardless of the theories, the reality is that financial 
crises have occurred, people have suffered as a result, and this could have been avoided 
by having sound regulations in place. There is a greater development toward 
intervention in and regulation of the markets.
53
  
 
In the financial literature the risks facing investors can be divided into two mains types, 
see the diagram below (Figure 1.1). The first one is direct risks which arise from market 
abuse, irresponsible actions by individuals or companies and poor corporate governance 
by companies. The second is indirect risks which are due to the instability of the 
financial system. For instance, if a bank goes bankrupt then it affects investors 
indirectly. This thesis will focus only on the former risks. 
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Figure 1.1 stylised diagram of types of risks facing investors 
Three main types of direct risks are cited in the financial literature. One is the risk that 
someone will abuse the market. Examples of this are insider dealing or manipulation of 
the share prices or supplying false information. The second type of risk is due to 
irresponsible actions, usually by companies who do not disclose information on time or 
make incomplete disclosure. The third type of risk is from poor corporate governance 
where managers misbehave.  
 
Protection against these risks is provided by different types of regulation. Protection 
against market abuse is by means of hard law. This consists of primary legislation such 
as acts of parliament and secondary legislation which is legislation delegated by an act 
of parliament. Secondary legislation consists of so-called Rules. It is very useful 
because it is speedy and saves parliament time. It is passed by people who understand 
the subject and it has the power to impose fines without going to court. Irresponsible 
actions are also dealt with by hard law in the form of secondary legislation. Corporate 
governance, on the other hand, is protected by so-called Soft Law. It is considered to be 
‘soft’ because an offender cannot be jailed or fined. This soft law consists of voluntary 
Risks for Investors 
Direct Risks Indirect Risks 
              Market Abuse 
Irresponsible Actions 
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Instability of 
Financial System 
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codes. Hard and soft law are commonly known as securities laws and will be discussed 
later in more detail. Figure 1.2 shows Stock Market Investors’ Direct Risks and 
Protection Methods. This research will examine insider dealing, unfair disclosure and 
poor corporate governance risks in Kuwaiti securities law and find the best way of 
avoiding them.       
Stock Market Investors’ Direct Risks & Protection Methods 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.2 stylised diagram of the Stock Market Investors’ Direct Risks and Protection 
Methods. 
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One risk alone, insider dealing, provides ample justification for regulating the stock 
exchange. In the UK, in connection with insider dealing, the Financial Conduct 
Authority (FCA) has secured 24 convictions between 2009 and 2014.
54
 However, in 
Kuwait there has been none related to insider dealing. The reason for this could be due 
to the complexity and the long time required to prosecute insider dealing cases. This 
will be discussed in more detail in chapter three.  The FCA’s Director of Enforcement 
and Financial Crime, Tracey Mcdermott, emphasises this by saying ‘Insider dealing 
investigations are complex and long running. Nevertheless we are committed to 
undertaking the painstaking analytical work which is required to bring these cases to 
court’.55     
 
There are many other examples that show the need to regulate the stock exchange 
related to insider dealing, irresponsible actions and poor corporate governance which 
will be discussed later in more detail. Therefore, regulation of a stock exchange has the 
potential to reduce or prevent these kinds of risks.   
 
Nowadays, financial markets (including stock exchanges) have become more complex 
because of technological development, innovative financial instruments and 
globalisation. This increases the need to regulate the stock exchange in order to protect 
individual investors. Without regulating the market individual investors would suffer, 
but the question here is how to regulate the stock exchange?  
 
1.6.2.2 How Should the Stock Exchange be Regulated?   
 
There are several models for regulating stock exchanges. Initially, there was self-
regulation. The nature, scope and structure of self-regulation have changed greatly over 
the last twenty years and there is no clear definition of it. There is a range of self-
regulatory forms the world over. Sometimes, the term self-regulation is used to refer to 
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formal self-regulatory organisations (SROs). An SRO can be described as ‘a private 
institution that establishes, monitors compliance with, and enforces rules applicable to 
securities markets and the conduct of the SRO’s members.56 An SRO is ‘a non-
governmental organisation that has the power to create and enforce industry regulations 
and standards’.57 It is half-way between no regulation and state regulation, under which 
the state specifies, administers and enforces the regulations. Any person who wants to 
be a member of the SRO must be prepared to follow its rules.
58
 
 
SROs, such as stock exchanges, govern themselves without outside interference, 
especially if they are responsible for the operation of the exchange. This includes: 1) 
regulating market transactions, including ensuring that the members’ actions are in 
accordance with pre-agreed rules; 2) regulating the market participants by ensuring that 
they do not breach their obligations and that they maintain the value of their capital over 
time, that they do not take excessive risk, that they do not breach ethical behaviour, and 
that if they breach their obligations, they face sanctions from the SRO itself; and 3) that 
dispute resolution and enforcement actions are provided, including private mechanisms 
that enforce good conduct.
59
 In some cases, the internal statutory rules involve 
determining the financial sources, managers’ and employees’ codes of conduct, 
oversight procedures and the formal structure of the SROs.
60
 
 
Self-regulation has a number of advantages: 1) greater ability to monitor effectively; 2) 
members of an SRO may have more interest in keeping the market safe and in 
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preserving its integrity; 3) members of an SRO have more knowledge, expertise and 
experience about the market; and 4) the SRO has more flexibility.
61
 
 
It would be better if the responsibility for designing the features of operational rules and 
the way of processing them were performed by SRO members because of their 
experience, knowledge and commercial interests. However, competition could suffer if 
the members were to transform themselves into cartels (conflicts of interest). Also, with 
limited competition, the SROs could be more flexible in applying rules, such as the 
listing rules.
62
 This flexibility will be discussed in Chapter Four. 
 
Recently, many countries have transferred in different degrees some of the power and 
responsibility for regulation from the exchanges to a public regulator, which means that 
there is reduced reliance on exchanges as self-regulatory organisations (SROs).
63
 
Consequently, there are now four models of self-regulation involving the exchange and 
the regulator. The first is the ‘Government Model’, in which securities regulation lies 
with a public authority, and the exchanges have a limited supervision of their markets. 
This has occurred because of the movement of stock exchanges from non-profit making 
to being profit based and in many instances operating as listed company.
64
 The second 
is a ‘Limited Exchange SRO’, in which a primary regulator is a public authority, and the 
exchanges are responsible for operating functions, such as listing and supervising the 
markets. The third is the ‘Strong Exchange Model’, in which a primary regulator is a 
public authority and the exchanges have more operating functions, which include 
regulation of member conduct. The fourth is an ‘Independent Member SRO’, in which a 
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primary regulator is a public authority that relies on an independent SRO for regulatory 
functions.
65
   
 
Nowadays many developed countries regulate their financial markets using the 
‘Government Model’ mentioned previously.66 This is the case in Kuwait, where the 
Kuwait Stock Exchange is a self-regulatory organisation, and the Capital Market 
Authority represents the government.  
 
Therefore, it can be seen that because of the specialised nature of the topic, countries 
have found over time that in order to regulate dealing in the financial markets (including 
stock exchanges), it is better to appoint a “financial authority” with rule-making and 
investigative power, and the power to enforce the securities laws through prosecution 
and/or the imposition of sanctions. 
 
1.7 The Historical Development of the Kuwait, Saudi and Qatar Stock 
Exchanges 
 
The GCC
67
 is a recent organisation of states when compared with developed countries. 
The discovery of oil caused significant political, economic and cultural developments. 
Consequently, these countries achieved a modern status virtually overnight. The most 
significant occasion in the history of the GCC states from an economic standpoint was 
the discovery of oil and natural gas in the region. 
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The leaders of the State of Kuwait, the State of Qatar, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the 
United Arab Emirates, the State of Bahrain and the Sultanate of Oman met on 25 May 
1981 and reached a cooperative framework joining the six states. Article 4 of its Charter 
sets out the GCC’s basic objectives. The first goal is to coordinate, integrate and inter-
connect the Member States in all fields to achieve their unity. The second goal is to 
deepen and strengthen the relations, links and areas of cooperation now prevailing 
between their citizens in various fields. The third objective is to formulate similar 
regulations in various fields, such as economics, financial affairs, commerce, customs, 
communications, education and culture. The last goal is to stimulate scientific and 
technological progress in the fields of industry, mining, agriculture, water and animal 
resources; to establish scientific research; to establish joint ventures and to encourage 
cooperation by the private sector for the good of their citizens.
68
 
 
The Gulf stock exchanges are much younger than the stock exchanges in more 
developed countries. For instance, the London Stock Exchange opened in 1773,
69
 
whereas the first GCC stock exchange opened two centuries later in 1977.
70
 The 
establishment of public companies differed from one gulf country to another. For 
example, in 1952 the National Bank of Kuwait was the first local public company to be 
established in Kuwait. As a result, Gulf countries do not have a long history related to 
stock exchange markets.  
 
This research will focus on two countries in addition to Kuwait, because the scope of 
the research would be too wide if other gulf countries were included. Therefore, it was 
decided to limit the number of GCC countries, but to include major industrial countries 
such as the UK and the USA when necessary. Saudi Arabia and Qatar were chosen for 
analysis because they have two of the highest rates of GDP growth and more recent 
legislation than any others. The table below (Table 1.2) shows the percentage of GDP 
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growth and the year capital market laws were passed in the GCC countries. Moreover, 
Saudi Arabia is one of the group of twenty finance ministers and central bank governors 
in the G20 group. Therefore Saudi and Qatar are a good representation of the systems in 
the Gulf region.   
 
Name of country GDP growth for 2014 
71
 Year of passing a Capital 
Market Law 
Qatar 6.6% 2012 
Saudi 6.8% 2003 
Kuwait 5.1% 2010 
Bahrain 3.9% 2002 
UAE 3.9% 2000 
Oman 5.0% 1998 
 Table 1.2 the percentage of GDP growth and the year of passing capital market laws 
related to the GCC countries. 
 
The following section describes the Kuwaiti, Saudi and Qatari stock exchanges. 
  
1.7.1 Kuwait 
 
No transactions involving securities occurred in Kuwait until the end of the Second 
World War, when oil was discovered. The first cargo of crude oil was exported in 
1946. The discovery of a vast supply of oil significantly transformed the lives of the 
Kuwaiti people, who previously lived simply. Before oil, the Kuwaiti economy 
relied on the pearl trade, maritime transport, and fishing.
72 A tribe of Bedouins 
lived in the desert and herded sheep and camels. Since 1946, oil has dominated the 
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Kuwaiti economy and has ultimately displaced traditional activities.
73
 Land trade 
and real estate were the main forms of wealth during the transitional period.
74
 
 
After this period of transition to an oil economy, the first Kuwait public company was 
established in 1952, which was called the National Bank. The National Cinema 
Company and the Kuwait Oil Tankers Company were established in 1954 and 1957, 
respectively.
75
 In 1960, the Commercial Companies Act No. 15 was passed to 
encourage people to invest, and the government established thirteen public 
companies. This law was the first to organise the issuance of shares by companies 
and subscribers to these shares.
76
 This was followed by the Law No. 32 in 1970 which 
was enacted to regulate the negotiation and transaction of company securities. At that 
time, there were few companies and there was a lack of sufficient knowledge about 
dealing in securities. This law was enacted before the Kuwait Stock Exchange was 
created. Law No. 32 gave the Minister of Commerce and Trade the power to issue the 
necessary rules to regulate the trading of securities of Kuwaiti firms. Making rules was 
based on the opinion of the Market Committee (MC).
77
 The first market committee was 
established in 1976.
78
 In 1977, the Kuwait Stock Exchange opened, which was the 
important first step along the path of trading securities in Kuwait.
79
 The Stock Exchange 
was opened to replace unofficial unregulated stock exchanges. 
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Kuwait was the first country in the region to establish a legal framework for its Stock 
Exchange. After the Suq al-Manakh
80
 Crisis in 1983, the Kuwaiti legislature issued the 
Emiri Decree Organising Kuwait Stock Exchange No. 35, which sought to protect 
public savings and investors’ interests. In 1983, the Kuwait Stock Exchange became an 
independent body recognised by Emiri Decree No. 20/1983. During that same year, 
Emiri Decree No. 35/1983 was passed. This was very important, because it included 
stock exchange objectives, the listing and acceptance of securities, stock exchange 
membership, dealing in securities, stock exchange administration, stock exchange 
budget and financial accounts, disputes and arbitrations, and disciplinary action. The 
most important change came with Article No.1, which provided that the Stock 
Exchange should be an independent entity. 
 
In the 1970s individuals had a lot of liquidity available. This led to speculation on the 
official exchange resulting in a small crash. As a result the Kuwait government passed 
stricter regulation. In 1977, ministerial resolution No. 31 was issued. This aimed to 
prohibit the creation of new joint stock companies and the resolution worked until 
1979.
81
 This resolution was one of the principal reasons for the Suq al-Manakh Crisis, 
as will be discussed later, because it drove the least risk averse investors to invest in the 
unofficial Suq al-Manakh market. This became a parallel market to the official market 
and was dominated by wealthy families whose trading was totally unregulated. 
Eventually, a crash occurred in 1982 which is mentioned below.  
 
Suq al-Manakh can be described as an unofficial stock exchange market. There were 70 
brokers and the market was open 24 hours a day. The process of trading relied on 
jobbers (market makers), who wandered around brokers’ offices to order or offer shares 
for sale or purchase. People were prepared to pay up to 15 million dinars 
(approximately 50 million U.S. dollars in those days) to buy office space in the stock 
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exchange to operate as brokers.
82
 During this period, compared with the official 
markets, the Suq al-Manakh was considered to be a third market, after the stock markets 
in the United States and in Japan and in advance of the markets in the UK and France. It 
transacted a vast number of trades.
83
 The market became so attractive that millions of 
Kuwaiti Dinars were routinely transacted without even examining the credit history of 
the purchaser, because the people in Suq al-Manakh trusted each other. Gulf companies 
and many Kuwaiti public companies invested around 80% of their capital in the market, 
as a result of which there was a massive impact on economic growth.
84
 The Suq al-
Manakh
85
 replaced the Suq al-Jat,
86
 the previous unofficial market, which was no longer 
fit for buying and selling shares as a result of the volume of shares. 
 
The Suq al-Manakh Crisis occurred between 1976 and 1982.
87
 Events leading up to the 
crash began in 1976, when some Kuwaiti investors started to engage in establishing 
public companies in other Gulf countries.
88
 Another interesting consideration is that the 
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Suq al-Manakh was allowed to trade stocks from Gulf companies, especially from the 
UAE and Bahrain.
89
 Kuwaiti investors set up new public companies in other Gulf 
countries and traded with their shares because of the ban issued in that period, which 
halted the establishment of new Kuwaiti public companies due to the instability of stock 
prices, the realisation by the legislature in that period of the need to regulate the stock 
market, and the enormous availability of liquidity at that time. The prohibition applied 
only to Kuwaitis. 
 
The crash occurred in July 1982 as a result of which some companies disappeared while 
the capitalisation of the others plummeted. There was no clear single reason for the 
crash. However, three reasons were thought to be part of the problem. The first was the 
absence of government involvement.
90
 At that time, there was a perfect speculative 
atmosphere because of the lack of any legal framework and the unofficial nature of the 
Kuwaiti market. The second reason was the availability of risky financing tools. For 
example, a speculator would give a trader a post-dated cheque in payment for shares, 
because there was no money in the bank to cover that cheque at the time of the 
transaction. The speculator hoped that he would make enough profit on the shares by 
the time his cheque was due, and would use the shares as collateral to borrow money 
from the bank.
91
 Some companies transferred their activities to trade in markets to make 
an enormous profit without any real investment.
92
 The third reason is that shares from 
Gulf countries were not subject to any supervision by the Kuwaiti Central Bank, the 
Ministry of Commerce, or any other governmental or quasi-governmental entity.
93
  
 
Most investors in the market did not have sufficient liquidity to fulfil their obligations, 
because the trading was based on confidence. As noted above, some investors had 
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bought and sold securities by using post-dated cheques. This practice inflated securities’ 
prices. The majority of traders were in possession of post-dated cheques.
94
 The crisis 
began to surface when one of the major traders could not cash in his post-dated cheques 
and then tried to resolve this by asking his debtors to pay their debts. His debtors in turn 
went to their debtors to cover their positions. This situation prompted the traders 
involved to cash their post-dated cheques hurriedly, even before the cheques had 
matured. Approximately 89 billion US dollars were introduced into the market. 
However, there was not enough money to cover the total amount of post-dated cheques 
collected. As a result, future deals were based on the shares traded in the market.
95
 In 
fact, the Suq al-Manakh was based on the hope of continuously increasing security 
prices and on the use of post-dated cheques.
96
 
 
Even after the crash ended its effects remained for a long time. For example, eight 
people known as the ‘Knights al-Manakh’ owed around $100 billion, which amounted 
to approximately 70% of all debts. This meant that those people owed approximately 
four times the Kuwait national budget, which at that time was around $18 billion.
97
 Not 
only did the crisis impact traders and ordinary people, but also some MPs and even the 
Royal Family, ministers and others, so the crisis affected all members of the 
community.98 As a consequence of the crash, the Kuwaiti market lost its reputation, and 
many foreign banks were unwilling to trade with Kuwaiti companies. In addition, the 
Kuwaiti government spent approximately $3 billion to help small investors
99
 because 
individual investors had become involved without protection from the law. 
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The collapse of the Suq al-Manakh took place in August 1982, which marked the 
beginning of the end of the unregulated market. The government made a mistake when 
it refused to intervene, because it firmly believed that the perfect market is a free 
market. The government did not pass any regulations to control the market.
100
 Vested 
interests of powerful wealthy families prevented the government from taking action to 
regulate this exchange and this was the major reason why the crash occurred.  
 
The Suq al-Manakh crisis made the government realise that there was a need for the 
regulation of activities involving securities. Between 1983 and 2010, a number of laws 
were passed to regulate the stock exchange. In 1988, Decree Law No. 32 granted 
permission to GCC citizens to hold (own) shares in the Kuwaiti public companies listed 
on the Kuwaiti Stock Exchange. Previously, GCC citizens were not permitted to buy 
shares in Kuwaiti companies. In 1990, the Kuwaiti legislature created a legal system for 
unit trusts in Act No. 31, which involved organising the trading of securities and the 
establishment of investment funds. In 2000, Law No. 20 was enacted to allow non-
Kuwaiti investors to own shares in Kuwaiti shareholding companies, because the 
legislature believed in attracting foreign investors in order to take advantage of their 
money and expertise.
101
 
 
In 2000, the Stock Exchange market capitalisation was US $35 billion, and the value of 
trading was US $22 billion, making the Kuwaiti Stock Exchange the second largest in 
the Arab world.
102
 This prompted the government to make changes to the operation of 
the Stock Exchange. In 2005, Emiri Decree No. 158 was issued concerning the 
amendment of some articles of the decree organising the Kuwaiti Stock Exchange.
103
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Before 2010, the Ministry of Commerce and Trade (MOCI), the Central Bank of 
Kuwait (CBK),
104
 the Market Committee (MC) and the Kuwait Stock Exchange (KSE) 
were responsible for regulating and supervising securities markets in Kuwait.
105
 The 
absence of a comprehensive law involved in creating and organising the Kuwait Stock 
Exchange and the lack of a single body with responsibility for regulation resulted in 
some deficiencies that were exploited by unscrupulous dealers at the expense of small 
and large investors. There was no comprehensive and holistic legal system, the lack of 
                                                                                                                                               
Organising the announcement of interests and issuing and declaring the financial 
reports. 3 - Specifying the methods of dealing with securities ensuring the soundness of 
information and protecting the traders. 4 - Developing the financial market to serve the 
goals of economic development. 5 - Developing the market links with other regional 
and global markets to keep pace with the standards followed in those markets. 
Article 6 mentions that:  
The market committee is responsible for setting the general rules and policies for KSE 
within the goals mentioned in Article 3 of this decree, especially in setting the 
following rules and procedures: 
1 - Dealing with securities, supervising its activities. 2 - Central depositary, settlement 
and clearing, and supervising its activities. 3 - Registration of brokers and the stocks of 
the listed companies. 4 - Supervising the dealing of funds and investment portfolios 
with securities listed in the market. 5 - Preparing, disclosing and supervising the 
financial reports of the listed companies and investment funds. 6 - Regulations for 
acquiring effective percentage of the company’s capital. 7 - Regulations for banning 
trading based on internal or unannounced information or conflict of interest. 8 - 
Regulations regarding professional conduct and confidentiality of the market’s 
employees and the companies dealing with securities. 9 - Preparing reports and analyses 
as well as stating the regulations that should be abided by in preparing the above. 10 - 
Procedures to be taken by the market administration under exceptional circumstances, 
including the decision to suspend one or more companies from trading their stocks in 
the market for a period determined by the market administration. 11 - Approval of the 
market projected annual budget, probating the final accounts, and assigning a financial 
auditor. 
104
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105
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which created misunderstanding and the inability to resolve serious systemic 
problems.
106
 In 2010, the Act was enacted to address these problems. 
 
The 2010 Act was supposed to fix all previous problems relating to securities activities 
firstly by having for the first time a regulatory authority that was responsible for 
regulating securities activities. Secondly a number of illegal activities related to 
securities were banned for the first time under the 2010 Act such as insider dealing, 
manipulation and misleading the market.  
 
The Act has 13 chapters and 165 articles. The first chapter is about the definitions of 
words and terms wherever they are used in the Act such as exchange, clearing agency, a 
security, listed company and others. The second chapter (from article 2 to article 30) is 
about the Capital Market Authority and its objectives, duties, powers, managing the 
authority board. For example, Article 3 of chapter 2 mentions the objectives of the 
Kuwaiti Authority which are: 
1- Regulate securities activities in a fair, transparent and efficient manner. 
2- Grow the capital markets, and diversify and develop investment 
instruments thereof in accordance with best international practice. 
3- Enhance investors’ protection. 
4- Reduce systemic risks arising from securities activities. 
5- Impose requirements of full disclosure in order to achieve fairness and 
transparency, and to prevent conflicts of interests and the use of insider 
information. 
6- Enhance compliance with the rules and regulations related to securities 
activities. 
7- Enhance public awareness of securities activities and of the benefits, 
risks and obligations arising from investments in securities and encourage 
their development. 
                                                 
106
 Khaled Helmy (n 80) 170. 
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The Act has seven aims. One of these objectives is protecting investors which are the 
subject of the thesis. The Act mentions the aims but it does not mention the way of 
achieving them and nor does it explain them. The Act also gives the authority the power 
to pass rules according to Article 4 by saying that ‘the Authority’s board shall issue 
necessary byelaws and instruments to execute the Law. It shall also work on issuing 
recommendations and the necessary studies needed to develop the regulations which 
assist in achieving its objectives’.  
 
Chapter three (articles 31-47) of the Act is about securities exchanges. Chapter four 
(articles 48-62) is about clearing agency. Chapter five (articles 63-67) is about regulated 
securities activities. Chapter six (articles 68-70) is about reviewing the accounts of 
licensed persons. Chapter seven (articles 71-75) is about acquisitions and protection of 
minority interests. Chapter eight (articles 76-91 articles) is about collective investment 
schemes. Chapter nine (articles 92-99 a) is about the prospectus for securities issued by 
companies. Chapter ten (articles 100-107) is about disclosure of interests. Chapter 
eleven (articles 108-148) is about penalties and disciplinary actions. Chapter twelve 
(articles149-150) is about general rules. Chapter thirteen (articles 151-165) is about 
transitional provisions. The act covers transactions and other dealings with securities. 
The Act also was the first major legislation to regulate the offer and sale of securities.  
 
1.7.2 Saudi Arabia 
 
The Saudi Stock Market is one of the largest markets in the Gulf region. For example, 
the market in 2003 stood at US $157 billion. The number at the end of 2014 was around 
$ 483 billion.
107
 However, the Saudi market was informal until the mid-1980s. 
Consequently, it does not have a long history. In 1995, only 33 companies were listed 
on the Stock Exchange; by 2005 that number had increased to 77 companies.
108
 
                                                 
107
 <http://www.tadawul.com.sa/static/pages/ar/Publication/PDF/Yearly_2014.pdf > accessed 14 June 
2015. 
108
 Monzurul Hoque, ‘Saudi stock exchange market crash was predictable’ Paper presented to the 
Conference of Securities Markets and Stock Exchanges, United Arab Emirates University-College of 
Sharia and Law 2006) 1. 
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Nowadays, there are 151 companies on the Saudi Stock Exchange.
109
 In 2015 the 
number is 164 companies.
110
 The first public company was established in Saudi Arabia 
in 1934. In 1983, there were approximately 38 public companies.
111
 
 
In 2001, a new infrastructure was introduced that is known as the Tadawal or Stock 
Exchange. This resulted in a rapid increase in transactions per day. Before that, trading 
took place through local banks. A more important structural change has been the 
establishment of the Saudi market in 2003 when the Capital Market Act was passed.
112
 
A significant event in the Saudi Stock Exchange occurred between 2002 and 2006. 
During this period, there was a large increase that can be described as a bubble in the 
Saudi Market Index (TASI), which rocketed by approximately 563%. Whether this 
dramatic increase was the result of real structural economic factors or it was just 
irrational is unknown.
113
 After that period, a huge drop occurred which cost many 
investors their money and their savings because the share values plummeted and stayed 
low for a long period. The rise was just a false increase, which cost many people their 
investments. Some experts said that the most important reason for this false increase 
was that the Saudi market lacked laws and regulations to govern the stock exchange. 
This was clear when the index dropped from 21,000 points in the middle of February 
2006 to approximately 9,500 points just two months later without any change in 
economic factors.
114
 
 
                                                 
109
 <http://www.tadawul.com.sa/wps/portal/> Official website of the Saudi Stock Exchange market. 
accessed 22 May 2012. 
110
 <http://www.tadawul.com.sa/wps/portal/!ut/p/c1/04_SB8K8xLLM9MSSzPy8xBz9CP0os3g_A-
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111
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jadida 2009) 97. 
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 Ahmed Badawi, ‘Empical Evidence of Herding Behaviour in the Saudi Stock Exchange Market’ 
(Paper presented to the Conference of Securities Markets and Stock Exchanges, United Arab Emirates 
University-College of Sharia and Law 2006) 1. 
114
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1.7.3 Qatar 
 
The Qatar Stock Exchange also does not have a long history. It was founded in 1995 
(previously Doha Securities) under Law No. 14.
115
 On September 14 2005, Act No. 33 
of 2005 as amended by Legislative Decree No. 14 of 2007 established the Qatar 
Financial Markets and the Doha Securities Market. Under this law, the Qatar Financial 
Markets Authority (QFMA) holds the legislative and regulatory framework, while the 
executive role is held by the Qatar Exchange with respect to trading shares, the transfer 
of ownership, and making financial settlements between brokers.
116
 
 
The Qatar market entered a new phase in 2009 with the issuing of an amendment to 
Law No. 33, which transferred the Doha Securities Market to a joint stock company 
under the name of the Qatar Exchange. This transfer was intended to bring about a shift 
in the structure that would help with the transition to a global exchange and to operate 
according to the latest systems.
117
 The market opened with 17 companies, and has since 
increased to 45companies.
118
 On August 7 2012, Qatar passed a new Law No. 8 of 2012 
regarding the Qatar Financial Markets Authority, which repealed the law of 2005 and 
subsequent amendments.
119
 
 
The following table (Table 1.3) shows the significant market indicators in 2012 for the 
Kuwait, Saudi and Qatar stock exchanges. 
 
 
                                                 
115
 ibid 112. 
116
 <http://www.mofa.gov.qa/details.cfm?id=216> accessed 20 May 2012. 
117
 ibid. 
118
 Official website of Qatar Exchange 
Market<http://www.qe.com.qa/pps/qe/qe%20english%20portal/Pages/Home//>  accessed 23 May 2015. 
119
 The amount of information reflects the size of the stock exchange which is smaller than Kuwait and 
Saudi. Moreover Qatar Stock exchange has not experienced as many notable events during its evolution.  
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Country Number of listed 
companies 
Trading Value 
(Mil. $) 
Volume of 
Traded Shares 
(Mil. Share) 
Market 
Capitalisation of 
the companies 
whose shares are 
listed (Mil. $) 
Kuwait
120
 216 23 812.5 82 805.5 130 677.1 
Saudi 
121
 148 501 417.2 83 653.0 373 404.6 
Qatar
122
 42 17 719.4 2 190.2 103 929.9 
Table 1.3 Stock Market Indicators 
 
As a result, it is clear that legal developments differ from one country to another. In 
connection with this thesis Qatar, Saudi and Kuwait have a special law for securities, 
which is the material of this thesis.  
 
1.8 The historical development of the legal systems in Kuwait, Saudi 
and Qatar 
 
A multifaceted interplay of economic, social, and political factors has affected the 
current legal systems in the Arabian Gulf countries comprising Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, 
Qatar, Bahrain, Oman, and the United Arab Emirates. This region is commonly referred 
to as the GCC. The rural places along the Arabian Peninsula were rooted mainly in 
                                                 
120
 Annual Report 2012 of Kuwait Stock Exchange. 
<http://www.kuwaitse.com/Portal/Report/KSEAnnual2012.pdf> accessed 6 May 2014. 
121
 Annual Report 2012 of Saudi Capital Market Authority. 
<http://www.cma.org.sa/Ar/Publicationsreports/DocLib/Report%20CMA%202012%20Final2.pdf> 
accessed 6 May 2014.  
122
 Annual Report 2012 of Qatar Exchange. 
<http://www.qe.com.qa/pps/qe/qe+english+portal/Pages/About+QE/Annual+Report?> accessed 5 May 
2014.  
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tribal custom, and tribal elders performed adjudicative functions.
123
 The Quran, the 
Sunnah (the prophet’s traditions), the Ijma (consensus of Muslim jurists), and the Qiyas 
(judgment upon juristic analogy) were the main sources of Shari’ah Islamic law, which 
was widespread in the region and was the source of authority in the entire area. Islamic 
law is sacred. It has four main sources: the Quran,
124
 the Sunna,
125
 the Ijma,
126
 and the 
Kiyas.
127,128
  
 
The largest economic event in the history of the GCC States was the discovery of oil 
and natural gas in the region. Previously, the main economic activities were agriculture, 
fishing, trade and pearl-diving
129
 in addition to camel and sheep herding. The discovery 
of oil created a new economic, social and political order which could no longer rely 
solely on customs and Shari’ah Islamic law. All the GCC countries except Saudi Arabia 
decided to adopt the Egyptian-French model
130
 as a basis for their national legal 
systems. However, these legal systems have been influenced by Islamic law. For 
example, the Kuwaiti civil code is influenced by Islamic law.  
 
Kuwait was first mentioned in history as a country in the eighteenth century, when the 
Sabah family came to Kuwait in approximately 1765. In 1899, the modern Kuwait 
appeared with the signing of a protection agreement with the British. Sheikh Mubarak 
(the ruler of Kuwait) signed an agreement, because he feared an external attack from the 
Ottoman Empire. The British were also concerned about the extension of Russian and 
                                                 
123
 Ahmed Al-Suwaidi, Finance of International Trade in the Gulf (Graham & Trotman 1994) 24. 
124
 Book of God. 
125
 The prophet Muhammad life and times between 610 and 632 CE, transmitted from generation to 
generation; Frank E Vogel, Islamic Law and Legal System Studies of Saudi Arabic: Studies In Islamic 
Law and Society (Brill 2004) 4. 
126
 Consensus of researchers. 
127
 Reasoning by parallel.  
128
 Joseph Schacht, An Introduction to Islamic Law (OUP 1964) 114. 
129
 Ahmed Al-Suwaidi (n125) 9. 
130
 The French legal system spread into some Arab countries through Egypt. 
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German interests in the area. According to the agreement, Kuwait promised that it 
would not receive an agent or representative of any other power or government in 
Kuwait without a previous sanction by the British government.
131
 During this period, 
Kuwait relied on Islamic law and custom; there was no written law. However, the 
judges were separate from the ruling family,
132
 who were the head of the executive 
authority; the judges were the head of the judiciary.
133
  
 
In the twentieth century, the Islamic countries converted from Islamic law to modern 
law.
134
 In 1938, judges had to follow a civil code known as the ‘Mejelle’, which was 
written by the Ottoman Empire between the nineteenth and the twentieth centuries. It 
consists of collections of a civil code of Islamic law, containing 1,851 Articles based on 
the Hanafi Islamic School.
135
 In the same year, the first council was elected to represent 
the people. The next important event in Kuwaiti history occurred in 1961, when Kuwait 
withdrew from the British extra-territorial jurisdiction and the Constitution of Kuwait 
was drawn up. In 1963, Kuwait became a member of the United Nations (UN).  
 
The Kuwaiti people are the source of all power and the democratic system of 
government. Article 6 of the Kuwaiti Constitution provides that the system of 
government in Kuwait shall be democratic and that sovereignty resides in the people, 
the source of all power but in practice the legislative power
136
 is with the Emir and the 
National Assembly, which consists of 64 democratically elected  members.
137
 The Emir 
                                                 
131
 Osman Abd-Malik, Constitutional Order and Political Institution In Kuwait (Dar Al-Kotob 2003) 53-
55. 
132
 The ruling family is Al Sabah.  
133
 Khalid Toama, The History of Kuwait Law (2008) 14. 
134
 Joseph Schacht (n130) 3. 
135
 <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mecelle> accessed 24 April 2014. 
136
 Article 51 of the Kuwaiti Constitution says that the legislative power is vested in the Emir and the 
National Assembly. 
137
 Kuwaiti Constitution, Article 56 provides that the number of Ministers in all shall not exceed one-third 
of the number of the members of the National Assembly. 
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is the Head of State.
138
 In addition, the Council of Ministers has executive power.
139
 
There are no political parties in Kuwait. The Emir appoints the Prime Minister, who 
then chooses the Council of Ministers.   
 
The legislative, executive and judiciary are the three authorities in Kuwait. There are 
clear distinctions among these three branches. Article 50 of the Kuwaiti constitution 
says that the system of Government is based on the principle of separation of powers 
functioning in co-operation with each other in accordance with the provisions of the 
Constitution. None of these powers may relinquish all or part of its competence 
specified in the Constitution. The Kuwaiti judicial system
140
 is comprised of three 
stages of adjudication. All courts in Kuwait pass sentences in the name of the Emir. 
Article 53 of the Kuwaiti Constitution says that the judicial power is vested in the 
courts, which exercise it in the name of the Emir within the limits of the Constitution.   
 
Around 1960, a new legal system appeared to replace Shari’ah law. Article 2 of the 
Kuwaiti Constitution provides that ‘the religion of the state is Islam and Islamic 
Shari’ah is a principal source for legislation’.141 This means that Shari’ah is not the 
exclusive source of Kuwaiti law, it also includes many codes, such as civil, commercial, 
company and criminal codes. However, the relationship with Shari’ah remains. For 
example, in civil cases, if a situation is not included in the code, the judge must look to 
Shari’ah law.142 
 
                                                 
138
 Kuwaiti Constitution, Article 54 (the Emir is the Head of the State. His person is immune and 
inviolable). Article 55 (the Emir exercises his powers through his Ministers). 
139
 Article 52 of the Kuwaiti Constitution says that the executive power is vested in the Emir, the Cabinet, 
and the Ministers, in the manner specified by the Constitution. 
140
 In Kuwait, there are different levels of courts, namely summary, first instance, appeals and cassation 
courts. The latter considers solely the law without looking at the facts. 
141
 Ahmed Al-Suwaidi (n 125) 25. 
142
 Article 1 Kuwaiti Civil Law, amended in 1996.  
 43 
 
The Shari’ah is the main source for legislation as provided in Article 2 of the Kuwaiti 
Constitution. This is the subject of much discussion in Kuwaiti society, because many 
want to make Shari’ah the only source of law. At present, there are other sources of law 
which can contradict Shari’ah, a clear example is commercial law, which allows for the 
payment of interest or Riba.
143
 
 
The Kuwaiti legal system is similar to the Egyptian and French codes, which are known 
as the ‘Latin System’.144 In 1804, the Napoleonic code was widespread in western and 
southern Europe and Latin America.
145
 Samiha Qalyoobi criticised the slow pace  of the 
development of laws in Kuwait and gave an example of the Kuwaiti Company Law, 
which was adopted from the French Company Law in 1960. French Company Law has 
changed eight times in the intervening period; Kuwait’s Company Law was not changed 
until 2012.
146
 
 
In Saudi Arabia the constitution is unwritten and is very unclear,
147
 in contrast to the 
constitutions of the other Gulf countries, which are written. In Saudi, Shari’ah law can 
be supplemented by the King, who can issue royal decrees to achieve a satisfactory 
balance between present day socio-economic requirements and Islamic traditions. As a 
result, business law in general and laws dealing with investments and overseas trade in 
                                                 
143
 Article 102 of the Commercial Code provides: (1) The creditor has the right to interest in a commercial 
loan unless the contrary is agreed; if the rate of interest is not specified in the contract, the interest due 
shall be the legal interest of seven per cent. (2) If the contract contains agreement on the rate of interest 
and the debtor delays in payment, then interest for delay shall be calculated on the basis of the agreed 
rate. However, Article 547 of the Civil Code provides: (1) Loans shall be without interest. Any condition 
to the contrary shall be void, without prejudice to the loan agreement itself. (2) Any benefit stipulated by 
the lender shall be considered interest. 
144
 <http://www.al-ayoub.org/legal.html> accessed 24 April 2014. 
145
 Raymond Wacks, Law: A very short introduction (OUP 2008) 8. 
146
 Samiha Qalyoobi, ‘A lecture on Kuwaiti. First Conference to Discuss the Most Important 
Development in the New Companies Act: The Provisions Related to adjusting the conditions of existing 
companies’ (Office of Loay Jassim Al-Krafi Law Firm 2014). 
147
 Ahmed Al-Suwaidi (n 125) 26. 
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particular have grown greatly in terms of legal decrees that codify these subjects. This 
development occurred as the result of increased development in Saudi Arabia and to 
avoid legal problems. For example, the Company Law was issued in 1965 and amended 
in 1978 by royal decrees.
148
 
 
In Saudi, Shari’ah is the main source of legislation and in cases where the Shari’ah does 
not cover all aspects of laws such as traffic law, the King passes the law on condition 
that the new law is not against Shari’ah. This makes the legal system in Saudi different 
from the rest of the regimes in the region. In Saudi, there is no distinction between 
legislative and executive authorities. Both are controlled by the King. The King in Saudi 
has unlimited power. He is the head of state and the head of council of ministers.
149
 
 
Qatar has had three constitutions. The first was ratified on 2 April 1970, but was 
replaced two years later by an amended provisional constitution. Article 7 of the 1970 
constitution provided that the religion of the state is Islam and that Islamic Shari’ah is 
the principal source for its legislation. Qatari Law No.16/71 was passed in 1971 and 
amended by Law No. 10/82 in 1982, which enacted civil and commercial laws.
150
 The 
third and current Qatar constitution has 150 articles and was ratified in 2004. It repealed 
the 1972 constitution. It is clearer than the two previous constitutions. It came with new 
ideas, such as the fact that Qatar is a hereditary Emirate that is ruled by the Al Thani 
family.
151
 It mentions that Shari’ah law is one of the main sources of legislation.152 This 
means that it is not the only source. The constitution mentions a number of principles. 
For example, article 18 states that ‘the Qatari society is based on the values of justice, 
                                                 
148
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 <http://www.nyulawglobal.org/globalex/saudi_arabia.htm> accessed 20 December 2014. 
150
 Ahmed Al-Suwaidi (n 125) 26. 
151
 Article 8 states: ‘The rule of the State is hereditary in the family of Al Thani and in the line of the male 
descendants of Hamad Bin Khalifa Bin hamad Bin Abdullah Bin Jassim’.  
152
 Article 1 states: ‘Qatar is an independent sovereign Arab State. Its religion is Islam, and Shari’ah law 
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benevolence, freedom, equality, and high morals’. Articles 34153 and 35154 mention the 
public’s rights and duties. The current constitution provides two ways to propose new 
legislation. One is by the Shoura Council; the other is through the Cabinet of Ministers. 
However, the final draft must be approved by the Emir.
155
  
 
1.9 Conclusion 
  
This chapter discussed the aims and the benefits of the thesis and the methodology that 
the thesis will follow. The research will explore ways in which investors on the Kuwait 
Stock Exchange can be better protected against market abuse, irresponsible actions and 
poor corporate governance risks. This aim will be achieved by comparing the Kuwaiti 
2010 Act with legislation in the GCC countries and, when necessary, with legislation 
enacted in some of the developed countries, such as the UK and the USA. The structure 
and the difficulties of the thesis have also been discussed. This research has faced three 
difficulties namely, a poor understanding of securities laws, poorly documented 
financial regulation in the GCC and the rapidly changing financial regulation during the 
course of this research.  
 
This chapter has outlined the extent of the research in this thesis. In terms of financial 
markets, this research will focus on secondary stock exchange markets and in respect of 
financial products, it will look at the direct trading of shares in listed companies. In 
terms of investors, individual investors are the focus of this research. In terms of laws 
and regulations, it will focus on securities law and with regard to risk will discuss 
methods of protection against direct risks related to insider dealing as an example of 
market abuse, unfair disclosure and poor corporate governance.  
 
                                                 
153
 Article 34 states: ‘The Citizens of Qatar shall be equal in public rights and duties’. 
154
 Article 35 states: ‘All persons are equal before the law, and there shall be no discrimination 
whatsoever on grounds of sex, race, language, or religion’. 
155
  <http://www.qatarlaw.com/legislation-legal-system-in-qatar> accessed 21 December 2014. 
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This chapter has discussed the historical developments of the stock exchanges and their 
legal frameworks in Kuwait, Qatar and Saudi Arabia. These countries lack a long 
history and experience with regard to the regulation of a stock exchange. After the Suq 
al-Manakh crisis, the Kuwaiti government recognised the need to regulate the stock 
market. It passed several laws to regulate the market, the latest of which was in 2010. 
The 2010 Act is a comprehensive law and created a single body (Kuwait Capital Market 
Authority) with the responsibility to regulate the market. 
 
Before the discovery of oil, the GCC countries relied mainly on Shari’ah Islamic law. 
Thereafter, these countries tried to find a legal system that combined Shari’ah law and 
the Egyptian French model. Although Qatar, Saudi and Kuwait have different legal 
systems related to the material of this thesis, each has a special law for securities.  
 
The next chapter will deal with the protection of individual investors under securities 
law. 
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Chapter Two 
The Concept of Protecting Investors under Securities Law 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter aims to provide more detail about the aims and objectives of the thesis and 
to serve as a general background to the world of investor protection.  
 
The concept of protecting investors under securities law has four elements: the 
investors, the securities, the securities law and the meaning of protecting investors. Each 
of these elements has many ramifications. Before looking at the subject of this thesis, an 
introduction to each of the elements will help to understand the thesis.  
 
As mentioned in Chapter One, in this thesis investors are ordinary persons who try to 
ensure a good future for themselves and their families by improving their standard of 
living, obtaining a good education for their children and protecting the value of their 
savings. This type of investor differs from others in terms of the type of protection that 
is required. 
 
To understand how securities law works one needs to appreciate what is meant by the 
term securities and that shares are only one type. Some countries regulate their financial 
systems with laws targeted at securities to complement other laws, such as company law 
and commercial law. Other laws can play a significant role in protecting investors and 
they will be mentioned later but will not be considered in detail in this thesis. This thesis 
will discuss the areas of protection and how to achieve such protection. However, there 
is no perfect way to protect investors on the stock exchange. This chapter will focus on 
four points. The first concerns investors. The second defines securities. The third 
defines securities law and the fourth is about the scope of the protection. 
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In addition to clarifying  the position of an investor in the financial markets, this chapter 
also  mentions for the sake of completeness some non- securities specific legislation 
which contributes to investor protection but is too extensive to analyse in detail in the 
thesis.  
 
2.2 Who Are Investors?  
 
An owner of money can be a spender, saver or investor. Investors are generally people 
or companies who want to increase their wealth. They can do so by investing their 
money in a number of places, such as 1) deposit money in a bank without risk,
1
 
although the interest rate is generally poor compared to other investments; 2) buy real 
estate; 3) buy bonds that are issued by companies or by a government, receiving a fixed 
income on a fixed date in the future; 4) buy vintage cars or antiques; or 5) buy shares in 
a company, which is more flexible, with potentially higher returns than a bank deposit, 
but presents a higher risk. This thesis will focus on investors who buy shares in a 
company which are traded on a stock exchange. Investors in the stock exchange are 
different from speculators
2
 in terms of the period of investment, degree of risk and 
expected return. The latter trades are based on short term price fluctuations
3
 and are 
carried out by people who are experts in taking advantage of such fluctuations.
4
 
 
                                                 
1
 For example, in the UK deposits with authorised financial services firms are insured with the FCSC to 
the extent of £85,000. < http://www.fscs.org.uk/what-we-cover/eligibility-rules/compensation-limits/> 
accessed 2 February 2015. 
2
 Speculators, who are also known as dealers, are one of the participants in financial markets, in addition 
to investors and brokers. The main motive of speculators is to realise profit by buying and selling shares 
over a short period and not from owning shares for a long period. Jakob de Haan, Sander Oosterloo and 
Dirk Schoenmaker, Financial Markets and Institutions: A European Perspective (2
nd
 edn, Cambridge 
University Press 2012) 31. 
3
 Jihan Jamal, Methods and Strategies for Speculation in the Stock Exchange (Economic Publishing & 
Distribution 2012) 22. 
4
 Mohamed Helmy Abdel Tawab, The Legality and Technical Frames For The Stock Exchange and 
Mechanisms of the Legality Observation (Dar Al Fikr Al Arabi 2012) 395. 
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Individual investors usually want to increase personal wealth. Individuals can invest by 
holding collective funds, allowing others to handle the investment process or by buying 
shares in individual companies. In addition to individual investors, there are institutional 
investors. Both individual and institutional investors can be majority or minority 
shareholders and can be local or foreign investors. Institutional investors include 
pension funds, mutual funds and insurance companies; these have increased 
significantly over the years.5 Individual investors are persons not businesses.
6
 This 
thesis will focus on protecting individual investors regardless of their nationality and 
their minority or majority status. The protection of institutional investors is beyond of 
the scope of this thesis.
7
 Figure 2.1 shows types of investor on the stock market.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
5
 Mats Isaksson and Serdar Çelik, ‘Who Cares? Corporate Governance In Today’s Equity Markets’ 
(OECD Corporate Governance Working Papers No. 8 2013) 33 < http://www.oecd-
ilibrary.org/governance/who-cares-corporate-governance-in-today-s-equity-markets_5k47zw5kdnmp-en 
> accessed 9 September 2013. 
6
 In the UK, the Consumer Protection from Unfair Trading Regulations 2008 s2(1) defines a consumer as 
‘any individual who in relation to a commercial practice is acting for purposes which are outside his 
business’.   
7
 In the financial literature, it is always small investors who are the victim. Also institutional investors do 
not need as much protection as individuals investors. 
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Stock Market Investors 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.1: Stylised diagram of investor types in stock market.  
 
One of the aims of the regulation of financial services in the UK is to protect individual 
investors (consumers of financial services). The Financial Services Act 2012 defines 
consumers
8
 to include two types of persons: 1) persons who use, have used, or may use 
financial services or who have relevant rights or interests in relation to those services. 
Financial services could be regulated financial services
9
 or services that are provided by 
persons other than authorised persons who are carrying on regulated activities. 2) 
Persons who have invested or may invest in financial instruments or who have relevant 
                                                 
8
 Financial Services Act 2012 part 1A s1G. 
9
 Financial Services Act 2012 part 1A, section 1H, 2 states that regulated financial services are ‘services 
provided a) by authorised persons in carrying on regulated activities; b) by authorised persons in carrying 
on a consumer credit business in connection with the accepting of deposits; c) by authorised persons in 
communicating or approving the communication by others, invitations to engage investment activity; d) 
by authorised persons who are investment firms, or credit institutions, in providing relevant ancillary 
services; e) by persons acting as appointed representatives; f) by payment services providers in providing 
payment services; g) by electronic money issuers in issuing electronic money; h) by sponsors of issuers of 
securities; and i) by primary information providers to persons who issue financial instruments’. 
Institutional Investors 
Individual Investors 
(Financial Consumers) 
 
- Individual investors are not speculators or businesses.  
- They are “Consumers” who invest their savings in equities in order to 
get a return. 
- They are usually looking for   
1- Fair Securities Price. 
2- Fair Disclosure of Inside Information 
3- Good board Practice. 
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rights or interests in relation to those instruments. This thesis will only focus on the 
latter.  
 
In Kuwait, the securities law does not distinguish between individual and institutional 
investors, nor does it distinguish between individual investors who use financial 
services and those who invest in financial instruments. This will be discussed in detail 
in Chapter Six.  
 
The financial system has many players. On the one hand, there are banks, shadow 
banks, suppliers of financial products and services, and other companies. On the other 
hand, there are the consumers of financial products and services (including investors). 
In addition, there are different markets that make up the financial system namely the 
FOREX Market, Derivatives Markets, Money Markets and the Capital Market. The 
Stock Exchange is one of the capital markets. The Stock Exchange has two markets: 
Primary and Secondary (where shares trade every day). As far as markets are concerned 
this thesis will only look at the secondary market, while as far as players are concerned 
this thesis will look at investors. Therefore, this thesis will focus on protecting investors 
in secondary markets. The figure 2.2 below shows the parts of the financial system.  
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Figure 2.2 Stylised diagram of the parts of the Financial System. 
 
Sophisticated investors are investors with real experience and understanding of the risk 
involved.
10
 They can be defined as  persons who know what legal protection they have  
and are  fully capable of protecting themselves from securities fraud. Lynn Stout 
criticises this idea by saying that  history has shown that no one can be sure that he will 
not be defrauded and if you ask any investor who lost his money whether  he  expected 
                                                 
10
<http://www.investopedia.com/articles/investing/042613/how-become-sophisticated-investor.asp> 
accessed 7 October 2015 
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to be defrauded , the answer would be no. Individual investors cannot make a distinction  
between honest, good and well run companies from poorly managed and dishonest 
firms . They need regulation to protect them. They need some compulsory protection.
11
 
The majority of retail investors are not sophisticated.
12
 Protection in this thesis will 
include sophisticated and less sophisticated investors.  
 
In the financial literature, the idea is about offering some types financial instruments to 
people who are aware of their decisions and the  law should stop unsophisticated 
investors from being a danger to themselves and others.
13
 For example, in the UK,  
some type of financial instruments such as unregulated collective schemes (Ucis) which 
are based on some kind of investment such as film protection are  promoted to 
sophisticated investors.
14
 These  financial instruments can be described as dodgy 
alternative products. Also  in the UK also in 2014, the FCA restricted the promotion of 
contingent securities  just to sophisticated or high net worth investors.
15
  
 
Gaetane willemaers said that from an economic point, prohibiting  retail investors from 
direct access to the capital markets (stock exchange) is not a good solution because 
retail investors increase the liquidity in the market which contributes to the strength of 
stock exchange markets and to economic stability too.
16
  
 
Discussing sophisticated or unsophisticated investors is out the scope of the thesis 
because the thesis will not look at these types of financial products such as Ucis.  It will 
just focus on shares which anyone can buy. The thesis is also about investors in shares 
and not other more risky instruments where the level of sophistication is important. 
                                                 
11
 Gaetane Schaeken Willemaers, The EU Issuer Disclosure Regime: Objective and Proposals for Reform 
(Kluwer Law International 2011) 11 
12
 Ibid 34 
13
 <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=322301> accessed 14/11/2015  
14
 <http://www.moneyobserver.com/our-analysis/are-you-sophisticated-investor> accessed 7 October 
2015 
15
 ibid.  
16
 Gaetane Schaeken Willemaers (n11) 50  
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2.3 What Are Securities?  
 
A broad definition of a security is that it represents an ownership position in publicly 
traded company shares,
17
 a creditor relationship with a government body or a firm 
(bonds,
18
 sukuk
19
 and debt securities),
20
 or rights to ownership as represented by an 
option
21
.
22
 Each of these categories can furthermore consist of different types.
23
 For 
example, there are different types of shares, such as ordinary and preference shares. It is 
difficult to include every type of security in laws designed to protect investors. The list 
of securities varies from law to law.   
 
UK securities legislation, namely the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 
(FSMA), covers these three categories with the added stipulation that the securities have 
                                                 
17
 Three rights are given to an investor who buys shares. The first is the right to vote. The second is the 
right to take delivery of a corporation’s residual cash flows. The third is the right, after all claimants are 
paid, to the residual assets in liquidation. Stephen J Choi and A C Pritchard, Securities Regulation: The 
Essentials (Aspen Publishers 2008) 10. 
18
 Another common security is a bond issued by a corporation to raise capital. With a fixed and certain 
return, bonds are provided to their owners in the form of periodic interest payments in addition to a final 
payment when the bond matures (ibid). 
19
 An alternative finance investment to bonds are sukuk instruments, which perform an equivalent 
function to bonds and loans in the western financial system, but which use Shari’ah compliant financial 
instruments. They are structured to pay a return linked to the assets that the bond has funded, so that they 
are not paid in a conventional sense. They are a form of asset-based and profit-sharing instrument. Iain G 
Macneil, An Introduction to The Law on Financial Investment (2nd edn, Hart Publishing Ltd 2012) 146. 
20
 Debt securities are proof of a monetary debt which must be repaid according to certain terms that define 
the interest rate and maturity/ renewal data. <http://www.imf.org/external/np/sta/wgsd/pdf/051309.pdf> 
accessed 15 February 2015. 
21
 The purchaser has an option rather than an obligation to buy or sell, so the consumer buys the option 
against a sum of money. The premium paid is the highest loss that the purchaser of an option can suffer. 
Iain G Macneil (n 19) 154. 
22
 < http://www.investopedia.com/terms/s/security.asp> accessed 16 February 2015. 
23
 Each of the securities has advantages and disadvantages. For example, one of the advantages of issuing 
shares is that the issuing companies do not have to repay the borrowers’ money except in the event of 
liquidation. 
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to be ‘transferable’24 which means negotiable (able to transfer from one owner to 
another) on a capital market. In practice, on the London Stock Exchange in addition to 
ordinary shares, retail bonds and debt securities, there are many other types of securities 
such as derivatives, exchange traded funds, structured products, exchange traded 
commodities, covered warrants, GDRS and GILTS.
25
 
 
In Kuwait, Qatar and Saudi, each legislature has addressed this issue differently. The 
descriptions are not similar, although all provide for some types of securities. The Saudi 
legislature, for instance, gives discretionary and flexible power to the Board (The Saudi 
Capital Market Authority’s Board of Commissioners) to define securities.26 The laws of 
Kuwait, Qatar and Saudi Arabia include different definitions of securities. In the 2010 
Law the Kuwaiti legislature has defined securities as:  
Any bond of whatever legal form that proves a share in a marketable finance 
licensed by authority as: 
A. Shares issued or proposed to be issued in a company’s capital.  
B. Any instrument that originates or proves indebtedness that has been, or shall 
be, issued by a company.  
                                                 
24
 Section (102A) part 2 of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (FSMA) mentions transferable 
securities which are defined in Article 4.1 (18) of the Markets in Financial Instruments Directive (MiFID) 
2004/39/EU. MiFID directive defines Transferable securities as: 
‘Transferable securities’ means those classes of securities which are negotiable on the 
capital market, with exception of payment, such as: 
(a) shares in companies and other securities equivalent to shares in companies, 
partnership or other entities, and depositary receipts in respect of shares; 
(b) bonds or other forms of securitised debt, including depositary receipts in respect of 
securities; 
(c) any other securities giving the right to acquire or sell any such transferable securities 
or giving rise to a cash settlement determined by reference to transferable securities, 
currencies, interest rates or yields, commodities or other indices or measures; 
25
<http://www.londonstockexchange.com/traders-and-brokers/security-types/security-types.htm> 
accessed 16 February 2015.   
26
 Capital Market Law 2003, Article 2. 
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C. Loans, bonds and other instruments that could be convertible into shares in a 
company’s capital.  
D. All marketable general debt issued by various government entities or the 
public authorities and institutions.  
E. The sukuk issued under the applicable Shari’ah-compliant contract forms.  
F. Any right, option or derivative relating to any of the securities.  
G. Units in any collective investment scheme.  
H. Commercial paper, such as promissory notes, letters of credit, fund transfers, 
exclusively inter-bank traded instruments, insurance policies and the rights of 
beneficiaries on pension schemes shall not be considered as securities.
27
 
 
It can be seen that the definition of securities is quite extensive. Further, by eliminating 
commercial paper from the definition of securities, the legislature has removed any 
ambiguity on the subject. 
 
The Qatar legislature has defined securities as:  
Shares and bonds of Qatar shareholding companies, bonds and notes issued by 
the government or any Qatari authority or public institution, or any other 
approved securities. Derivatives, commodities and investment instruments, 
approved by authority, shall also be considered as securities.
28
 
Qatar does not have an extensive definition of securities. 
 
The Saudi legislature states that the term ‘securities’ means: 
a. Convertible and tradable shares of companies 
b. Tradable debt instruments issued by companies, the government, public 
institutions or public organisations 
c. Investment units issued by investment funds 
d. Any investment representing profit participation rights, any right in the 
distribution of assets, or either or the foregoing, and  
e. Any other rights or instruments which the Board determines should be 
included or treated as Securities if the Board believes that this would further the 
safety of the market or the protection of investors. The Board can exercise its 
power to exempt from the definition of Securities rights or instruments that 
                                                 
27
 Capital Market Law 2010, Article 1. 
28
 Qatari Law No. (8) 2012, Article 1. 
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otherwise would be treated as Securities under paragraphs (a, b, c, d) of this 
Article if it believes that it is not necessary to treat them as Securities, based on 
the requirements of the safety of the market and the protection of investors. 
29
 
 
The legislature also said that commercial bills, such as cheques, bills of exchange, order 
notes, documentary credits, money transfers, instruments exclusively traded among 
banks, and insurance policies shall not be considered securities.
30
 
 
 Clearly, in Saudi the Authority’s Board of Commissioners has discretionary power to 
determine what a security is with the proviso that the determination should further the 
safety of the market or the protection of investors; the Kuwaiti legislature fails to 
mention this. The Kuwaiti legislature should add the same provisions as in part (e) of 
the Saudi legislation, to avoid the need to amend the legislation to take into account any 
developments in the future involving the creation of new types of securities. 
 
See the table below (Table 2.1) for a comparison of securities
31
 and commercial paper 
in terms of the features of each of these types of financial instruments.
32
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
29
 Capital Market Law 2003, Article 2. 
30
 Capital Market Law 2003, Article 3. 
31
 Securities are different from bank notes that are issued by central banks because bank notes have a 
fixed value. Muhammed Ali Sweilem, Tools To Invest In the Stock Exchange (Dar University 
Publications 2013) 12-13. 
32
 Tamer Saleh, Legal Protection for Securities Markets (Dar New University 2011) 83-86. 
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Feature Securities  Negotiable (commercial) paper  
Brief Definition  Previously defined  Instruments represent the right to cash due 
and payable within a given time.  
Can be transferable by endorsement.  
Important Types  Shares and bonds Bill of exchange and 
cheque (certified cheque, account paid)   
Value  Changing value  Fixed value  
Issuer  Firms or governments  Firms or individuals  
Importance  Increasing in importance  Decreasing in importance because of the  
of use modern methods 
Essential 
Conditions  
Usually by brokers.  
Trading in a certain place 
(such as stock exchange)  
Trading between individuals.  
Trading anyplace  
Return Yes No  
Table 2.1 Comparison of Securities and Commercial Paper 
 
There are clearly differences between securities, other investments and other 
commodities in which people deal.
33
 The first difference is that securities unlike goods 
                                                 
33
 The table below (Table 2.2) shows a number of investment types.   
  
Types of Investment Physical investment, such as real 
estate  
Financial investment, such as stocks 
and bonds 
Multiplicity of 
Investment  
Multi-investment (Portfolio) Individual investment  
Private and Public 
Investment  
Private investment  Public investment (sometimes aimed 
at  social goals in addition to profits) 
Nationality of 
Investment  
Foreign investment  Local investment  
Table 2.2 Investment Types 
Muhammad Ali Sweilem (n 31) 20-23. 
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are not produced, but they are virtually created without cost. They can be issued in 
unlimited amounts, because securities are nothing in themselves: they symbolise only an 
interest in something else. Thus, securities cannot be used to acquire goods and 
services: they are not a kind of currency. The second difference is that securities are 
affected by a variety of published information. The third point is that many securities 
laws contain anti-fraud provisions, since the dealing markets for securities are uniquely 
at risk from deceptive practices and manipulation. The fourth difference is that 
securities laws are concerned with regulation to ensure that people and firms engaged in 
that industry do not gain from their superior experience at the expense of small 
investors. The fifth difference is that a range of government sanctions are provided to 
punish those who break the rules and the securities laws.
34
 It is apparent, therefore, that, 
because of their nature, securities need special regulation. 
 
2.4 Securities Law and Financial Regulation 
 
In some countries, such as the UK, securities law is part of financial regulation while in 
other countries, such as Kuwait, securities are regulated by separate and special laws 
called ‘Securities Laws’.  
 
In the context of securities laws, the following is an introduction to financial regulation 
and other laws that protect investors. 
 
2.4.1 What is Securities Law?  
 
Securities markets, including stock exchanges, are important for the financial systems as 
a whole, because they represent the arteries that feed the national economy with enough 
                                                 
34
 David L Ratner and Thomas Lee Hazen, Securities Regulation in a Nutshell (10
th
 edn, Thomson West 
2009) 3. 
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money to function properly.
35
 There is also an overlap between the banking sector and 
capital markets: both have an effect on economic development, as through them savings 
turn into productive investments.
36
 Securities markets and the banking system 
complement each other, and both should be promoted to have appropriate resources for 
financial investments.
37
 It is important to regulate the securities market because of its 
potential impact on the financial system as a whole. 
 
There is also a need for special regulation of securities because of their nature. For 
example, shares are intangible in nature. The holder of them owns future entitlements, 
rights or benefits, such as dividends, voting rights, and the return of capital, the value of 
which can go up or down. They are not pieces of tangible property that can be used or 
consumed, such as land or goods. As a result, special requirements and conditions are 
required by securities laws.
38
 Commercial law which is the rationale for statutory 
regulation of commercial activities cannot provide enough protection in investment 
markets, because of the importance of having timely and full information in a fair way. 
There are also systemic risks in investment markets which bring various types of risks.
39
 
For more details see chapter one.  
 
As previously stated, this thesis discusses the protection of retail investors, small, 
private and individual investors on stock exchanges in secondary markets. There are 
important differences between the securities market and traditional market for goods 
                                                 
35
 ‘Entrance to the Capital Markets’ (Qatar Financial Markets Authority) 13 
<http://www.qfma.org.qa/App_Themes/AR/ABook/Introduction_to_capital_markets.pdf> accessed 16 
March 2014. 
36
 Elham Wahid Daham, The Effectiveness of the Performance of Capital Markets and Banking Sector in 
Economic Growth (National Center For Legal Publications 2013) 63. 
37
 Mohamed Helmy Abdel Tawab (n 4) 336. 
38
 Robert Baxt, Ashley Black and Pamela Hanrahan, Securities and Financial Services Law (6
th
 
LexisNexis 2012) 7-8. 
39
 Iain G MacNeil (n 19) 20. 
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and services 
40
 as is shown in the table below (Table 2.3). Because of these differences 
the protection of investors requires a different approach.  
 
 
Table 2.3 Differences Between Traditional and Securities Markets 
Some countries, like the UK, have a single regulatory authority that is responsible for 
the regulation of the whole financial system,
41
 including the protection of consumers of 
financial products and services.
42
 On the other hand, other countries, like Kuwait, 
separate the regulation of securities from the regulation of other financial services. 
Therefore, the UK legislation gives the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) more power 
and a broader scope. However, in Kuwait the Capital Market Authority is only 
responsible for regulating securities activities. Therefore, one of its aims is to protect 
investors in securities and not in the whole variety of financial services. This will be 
discussed later.  
                                                 
40
 Mohammed Choukri Aladawa, Stock Exchange in the Balance of Islamic Law (Dar Thought University 
2012) 26-28. 
41
 According to part 1A, section 1I of the Financial Services Act 2012, the UK financial system includes 
‘a) financial markets and exchanges; b) regulated activities; and c) other activities connected with 
financial markets and exchanges’. 
42
 Financial Services Act 2012, part 1A, section 1B.  
Type of market  Traditional Market Securities Market  
What is traded  Goods & real estate Shares, bonds & other types 
The necessity of the presence 
of intermediaries  
Unnecessary  Important  
How to implement the 
contract  
Payment & delivery  Special way of delivery & 
payment. 
Physical presence of goods  Usually needed  Not needed  
The volume of transactions  Varies  Huge, frequent & focused 
Announcement of prices  Do not announce prices for 
each deal  
Official & daily 
announcements  
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In Kuwait, the scope of the regulatory authority’s responsibilities to regulate financial 
systems is limited to securities activities, while the major responsibility for financial 
systems lies with the central banks. For example, in Kuwait, protecting consumer loans, 
commissions, fees and credit cards is the responsibility of the Central Bank. Terms and 
conditions about the rights and obligations of consumers of financial services and 
products are the responsibility of the Kuwaiti Central Bank. Figure 2.3 shows the 
Central Bank’s roles according to Law No 32 of 1968, concerning currency, the Central 
Bank of Kuwait and Organisation of Banking Business, Law No. 41 of 1993 
Concerning State Purchase of Select Debts and Collection Procedure, Law No. 30 of 
2008 with Regard to Guaranteeing the Deposits at Local Banks in the State of Kuwait 
and Law Decree No. 2 of 2009 with Regard to Reinforcing the Financial Stability in the 
State.
43
 A similar approach to regulation exists in Saudi Arabia and Qatar.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
43
 The Forty-First Annual Report of the Central Bank of Kuwait for the Fiscal Year 2012/13, 
<http://new.cbk.gov.kw/en/index.jsp> accessed 14 March 2014. 
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Figure 2.3: Stylised diagram of the main responsibilities of Kuwait Capital Market 
Authority (KCMA) and the Central Bank of Kuwait (CBK). 
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It is generally accepted that regulation can play a significant role in the stability of the 
financial system.
44
 It is appropriate here to look at the meaning of financial regulation, 
which includes securities regulation. 
 
2.4.2 Financial Regulation 45  
 
Generally speaking, financial markets refer to the meeting place where one party has 
money to invest and another party has an idea of investment that needs money.
46
 
Moreover, Robert Shiller says that financial markets are not just about trading. Financial 
markets include banking, insurance, securities, future markets, and the derivatives 
market.
47
 There are four main types of financial services namely, banking, securities, 
insurance and non-bank credit.
48
  
 
Robert Shiller divides financial market regulation into five types. The first is within a 
company. When a company sets its own rules, these are called inertial rules. The board, 
including inside and outside directors, imposes certain principles. Shiller states that 
members of a board owe two important duties to the firm. Firstly, they owe the duty of 
care; namely, the director must know what he is doing, which includes acting as a 
reasonable person, who obtains information, watches and is careful about his 
obligations as a member of the board. The second is the duty of loyalty, not simply to 
the shareholders, but also to the firm. There is a growing belief that loyalty has been 
extended to stakeholders, other people and the community as a whole.  
 
                                                 
44
 Frank Partnoy, ‘Financial Systems, Crises, and Regulation’ (University of San Diego, Research Paper 
2014 No 14-154) 2 <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2435332> accessed 28 January 
2015. 
45
 Robert Shiller, ‘Financial Market 2011’ (Open Yale University courses I Tunes). 
46
 Mokhtar Hamida, Privatisation Through The Financial Markets (Hassan Modern Library 2013) 87. 
47
 Robert Shiller (n 45). 
48
 ‘Good Practices for Financial Consumer Protection’ (2012) World Bank working paper 5. 
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The second type of regulation refers to trade groups or ‘self-regulation’, when groups of 
firms or people decide to pass rules among themselves to form an organisation. Self-
regulation occurs when regulations are specified, administered and enforced by the 
organisation itself.
49
 Self-regulatory organisations (SROs) should be subject to the 
oversight of a regulatory authority.
50
  
 
Robert Shiller cites the New York Stock Exchange as an example of a trade group. As 
there was no organised stock exchange, in 1792 stockbrokers signed an agreement 
setting up the Stock Exchange to regulate the prices and the commissions. Twenty-four 
stockbrokers gathered under a buttonwood tree outside the building located at 68 Wall 
Street to sign the agreement known as the ‘Buttonwood Agreement’. This agreement 
remained until 1974 when the government broke the monopoly. Over time, Wall Street 
has come to represent the financial markets of the United States as a whole.
51
  
 
The third type of regulation is local regulation. For example, the American Blue Sky 
Laws are financial regulations issued by each state. The first was issued in 1911 in 
Kansas, and almost every state had its own law until the 1930s. The fourth type is 
national regulation. To complete the previous example, after 1934, all listed companies 
in the United States were regulated by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). 
This kind of regulation will be discussed later in more detail. 
 
                                                 
49
 Ian Bartte and Peter Vass, ‘Self-Regulation and the Regulatory State: a Survey of Policy and Practice’ 
(University of Bath, Research Report 17) 22.  
<http://www.bath.ac.uk/management/cri/pubpdf/Research_Reports/17_Bartle_Vass.pdf> accessed 11 
February 2014. 
50
 IOSCO Objectives and Principles of Securities Regulation (2010) principle 9 
<http://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD323.pdf> accessed 26 February 2014. 
51
 <http://www.nyx.com/en/who-we-are/history/new-york> accessed 11 February 2014.   
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The fifth type of regulation is international. There are a number of international 
organisations, such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF),
52
 the Bank of 
International Settlements (BIS)
53
 and the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 
(BCBS).
54
 One problem with national regulations is that people leave the country if they 
do not like the regulations. Therefore, attempts to have international regulations include: 
1) the BIS in Basel in 1930, which includes 57 central banks and which suggests rules 
that have a real effect even though they are not enforceable by law; 2) The Basel 
Committee of 1974, which suggested bank regulations and was followed by Basel 1 in 
1988, Basel 2 in 2004 and Basel 3 in 2010; 3) the G6, which comprises six major 
countries: France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the US and the UK. In 1976, Canada was 
added, and the group became the G7. In 2008, the group was extended to be the G20 to 
represent the leading financial countries in the rest of the World. In 2009, the G20 
created the Financial Stability Board (FSB) located in Basel to report recommendations 
to the G20 about the world’s financial systems. This thesis will not discuss Basel. 
 
Although, each of the above regulations can play a significant role in protecting 
individual investors, this research will focus on national regulation. National financial 
market regulation can be divided into two categories, namely prudential regulation and 
the conduct of business regulation. Prudential regulation is about controlling the 
solvency and liquidity of participants in financial markets.
55
 The conduct of business 
regulation focuses on the relationship between firms and customers, such as disclosure 
rules.
56
 The conduct of business regulation includes preventing market abuse and 
                                                 
52
 187 countries are members of the IMF. It has a number of objectives and functions, such as maintaining 
financial stability by developing international cooperation, encouraging international trade, reducing 
global poverty, encouraging high levels of employment, and providing loans. In addition, it monitors, 
advises, educates and trains the financial and economic police for its 187 member countries; Nicholas 
Ryder, Margaret Griffiths and Lachmi Singh, Commercial Law: Principles And Policy (CUP 2012) 464. 
53
 It supports central banks to maintain monetary and financial stability. It has a number of objectives and 
functions, such as promoting discussion among central banks; ibid 465. 
54
 It has a number of objectives and functions, such as improving awareness and enhancing the levels of 
banking supervision. Ibid.  
55
 Iain G McNeil (n 19) 36. 
56
 ibid 37. 
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ensuring that firms treat consumers fairly.
57
 Prudential regulation can be separated into 
macro-prudential regulation and micro-prudential regulation.
58
 The latter is about 
ensuring that the solvency of individual financial firms is not compromised by excessive 
risk-taking or other questionable practices, while the former is about protecting the 
stability of the financial system as a whole.
59
 Micro-prudential regulation includes 
promulgating principles that firms must observe to ensure that they conduct their 
business in a prudent matter.
60
 Macro-prudential regulation, which is largely an 
economic activity, is beyond of the scope of this thesis. For example, in the UK, the 
macro-prudential function is carried out by the Financial Policy Committee (FPC). The 
responsibility for micro-prudential regulations is divided between the FCA and the 
Prudential Regulation Authority (PRA). The latter is responsible for banks, large 
deposit-takers and others, the failure of which can impact the system as a whole. 1400 
financial groups are being supervised by the PRA, while approximately 23,000 firms are 
supervised by the FCA.
61
 
 
The question here is: how to regulate the financial system? For example, in the UK 
before and during the 2008 financial crisis there was a conflict between prudential 
supervision and the conduct of business supervision. It was difficult for one body to 
reconcile them. The former is largely an economic activity, while the latter is often 
performed by lawyers. A tripartite committee, which was responsible for financial 
stability in the UK and included the Treasury, the Bank of England and the FSA, was 
not able to limit that conflict. The FSA focused too much on the conduct of business at 
the expense of micro-prudential supervision.
62
 To reduce the conflict, there is a new 
approach that gives the Bank of England responsibility for micro-prudential supervision 
                                                 
57
 Emma Murphy and Stephen Senior, ‘Changes to the Bank of England’ (2013) 20 
<http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Documents/quarterlybulletin/2013/qb130102.pdf> 
accessed 4 April 2014. 
58
 This distinction between regulations first occurred in 2000, while in the past there was a mixture 
between them. Robert Shiller (n 45). 
59
 Iain G McNeil (n 19) 36. 
60
 Emma Murphy and Stephen Senior (n 57) 20. 
61
 ibid. 
62
 <http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200809/ldselect/ldeconaf/101/10108.htm> accessed 11 
January 2014. 
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(shadow banking sector), which means that it oversees some individual firms in addition 
to macro-prudential supervision (financial stability of the economy) and its monetary 
policy role.
63
 This will be discussed in detail in Chapter Six. 
 
There are two ways of looking at finance. The first is to focus on the theory of finance, 
which views financial economics as a scientific discipline. The second is about solving 
problems in practice.
64
 However, there is no clear scientific solution to these problems. 
One of these problems is how to protect individual investors. This thesis will try to 
present a way of protecting individual investors under securities law. 
 
2.5 Protection of Investors under Securities Law 
 
Finance, including investment problems, affects business, individuals, governments and 
financial systems as a whole. Protecting investors in securities markets is not just 
beneficial for investors themselves, but also protects the financial system as a whole. 
This is evident from three angles: firstly, the effect of the retail financial market on the 
recent financial crisis of 2008; secondly, an increasing number of individuals invest in a 
collective investment scheme (CISs); thirdly, there is more political interest because of 
retirement aims that are affected by securities markets.
65
 
 
As there is no clear definition of what protecting investors means, this thesis will 
address the problems from the view of what investors are looking for. Firstly, they seek 
a fair price that has not been influenced by market abuse. Secondly, they require fair 
disclosure of inside information. Thirdly, they want to be able to rely on good behaviour 
by managers. Lastly, they expect sound legislation to protect their interests. The 
                                                 
63
 ibid. 
64
 Nico Van Der Wijst, Finance: A Quantitative Introduction (Cambridge University Press 2013) 2. 
65
 Niamh Moloney, How to Protect Investors: Lessons from the EC and the UK (Cambridge University 
Press 2010) 2-3. 
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following section considers these four areas of protection that will be covered in this 
thesis. 
 
2.5.1 Fair Trading Prices 
 
A key point in finance, including investment, is  about the future valuation of assets and 
about financial expectation relying on time and uncertain elements.
66
 Finance, including 
investment studies, involves money, risk and time, which help people to select between 
uncertain future values.
67
 That is what investors pay for. The market price today reflects 
the future of the cash flow and risk. These issues mean that regulations for the 
protection of investors are complex but are needed in financial markets. 
 
The financial market includes a number of players such as 1) investment managers, who 
manage portfolios of share and bond companies; 2) chief executive officers; 3) bankers; 
4) investment bankers, who help to sell new securities; 5) traders and market makers 
(who benefit from short-run movement work, like speculators);  7) market designers; 8) 
derivative providers (future, option and swap); 9) lawyers and financial advisors; 10) 
lobbyists
68
 (who have the ability to influence the government); 11) regulators 
(government regulatory or self-regulatory organisations); 12) accountants and auditors 
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(bookkeepers); 13) policy makers; and 14) securities brokers. Any of these people could 
behave in a way that affects the fairness of price either through misrepresentation, 
omitting information about securities, manipulation of the market prices of securities, 
selling unregistered securities or insider dealing. The last action will be discussed in 
detail in Chapter Three.  
 
2.5.2 Fair Disclosure 
 
Fair disclosure means timely and full disclosure. There are different forms of disclosure 
obligations on an issuer. The first is periodic disclosure (including annual reporting and 
accounts). Usually, this type of disclosure is required in a specific period of time. 
Another disclosure obligation relates to prospectuses and listing particulars. Finally, 
there is ongoing disclosure obligations (including inside information disclosure) 
required as soon as possible after certain information is known.   
 
Inside information is specific, non-public information which if published would have an 
effect on securities prices. Different actions can constitute unfair disclosure namely, 
non-disclosure, limited disclosure, false disclosure, delayed disclosure and disclosure 
constituting misrepresentation. Lack of fair disclosure of inside information can harm 
investors because investors rely on such information to make informed investment 
decisions (buy, sell or defer investment). In terms of legislation unfair disclosure can be 
either a criminal or civil offence. This will be discussed in detail in Chapter Four. 
 
2.5.3 Misbehaviour by Managers 
 
In the last fifty years, many changes have occurred in the style of company ownership 
depending on the country. Nationalised industries have been privatised, and there has 
been a move away from family-owned firm to firms with diverse shareholders made up 
of individuals and institutions. This separation sometimes causes bad behaviour by 
managers of parties involved on secondary markets, such as advisors, analysts, hedge 
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funds, auditors, collective investment schemes (CIS),
69
 market intermediaries (brokers 
or investment banks), market operators and issuers (companies). A number of 
companies have been ruined as a result of poor corporate governance.
70
 The bad 
behaviour by company managers will be discussed in detail in Chapter Five.  
 
2.5.4 Finding Sound Financial Regulations 
 
Sound financial regulation is required to protect investors from unfair prices, unfair 
disclosure and misbehaviour by managers. Regulating financial markets including stock 
exchanges is a complex issue. For example, in the financial industry, it is 
straightforward to say that fraud is bad, but a debate would arise about what transactions 
are considered to be fraud.
71
 In the modern thinking of lawyers, three instruments could 
help to regulate financial markets, primary legislation, secondary legislation allowing a 
regulatory authority to make rules and voluntary codes. The first two are often referred 
to as ‘Hard Law’ while the last is known as ‘Soft Law’.72 The latter aims to change the 
business culture of an organisation. An example of financial culture acting as a deterrent 
is a bank that takes high risks. This will affect its reputation and, in turn, people will 
refuse to deposit their money with that institution.
73
 The way to improve laws, pass 
rules and benefit from the financial culture will be discussed in Chapter Six. 
 
2.6 Protection under Other Laws 
Measures for protecting investors are not limited to securities law. In the UK securities 
legislation consists of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (FSMA) and the 
Financial Services Act 2012 (FSA). However, there are others laws and standards which 
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protect investors even though they are not investor specific. For example, the law 
covering bribery, fraud, company law and accounting law, such as EU Directives 
2013/34/ and 2014/56,
74
 as well financial reporting standards such as the Generally 
Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) in the UK. 
  
Securities law protection differs from protection under others laws on two counts. For 
example, securities law only covers securities activities while other law covers 
securities and other commercial activities. In addition, company and accounting law 
covers listed and unlisted companies but not foreign listed companies, while securities 
law covers all listed companies whether foreign or national, but not unlisted national 
companies.  
 
The methods of enforcing, supervising and policing compliance with securities law is 
also different. There is a specific body responsible for the enforcement and supervision 
of compliance with securities laws. This area of law covers a mixture of statutory 
provisions also known as ‘Hard Law’ and voluntary provision known as ‘Soft Law’ 
such as the “Comply or Explain” principle, whereas other laws consist solely of ‘hard 
law’. This will be discussed later. 
 
2.6.1 Fraud and Bribery Legislation 
 
The crime of corporate fraud is defined in the Fraud Act 2006 (UK). It states that a 
person by their action, or lack of action, may be found guilty of fraud if they breach or 
commit any of following: fraud by false representation,
75
 fraud by failing to disclose 
information
76
 or fraud by abuse of position.
77
 The Fraud Act 2006 will not be 
considered in this thesis because there is an overlap between the provisions of the Fraud 
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Act 2006 applicable to investors and the securities legislation, so an analysis of the 
latter suffices.  
 
Bribery is an example of an offence which can harm investors. However, it is not 
covered by securities legislation but by the Bribery Act 2010. The risk of bribery 
applies to all companies, large and small, and it needs to be countered because it harms 
investors. Receiving and offering bribes can damage society and economic growth. 
Bribery damages competition and free markets and also rewards unethical behaviour.
78
 
It can harm investors in one of two ways. The company which pays the bribe is actually 
depressing its profit which has an effect on its own shareholders. There can also be an 
adverse effect on the shareholders of a competing firm which may have lost out because 
of the unfair advantage created by the bribing action of its competitor. On the other 
hand, some could argue that without bribery the company would not get business, 
especially with overseas countries. For example, Hewlett- Packard (HP) bribed public 
officials in Poland, Russia and Mexico in order to win public contracts.
79
  In the UK, the 
Bribery Act 2010 was passed to create some new offences that apply to all companies 
that do business in the UK. The Former Secretary of State for Justice in the UK, 
Kenneth Clarke, supported this idea in the Foreword to the Guidance of the Bribery Act 
2010 by saying ‘we do not have to decide between tackling corruption and supporting 
growth’.80 
 
Section 6 of the Act addresses the offence of bribing foreign public officials. This is 
different from the general bribery offences set out under section 1, relating to bribing
81
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another person, and under section 2 relating to the person being bribed.
82
 The two 
offences of bribing and being bribed replace the common law offences and the Acts of 
1889, 1906 and 1916.
83
 
 
Under section 6, a person commits a crime if he or she bribes a foreign public official
84
 
on condition that the bribe is intended to influence the capacity of the foreign public 
official. Part (2) of section 6 mentions that the bribery must have the intention to get or 
to keep hold of business or an advantage in conducting business. According to section 6 
part 3b, the only exemption is if there is an applicable written law that allows influence 
                                                                                                                                               
improper performance (test of a reasonable person in the UK) of a relevant function or 
activity (That including (a) any function of a public nature, (b) any activity connected 
with a business, (c) any activity performed in the course of a person’s employment, (d) 
any activity performed by or on behalf of a body of persons) that could happen directly 
or through a third party. 
82
 Under section 2 of the 2010 Act, there are different offences relating to being bribed, such as 
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by such things (offer, promise or gift). The question here is whether there is a country 
that allows its officials to be bribed.    
 
Section 7 of the Bribery Act (UK) refers to a commercial organisation which could be 
guilty of an offence if a person associated with it, who performs services for the 
commercial organisation or on its behalf, such as an employee, agent or subsidiary, uses 
bribery to obtain or retain business or secure an advantage in the conduct of business. 
However, it is a defence for the company to prove that it had in place adequate 
procedures to prevent such things. The Act treats a company as a separate body, which 
has its own entity and its own responsibilities.
85
 Any fine against the company could 
affect innocent shareholders. However, some argue that shareholders must be more 
careful when they elect the board.
86
 
 
The penalties for individuals include imprisonment for up to ten years and an unlimited 
fine for the company. In the UK the first conviction under the Bribery Act at Southwark 
Crown Court was on 5
th
 December 2014 against a former Director and Chief 
Commercial Officer of Sustainable AgroEnergy plc (SAE), Gary West, who was 
convicted of being bribed under s.2 of the Bribery Act. The second man, Stuart Stone, 
who was convicted under s.1 of the Bribery Act of offering or giving bribes, was a sales 
agent of unregulated pension and investment products for a separate company. West 
received bribes from Stone.
87
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Neither Kuwait, Saudi Arabia nor Qatar
88
 has a law such as the Bribery Act 2010. 
Section 6 (bribery of foreign public officials) and section 7 (failure to prevent bribery in 
commercial organisations) may provide good examples for these countries to follow. In 
Kuwait, for a criminal offence to be committed a bribe has to be given to a government 
official in Kuwait.
89
 Kuwait needs to pass the kind of special legislation on bribery that 
exists in the UK, which is more extensive because it seeks to prevent bribery inside and 
outside the UK in both the private and public sectors.
90
   
 
Article 35 of Kuwaiti Criminal Law of 1960 mentions that bribery occurs if a public 
officer ‘government employee’ requests or obtains something (money, gifts or any types 
of interests) in consideration of the fulfillment of his duty. Article 43 states that any 
employee working in a company in which the government has a share is deemed to be a 
public official for the purposes of the Kuwaiti bribery legislation. In effect Kuwait has 
limited the protection to listed companies if the Kuwaiti government owns part of the 
shares. However, in the UK the Bribery Act extends the protection to cover the 
employees of  any listed companies regardless of whether the government owns part of 
the company or not and Kuwait ought to follow the example of the UK.  
 
2.6.2 Protection under Company Law  
 
Under company law, shareholders have some protection, but it is limited to certain 
actions, such as the right to approve important decisions such as amending the Articles 
of Association and electing or removing directors.
91
 In the UK, there are some rights 
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available under company law to protect minority shareholders;
92
 for example, any 
shareholder can demand a copy of the company’s last annual reporting statements.93 
Furthermore, a member (shareholder) can apply to the court for unfair prejudice to the 
shareholder.
94
 If the court agrees it may compensate the shareholder or regulate future 
conduct of the company. Examples of prejudicial conduct are mismanagement, the 
majority taking financial advantage of minority shareholders, exclusion from 
management, non-payment of dividends or reducing dividends by paying excessive 
remuneration and improper allotments.
95
 
 
Some people feel that company law should go further to protect investors from board 
actions which may adversely affect the company’s share price and even jeopardise its 
survival. Some examples are: when a board member takes money from the company, 
takes advantage of his position by selling a company’s assets to relatives at a low price, 
buys at a high price to favour someone, pays a favoured employee a high salary, or 
deals as an insider. Minority shareholders need to protect their investment against the 
majority who have the power to influence the board of directors.  
 
It is felt that board appointments are dominated by majority shareholders and the 
company’s interests would be better served if minority shareholders had more say in the 
appointment of a company board. One way of doing this would be through cumulative 
voting.
96
 However, there is no guarantee that this would be of benefit to minority 
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shareholders, because most board decisions require a simple majority. However, 
cumulative voting does give minority shareholders better access to information about 
board practice and decisions.  
 
Cumulative voting
97
 still involves the one share equals one vote principle. This is 
different from multiple votes equal one share. For example, an A share has one vote; a 
B share has 10 votes. There are a number of critical points relating to the ten vote equals 
one share system, which is not in the company’s interest. For example, this system 
reduces the value of the stock, because a share has two rights, one about profit and the 
other about voting, so that the voting right affects the price. On the other hand, some 
people believe that long-term investors should be given more voting power because of 
their loyalty.
98
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The number of candidates is not important in Cumulative Voting; however, the number of directors at a 
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are two ways of selecting the board.  
1- Straight Voting (Barriers between directors)  
Owner 
name  
Owner 
share 
Position 1 Position 2  Position 3 Total vote  
A 5 shares 5 Votes 5 Votes 5 Votes 15 Votes  
B 2 shares 2 Votes  2 Votes 2 Votes 6 Votes 
It can be seen from the table that A will win all the positions; therefore B cannot win any seat (position), 
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representative on a board.  
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In some countries, like the UK,
99
 company law does not dictate the method of voting for 
directors. Therefore, although a company may write this into its Articles, some people 
feel that it should be a statutory provision. An attempt was made in 2012 in Kuwait to 
make cumulative voting mandatory, because it was felt that this was needed to give 
extra protection to minority shareholders to improve corporate governance.
100
 This 
change was introduced after the company law had been in existence for 53 years with 
no mention at all of cumulative voting. Yet, four months after making cumulative 
voting mandatory, the legislature changed its mind and made cumulative voting optional 
once again. The speed of this reversal was very strange, since traditionally Kuwait takes 
a long time to implement changes. As a result of this change, it was thought that the 
majority of firms would not adopt cumulative voting. The legislature was criticised for 
changing its mind by Dr. Fayez al-Kandari, a law professor at Kuwait University, in an 
article entitled ‘Legal Opinion: Why cancel mandatory cumulative voting?’,101 and was 
accused of bowing to pressure from influential businessmen, who benefitted by 
maintaining the status quo.  
 
Some argue that if cumulative voting were part of company law it would apply only to 
national companies and would not apply to foreign companies listed on the stock 
exchange. A better option would be to make such a provision part of the securities law 
as well as the company law. Securities law would apply to all companies regardless of 
nationality. The Kuwaiti 2013 Corporate Governance Code requires that cumulative 
voting be used to elect the directors.   
 
2.6.3 Protection under Accounting Law  
 
Companies may try to exaggerate their performance by how they report their earnings. 
A number of accounting scandals during the late 1990s and the early 2000s caused huge 
                                                 
99
 Andreas Cahn and David C Donald, Comparative Company Law: Text and Cases on the Law 
Governing Corporations in Germany, the UK and the US (Cambridge University Press 2011) 479.  
100
 Kuwaiti Company Law 2012 amended in 2013, Article 240. 
101
 <http://www.alqabas.com.kw/node/761115> accessed 3 October 2013. 
 81 
 
losses to investors (shareholders).
102
 Laws and regulations can reduce the ability of 
companies to ‘cook the books’ or to participate in ‘accounting games’.103 However, 
accounting rules try to limit the company’s power to determine what methods to follow. 
Investors tend to look at published annual reports and accounts, such as balance 
sheets,
104
 profit and loss accounts (P&L)
105
 and cash flow statements
106
 for reassurance, 
because they presume that annual reports and audited financial records represent a 
company’s health. However, as recent corporate failures have demonstrated financial 
statements, even audited ones, have proved to be unreliable. Below is a list of 
techniques that have been used to ‘cook the books’107 to mislead investors.  
1- Off Balance Sheet Vehicles  
Liabilities and assets are not included on a balance sheet. One way of doing this is to 
buy another company and then have the other company borrow money. 
2- Capitalising expenses  
This involves treating an expense as if it were capital. For example, Worldcom crashed 
because the company capitalised expenses to show a large profit that did not exist. The 
company put the expenses on the balance sheet as assets; they should have been in the 
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P&L statement. The company treated the expenses as assets to show falsely that it had 
substantial assets; in fact, these were not assets but operational costs.  
3- Manipulating the timing of expenses  
Income can be taken only when there are invoices. Consequently, if a contract is over a 
period of time, the revenue and cost also must be over a period of time. However, some 
companies try to put all of the revenue and expenses into the profit and loss account 
when they sign a contract. What then happens if something goes wrong with the 
contract? 
Other examples: 
- Recording sales just after the order but before the goods are shipped.  
- Recording incomes without taking into account goods returns strategy.  
- Not recording discounts.     
- 4- Non-recurring expenses and pension manipulation  
A company guarantees to pay an employee a specific amount based on a final salary and 
years of service. To guarantee this, companies have to put money in a fund and invest 
the money. One safe investment is a cash bond, which pays interest and secures the 
capital. However, some companies invest in the stock exchange, which involves more 
risk. They forecast by how much the interest will appreciate and calculate their 
contributions accordingly. They might underestimate their contribution to keep their 
profit high. If the fund does not grow sufficiently, there will not be enough money to 
pay pensions: this is known as a ‘hole’ in the pension fund. An example is the Royal 
Mail.
108
 
 
Some of above problems are compounded by poor auditing, as in the case of Enron. The 
auditor Arthur Andersen knew about the accounting fraud but did nothing about it. They 
were found guilty of destroying documents related to Enron’s auditing.109 To stop this 
kind of accounting fraud certain laws require firms to follow accounting reporting 
standards when they prepare their financial reports. It is also important to have auditing 
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standards and to have a public body to oversee the auditing profession. Accurate and 
reliable published accounts reduce the risks of an investor making a poor investment 
decision.
110
 However, it is not easy as it is complex and there is a financial cost to 
complying.  
 
In the UK, from 1947 companies have had to follow the UK accounting framework 
GAAP to present a “true and fair view” (TFV).111 In 2005, GAAP required public 
companies to follow International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRSs)
112
 as adopted 
by EU Directive 1606/2002 which was replaced in 2013 by EU directive 2013/34. In 
2014, EU Directive 2014/56 an “Audit Directive” was passed. The UK has to transpose 
this into the UK law by 2016. The Audit Directive has two important points. First, an 
auditor has to express his opinion on the statement of compliance with legal 
requirements. Second, an auditor has to state whether any material mistake has been 
identified. The Financial Reporting Council (FRC), as a single independent entity, sets 
and enforces the accounting framework and judges the fair and true view of the 
financial statements that show the firm’s position, profit and loss. 
 
In Kuwait, according to the 2010 Act, the Kuwaiti authority has the power to determine 
the kind of accounting standards which companies have to follow.
113
 According to rule 
No. 10/2011 the authority has adopted the International Financial Reporting Standards 
(IFRSs) issued by the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB). However, a 
number of experts in the accounting field criticised the application of international 
accounting standards, saying that it is difficult to comply with these rules because of 
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complexities. They recommended creating an independent body to help apply and 
supervise this complicated processes.
114
  
 
Protecting investors requires good accounting legislation that is fairly presented and 
subject to professional judgement. There are three important points to cover. First, 
having good accounting reporting standards. The second point is having professional 
auditors that express their opinion and state any misstatement. The third requirement is 
having a single independent body to set and enforce accounting standards.   
Although in Kuwait there is a clear indication of what is expected of companies in terms 
of financial reporting, it is difficult to measure their compliance because of the lack of a 
specific body to measure them. Kuwait needs to have a body responsible for developing 
the accounting standards and making firms comply, such as the Financial Reporting 
Council (FRC) in the UK. 
 
2.7 Conclusion 
 
This chapter has analysed the concept of protecting investors under securities laws and 
other laws. This chapter has considered four areas that are impacted by investor 
protection, namely the investors themselves, the securities, the securities laws and the 
mechanism of investor protection.  
 
Firstly, this chapter has stated that investors can be individuals or institutions, both of 
which in turn can be local or foreign. Each of them needs to be protected in a special 
way. Individual investors are normal persons, who try to ensure a good future for 
themselves and their families by improving their standard of living, obtaining a good 
education for their children, and protecting the value of their savings. An individual 
investor in the UK is viewed as a consumer of financial products or services. In 
contrast, Kuwait has no definition of an individual investor. 
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Secondly, the chapter has discussed the approach to financial regulation. Three 
components that make up financial regulation have been identified and are referred to in 
the UK as micro- and macro-prudential regulation together with the regulation of the 
Conduct of Business. The role played by the UK’s regulatory authority has been 
compared with the regulatory structure in Kuwait, especially with regard to the 
regulation of securities. In Kuwait, the Capital Market Authority is dedicated to the 
regulation of securities, while the Central Bank undertakes the regulation of everything 
else. In the UK, securities regulation is part of the overall financial regulation. Thirdly, 
this chapter has looked at the provisions contained in legislation not specifically 
targeted at securities, such as bribery law, company law, and accounting law, to 
illustrate how this form of ‘hard law’ protects investors. 
 
Based on investors’ expectations, protection needs to do three things. Firstly, it should 
guarantee a fair price that has not been influenced by market abuse, as discussed in 
Chapter Three. Secondly, it should ensure that investors have access to important 
information, as addressed in Chapter Four. Thirdly, investors should have protection 
from unscrupulous behaviour by managers, as discussed in Chapter Five. Finally, any 
regulation which tackles the above should be sound and effective and have the right 
balance of hard law and soft law. The next three chapters will address examples of laws 
that govern insider dealing, rule-making that governs fair disclosure and soft law that 
governs corporate governance. Chapter Six will focus on the way to develop laws, rule-
making and codes by having a sound regulatory authority. 
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Chapter Three 
Insider Dealing 
 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter aims to answer the question about whether  the 2010 Act protects  
investors from insider dealing. Professor Stephen M Bainbridge has described the issue 
of insider dealing as ‘one of the most controversial aspects of securities regulation, even 
among the law and economics community’.1 
 
There is no doubt that information is very important when buying or selling in the stock 
market, because information can materially affect the value of the securities. But, if 
access to information is limited to a group according to their positions, without which 
they cannot obtain the information, other investors will lose the opportunity to make a 
profit. Insider dealing adversely affects the opportunity that should be available to 
everyone in the market to have open access to information. This ‘principle of equality’ 
of having simultaneous information will be diminished.
2
 Since investors depend on 
information to make good decisions at the right and appropriate time, it is clear that a 
problem arises when only some investors know the positive or negative information, 
which can lead to shortcomings in the principle of equal access.    
 
                                                 
1Stephen Bainbridge, ‘Insider Trading’, in  Stephen Bainbridge (ed) Insider Trading (Edward Elgar 2011) 
700. 
2Article 3 of Executive Regulations of Kuwaiti Law No. 7 of 2010 provides that ‘The Authority aims to:  
1. Organise the securities business in line with the principles of equity, efficiency, competitiveness and 
transparency…’ 
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Decisions on whether to buy or sell are based on information collected from the market. 
The problem arises, however, when the information comes from confidential sources, 
and only a few people have access to it. This leads to the violation and derogation of the 
fairness of the market because of the inequality created by their position or their 
relationship to the source of the information. 
 
Promoting investor confidence in the securities markets and in particular ensuring that 
those participating in the markets do so on the same informational footing is one of the 
goals of the capital market worldwide. This goal cannot be achieved without regulating 
insider dealing. The existing legal framework for the regulation of insider dealing in 
Kuwait, Qatar and Saudi stock markets will be discussed in this chapter. 
 
This chapter will focus on the historical developments of the securities law governing 
insider dealing in the USA, the UK, Qatar, Saudi and Kuwait. Enforcement of insider 
dealing will be dealt with in chapter six. Criminal law will not be considered unless it 
forms part of the securities regulation as is the case in some jurisdictions such as 
Kuwait.   
 
3.2 Background to insider dealing 
 
Insider dealing involves the use of information that is not disclosed to the public. Insider 
dealing is not a recent phenomenon. It has a long history, and most countries have a 
special way to combat and fight it. The United States is a clear example of this battle.  
 
An increasing number of countries prohibit insider dealing by law. Even so, debate over 
the control of insider dealing has continued since the 1960s, and countries have different 
experiences with, and responses to, insider dealing. For example, the first judicial 
decision banning insider dealing was handed down in the United States in the case of Re 
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Cady, Roberts & Co.
3
 According to Seredynska, insider dealing in France was 
prohibited in 1967.
4
 Kuwait has not been immune from insider dealing, as will be 
discussed later. 
 
Nowadays, nearly every stock exchange market bans insider dealing, but they differ in 
the way they tackle it. Each of the two large competing markets, the European Union 
(EU) and the United States, has a different system for combating insider dealing. The 
EU recognises a breach of the duty of fairness to the market and other uninformed 
investors by using insider information obtained from a person in possession. It is 
beyond the scope of this thesis to study the EU position in detail; however, this thesis 
will look at the UK. The United States recognises insider dealing to be a violation of 
fiduciary duties or breaching a duty of confidence owed to the source of information, 
which will be discussed later.
5
 
 
When considering insider dealing, it is helpful to focus on American law, because the 
United States has a long history and extensive experience in this regard.
6
 The United 
States, which is the home of the world’s largest capital market, was one of the first 
jurisdictions to make insider trading illegal.
7
 There is a vast amount of information 
regarding the detection and prosecution of insider dealing under American law. Stephen 
Bainbridge said that ‘prohibition of insider trading will reward study not only for USA 
corporate and securities law scholars, but those of all countries’.8 However, Bainbridge 
                                                 
3
40 SEC 907 (1961). In Cady, Roberts & Co., a board member had given important information about an 
imminent dividend cut in a firm to a stockbroker, as a result of which the broker sold the company's 
shares. In 1961, the Disclose or Abstain Rule was established by this case. 
4
Iwona Seredynska,  Insider Dealing and Criminal Law; Dangerous Liaisons (Springer 2012) 1 
5
 ibid 2. 
6
Stephen Bainbridge, Insider (n 1) 700. 
7
Stephen Bainbridge, An Overview of Insider Trading Law and Policy: An introduction To the Insider 
Trading Research Handbook 2013 2. < http://ssrn.com/abstract=2141457 > accessed 7 December 2012. 
8
 ibid 2. 
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describes the modern American securities regulation as a complex, federally imposed 
ban of insider dealing and this is a central feature of the regulations.
9
 
 
3.3 Definition of insider dealing 
 
Generally, insider dealing involves trading (selling or buying) in a specific company’s 
securities by a person linked to that company, who, by virtue of that link, has inside 
information that would change the securities’ price if this information were made public 
knowledge.
10
 Such a person who possesses inside information could not achieve any 
profit from the trade if he or she did not have the link to the company.  
 
Bainbridge defines insider dealing, generally speaking, as ‘trading in securities while in 
possession of material non-public information’.11 This can be illustrated by the 
following example. A director of a company, who learns of good or bad news during a 
board meeting, buys or sells the company's shares to profit from the undisclosed 
information before the information is disclosed to the public. Under such circumstances, 
the director is involved in insider dealing. In this example, the director is seeking to take 
advantage of his position inside a company. This is also an example of the misuse of 
confidential data. Insider dealing also includes the situation where a person with 
confidential information persuades another person to trade in the securities. Insider 
dealing also occurs when a person avoids a loss or gains a profit by misusing 
confidential information gained through the person’s position within the company.12 
 
It should be underlined that the key to passing effective legislation against insider 
dealing is to define it properly. The definition has to cover the following four areas: who 
                                                 
9
 ibid 3. 
10
Gill Brazier, Insider Dealing: Law & Regulation (Cavendish Publishing Limited 1996) 76. 
11
Stephen Bainbridge, Insider (n 1) 701. 
12
Barry Rider, Kern Alexander, Lisa Linklater, Market Abuse and Insider Dealing (Butterworths 
Compliance Series LexisNexis 2002) 4. 
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is an insider? What is the inside information? How is the inside information transferred? 
And what action is banned? 
 
Who is an insider? In the past in the financial literature, ‘insiders’ were divided into two 
categories: primary insiders and secondary insiders. Primary insiders may hold such 
positions as members of the board of directors, managers, in-house accountants and in-
house lawyers, among others. These people hold positions that enable them to obtain 
information through the company’s management or supervision. Alternatively, 
secondary insiders are those who receive information directly or indirectly with full 
knowledge of the importance of the inside information through primary insiders.
13
 This 
includes people who work with the company through their profession, such as external 
accountants and lawyers.  
 
Some people argue that no distinction should be made between primary and secondary 
insiders. They offer several reasons to support their position. Firstly, they contend that 
the distinction is unnecessarily complicated, because it forces prosecutors and regulators 
to show not only that a person was in possession of inside information relating to a 
particular security, but that she or he obtained it in a particular manner. Secondly, the 
distinction fails to take into account how insider dealing is carried out. For example, few 
insider dealers deal themselves. Since there is nearly always a primary insider and a 
secondary accomplice, the distinction is not important. Finally, they argue that there is 
no justification for saying that a secondary insider (tippee) is less guilty than a primary 
insider.
14
 
 
Nowadays, much of the legislation defines insiders differently in that it does not 
distinguish between primary and secondary insiders. For example, the UK defines an 
insider as any person who has inside information (he knows it is inside information) 
                                                 
13
 Ahmed Almelhem, ‘The prohibition of company director from buying or selling the shares of the 
company during the term of his office’ (2011) 35 Journal of Law, University of Kuwait 461. 
14
 R C H Alexander, Insider dealing and money laundering in the EU: Law and regulation (Ashgate 
2007) 230. 
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from an inside source (he knows that he has obtained it from an inside source) 
according to section 57 of the Criminal Justice Act (CJA) 1993.  
 
What is inside information? Before defining inside information, the value of 
information in the financial market should be appreciated in order to understand insider 
dealing. Inside information includes the factors that determine the price of securities in 
the market.
15
 
 
Broadly speaking, inside information is defined as unpublished correct information that 
may substantially affect the price of securities and that relates to such securities or to the 
source of information. The definition has four elements. First, the information must not 
have been previously published. This includes non-published information described as 
secret information, even if a number of people know this information, as long as they 
know that the information is confidential. It is not necessary that all people are familiar 
with the information in order for it to be published. It is enough if it becomes known by 
one or more persons who are interested in the information. Statistics and the analysis of 
the published data are not necessarily confidential information, even though they are 
unpublished. Secondly, the information should be precise in that it is comprised of 
correct data rather than mere rumours. The disclosure of rumours does not constitute 
insider dealing. The third element is that the information be material, which requires 
that its publication will affect the price of the securities to which it relates. Finally, the 
information must relate to securities or to their issuing company. Such information can 
be internal in nature, such as information that discloses the occurrence of high profits 
and rewards, or it can be external information, which discloses that another company 
has agreed to a merger with the issuing company.
16
 
 
How is the information transferred? A person could obtain inside information from an 
inside source directly, such as being a director or through family relationship, for 
example, or indirectly via a family member to another person. In this respect, some laws 
                                                 
15
 Brenda Hannigan, Insider dealing (2
nd 
edn, Longman Group Ltd 1994) 2. 
16
 Ahmed Almelhem (n 13) 460. 
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require that, to be charged with insider dealing, the person should have obtained the 
information from inside sources. Typically If the person has not received the 
information from inside sources, he or she will not be convicted of any criminal offence 
or be subject to regulatory enforcement or attract any civil liability although this will 
depend on the jurisdictions.
17
 
 
What actions are banned? There are two important points here: the first is the type of 
prohibited act, such as dealing with inside information, disclosing inside information or 
encouraging other persons to trade. The type of ban will depend on the legislation and 
will be discussed later. The second important point is the scope of prohibition in terms 
of who is banned namely, a company insider or an outsider who receives inside 
information. For example, the Kuwaiti legislature omits any mention of criminal 
responsibility for the third party (a tippee) because he is not considered an insider.
18
 
 
3.4 Debate over insider dealing  
 
Protecting market integrity and stability is the main aim for prohibiting insider trading. 
The entire nation suffers from insider dealing, not just special individual victims.
19
 
Insiders have the potential to gain enormous profits. For instance, among many 
examples found in the United States, Ivan Boesky is one of the more well-known. 
Boesky paid a fine of $50 million and an additional $50 million in disgorged profits, a 
total of $100 million,
20
 and he received a prison sentence of 3.5 years
21
. The question 
here is, even after paying this amount of money in settlement, how much profit did he 
make from illegal insider dealing in 1991? How do those profits compare to the ill-
gotten gains being realised through insider dealing today? 
                                                 
17
 Barry Rider, Kern Alexander, Lisa Linklater (n 12) 6. 
18
 Adel Almane, ‘Criminalization of insider dealing in capital market: Comparative study between 
Kuwaiti and French laws’ (2012) Journal of Law, University of Kuwait. 
19
 R C H Alexander (n 14) 2. 
20
 Brenda Hannigan (n 15) 1. 
21
<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ivan_Boesky.> accessed 4 February 2015. 
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The question of why one should regulate insider dealing at all is not as odd as it might 
appear. Some have said that insider dealing is a victimless crime and that there is 
nothing fundamentally wrong with this activity, but the same could be argued about 
fraud.
22
 Identifying the victims of insider dealing presents an interesting issue. Some 
have said that the market suffers, but others have argued that this is too vague. In this 
situation, some laws have been enacted that criminalise conduct, such as treason, that 
affects the community at large but has no precise individual victims: the nation as a 
whole is the victim.
23
 Until recently, some countries, such as the central and eastern 
European states and some of the developing countries, have looked at insider dealing as 
a version of corruption or as a kind of perk that accompanies holding certain positions.
24
 
 
There are two principal arguments for and against insider dealing, respectively. The 
argument in favour of insider dealing, known as the ‘Manne Argument’, is an economic 
argument, while the argument against insider dealing is based on moral principles. The 
idea that insider dealing should be regulated and banned prevails. Each side has its 
reasons, as will be discussed. 
 
3.4.1 Manne argument 25 
 
Professor Manne researched the issue of insider dealing extensively and proffered an 
economic argument for permitting it. His arguments are based on economic, not legal, 
considerations. He believes that there is nothing wrong with insider dealing.
26
 Manne’s 
                                                 
22
 Alexander (n 14) 1. 
23
 ibid 2. 
24
 ibid. 
25
 Henry G Manne is one of the early exponents of the law and economics discipline. Professor Manne 
has published a number of books and articles, including recently ‘The Collected Works of Henry G. 
Manne’ in three volumes. <.http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Henry_Manne> accessed 4 February 2015. 
26
 Manne has also asserted that the SEC selected the wrong weapon to protect the market. ‘The SEC is 
presently in the process of shaping and developing another technique, more frightening and potentially 
more damaging than anything yet done. Instead of trying to discover the identity of inside traders after the 
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first argument is that insider dealing has the potential to encourage people to trade in the 
securities markets, since it focuses on corporate managers, who need the encouragement 
of a reward. Manne mentioned that managers need rewards for their performance and 
added that although they are remunerated for their managerial skills such remuneration 
is set in advance and cannot be used to distinguish between innovative and ordinary 
managers; therefore, it is inappropriate. He believed that nothing would motivate 
managers like market prices and that the greatest motivation is to become rich quickly 
through insider trading. Manne also believed that a bonus cannot reward a manager, 
because it does not depend upon individual contribution, but is instead based on the 
firm’s profits.27 
 
Manne’s contentions have generated a number of replies. First, the personal rewards of 
insider dealing do not make it advantageous to society. Otherwise, it would also be 
argued that the rewards of dealing in drugs are also advantageous to society. The second 
response to this argument is that those who hold these kinds of jobs, such as executives 
and managers, are already well-compensated by high salaries, bonuses, and other 
benefits. Another point is that Manne concentrated on corporate executives as though 
they are the only persons who might participate in insider dealing. He thereby 
disregarded other individuals who would benefit from insider dealing, such as the 
company lawyer and accountant, among others. Manne would offer them the same 
reward. The final reply to the first argument is that Manne failed to point out that there 
are two sides: a profit and a loss. He only referred to the situation when the company 
benefits from having a higher market value. In the contrary case, the executive might 
sell securities at a loss to benefit from insider dealing in a way that would cause other 
investors to suffer from the company’s losses.28 
 
                                                                                                                                               
fact....the SEC has sought to prevent insider dealing by stopping all trading in a company's shares.’ Henry 
Manne, ‘In Defense of Insider Trading’ in Stephen Bainbridge (ed), Insider Trading, Edward Elgar 2011) 
42. 
27
Henry Manne, Insider Trading and the Stock Market (The Free Press 1966) 131-136. 
28
 Alexander (n 14) 3-5. 
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In the second argument, Manne claimed that without insider dealing there would be a 
large change in securities prices which is harmful to the stability of the market. 
29
 
Manne emphasised that the whole market would benefit from insider dealing, because 
any rise or fall in securities prices that would result from such dealing would only 
gently increase or decrease the amount that would otherwise have resulted from the 
transaction. He explained that executives will buy securities at a lower price before the 
information becomes public so that, after the announcement, the securities will rise 
gradually. Since this process would benefit the market as whole, it could enhance the 
stability of the markets. Opponents of the Manne view argue that only a small fraction 
of all those trading in securities are involved in insider dealing. In addition, insider 
dealing occurs in a very small percentage of all of the securities transactions, as a result 
of which it is not significant.
30
  
 
3.4.2 Moral principles argument 
 
Fairness and equity are the strongest reasons for banning insider dealing, not the 
economic arguments that are still advanced today. The idea that insider dealing should 
be regulated and banned prevails.
31
 
 
3.4.2.1 Unfairness and harm 
The most popular moral argument against insider dealing is that it is simply unfair. An 
insider can rely upon information known only to him because of his position to decide 
whether and when to sell or buy securities. This is unfair. It is also unfair that the insider 
deals with people who do not have the same information as he does. So, the question 
here is whether it is unfair to enter into a securities transaction when an inequality of 
knowledge exists.
32
 
                                                 
29
 Henry Manne, In Defense of Insider Trading (n 26) 421. 
30
 Alexander (n 14) 6. 
31
Stephen Bainbridge, Insider (n 1) 700. 
32
ibid 52. 
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The strongest ethical objection is that insider dealing takes advantage of better data than 
other investors have, because they do not have and cannot get the same information that 
the insider possesses. However, some argue that it is illogical to expect that each 
transaction should be based upon an equality of knowledge in order to describe it as fair. 
In addition, no one can have and comprehend all available information. By analogy, a 
doctor cannot be blamed for charging the patient more money because the doctor has 
specialised knowledge.
33
 Others point out that knowledge is the key to power.  
 
The second area of concern is identifying the harm and the victim. The possible victims 
are as follows. 1) The market: some contend that the assertion that the victim of insider 
dealing is the market or society is made only because it is not possible to show that 
harm has actually been caused or to identify who has been harmed.
34
 2) Other investors: 
some contend that small investors are harmed by insider dealing, because they will be 
deterred from investing their savings in the market. Others counter that if the small 
investors are harmed because they lack knowledge about financial instruments, banning 
insider dealing will not increase their knowledge and, therefore, will not prevent them 
from suffering harm from insider dealing.
35
 3) Employers: some argue that employers’ 
information should be protected within the contract of employment with the insider and 
one should not rely on public law (as securities law) to protect the employer’s interests. 
This avoids any ethical debate on whether insider dealing should be regulated or not.
36
 
4) Insiders: proponents of insider dealing contend that insiders are harmed by this ban, 
because they are compelled not to use their knowledge even though insider dealing does 
not harm any person.
37
 
 
3.4.2.2 Fraud  
                                                 
33
ibid. 
34
ibid 54. 
35
ibid 56. 
36
ibid 57. 
37
ibid 57. 
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As the insider does not disclose all of the information that he or she possesses to the 
person with whom he or she is dealing, some say that insider dealing is a kind of fraud. 
Proponents of insider dealing counter that there is no moral duty to disclose and explain 
all of the information that the insider has.
38
 A practical example of a fraudulent action is 
the following scenario. An investor buys shares at a certain price from insiders before 
negative information is published. The insider is aware of the information, but does not 
disclose it. After the publication of the information the price drops. As a result, the 
insider has made money at the expense of the investor. Some would argue that the 
investor will buy anyway. But he would not buy at the same price if the information 
were published. 
 
In the UK, the court of appeal in McQuoid case agreed to consider insider dealing as a 
type of fraud by saying ‘the message must be clear, when it is done deliberately insider 
dealing is a species of fraud, it is cheating”.39 
 
From a different viewpoint, insider dealing can be considered as fraud because the 
insider trades are based on an employer’s information, especially when the employer 
has trusted him to take care of it. In this situation, the insider misappropriates 
information belonging to his employer by breaching a fiduciary duty. However, the 
insider does not have a fiduciary duty to a trader. The misappropriation theory mentions 
that the insider breaches the confidential duty owed to the source of the data if he trades 
based on the employer’s information. This will be discussed in detail later. 
 
3.4.2.3 Easy Money 
 
Opponents of insider dealing assert that, because an insider can easily realise a 
significant amount of money in a short period of time with little or no effort, insider 
dealing is like theft. Proponents of insider dealing reject this assertion, because anyone 
can work hard enough to become fully informed and be successful without insider 
                                                 
38
ibid 58. 
39
 R. v McQuoid [ 2009] EWCA Crim 1301 ; [2009] 4 All E.R 388 at [9].  
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information. They consider that opponents of insider dealing are really motivated by 
envy, which is not a good reason for any law.
40
 
 
Today, it is generally acknowledged that insider dealing is wrong and the argument 
about whether insider dealing should be regulated is purely of historical interest and is 
no longer an issue.
41
 The challenge now is to find the ideal model to combat insider 
dealing. What follows will consider the USA and the UK models for combating insider 
dealing. .  
 
3.5 Developments in the United States against insider dealing42 
 
In the USA, there is a complicated regulatory structure that regulates the  securities 
industry. There are federal and state laws.
43
 The top  regulatory agency is  the Securities 
and Exchange Commission (SEC) which has to oversee all stock exchanges and 
anybody connected with trading securities. In 2007 the Financial industry Regulation 
Authority (FINRA)  was created. FINRA is a self-regulatory organisation which is 
responsible for policing the securities industry. It  also sets rules for stockbrokers and 
licenses them and they can fine individual and firms. FINRA can handle   customer 
complaints about any illegal or unethical actions. In terms of laws, individual  states 
also have securities divisions.
44
 They are different from state to state. It can be said that 
in the USA there is a  multi fractioned regulatory system that includes federal and state 
bodies. This system is not suitable for  Kuwait because it does not have a federal legal 
system.  
 
The following section discusses the Pre-Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) rules, 
the SEC Era, the Disclose or Abstain Rule, Rule 14e-3, Misappropriation and Tipping. 
                                                 
40
 ibid 59. 
41
 Alexander (n 14) 229. 
42
 The phrase ‘insider dealing’ is referred to in the United States as ‘insider trading’. 
43
 <http://stocks.about.com/od/tradingbasics/a/Regulat011705.htm> accessed 16 Nov. 15 
44
 ibid 
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3.5.1 Pre-Securities Exchange Commission (SEC)   
 
Before the introduction of specific laws to regulate insider dealing in 1933-34, attempts 
were made to apply the common law of fraud in all circumstances, although this did not 
always work because of the special nature of securities fraud. Three approaches were 
used by the state courts to impose criminal liability on insiders. 
 
The ‘Minority Rule’ was adopted by a minority of states. According to this rule, an 
insider had to disclose inside information to selling shareholders before dealing with 
them. The majority of states adopted the ‘Majority Rule,’ whereby insiders did not have 
a fiduciary duty to shareholders, because, unlike trust law, they were not strictly trustees 
of the company. Although an insider had a duty of good faith and undivided loyalty to 
the company, the courts held that it was illogical to treat an insider as a trustee.
45
 The 
Majority Rule did not prevent liability arising for misrepresentation or concealment of 
facts material to the purchase.
46
 The third approach came about as an exception to the 
Majority Rule and was known as the ‘special circumstances rule’. It means that the 
insider has to disclose to selling or buying shareholders before dealing with them the 
special facts that he knows about a company’s activities that may or will soon have a 
material effect and that are not available in books or financial reports about the 
company. This rule is similar to the Minority Rule.
47
 An attempt to conceal the 
purchaser’s identity was also classified as special circumstances. 
 
3.5.2 The SEC Era 
 
Under American Federal law, four rules have evolved over the years in an effort to 
combat insider dealing. Two of these rules were created by courts according to section 
                                                 
45
 Michael Conant, ‘Duties of Disclosure of Corporate Insider Who Purchases Shares’ in Stephen 
Bainbridge (ed), Insider Trading (Edward Elgar 2011) 5. 
46
<http://www.sechistorical.org/museum/galleries/it/index.php> accessed 1 December 2012.     
47
 Michael Conant (n 45) 9. 
 99 
 
10(b)
48
 of the Securities Exchange Act 1934 and Rule 10b-5.
49
 Section 10(b) and Rule 
10b-5 were fraud provisions. Neither mentioned insider dealing. However the anti-fraud 
provisions were relatively easy to apply to a corporate insider who secretly traded in his 
own company’s shares while in the possession of inside information. What was unclear 
was whether 10b and 10b-5 prohibited insider dealing by a corporate outsider. In 
1961,in Re Cady, Robert & Co.
50
 the SEC stated in an administrative decision that they 
did based on the provision of 10b-5 which was known as the Disclose or Abstain Rule.  
 
3.5.2.1 The Disclose or Abstain Rule 
                                                 
48
 Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act 1934 renders it illegal:  
To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security registered on 
a national securities exchange or any security not so registered, or any securities-based 
swap agreement (as defined in section 206B of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act), any 
manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and 
regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public 
interest or for the protection of investors. 
49
 Rule 10b-5, promulgated in 1942 under the Rules and Regulations pursuant to the Securities Exchange 
Act 1934, provides:  
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or 
instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of any national 
securities exchange,  
a- To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, 
b- To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact 
necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under 
which they were made, not misleading, or 
c- To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would operate as 
a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase or sale of any 
security. 
50
40 SEC 907 (1961). 
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The Disclose or Abstain Rule states that ‘the people who have access to material non-
public information should either disclose the information or abstain from trading that 
security’.51 This rule is also known as the ‘equal access theory’ or “Traditional Theory”. 
     
Until the 1980s, cases on insider dealing were brought on the basis of the so-called 
traditional theory based on the disclose or abstain rule. However, at the start of the 
1980s the SEC brought a case against an outsider, a printer called Chiarella
52
 publishing 
tender information. Chiarella was convicted of violating rule 10b-5 by trading on the 
basis of material non-public information. He did not owe a duty to shareholders of the 
trading corporation or have any relationship at all to those shareholders.  
    
The United States Supreme Court overturned the conviction which had been based on 
the policy of equality of access to information stating that there can be no liability 
unless and until a person has a duty to disclose material information to a person with 
whom he or she is trading. In Dirks v SEC.
53
 The supreme court also rejected the 
insider’s legal obligation stating that a tip was not sufficient to create liability and one 
needed to look at the motive of the insider and whether he personally benefited directly 
or indirectly from his disclosure. These cases narrowed the scope of the Disclose or 
Abstain Rule by requiring a fiduciary duty that excludes the outsider. In the two cases 
the Supreme Court would not apply the Disclose or Abstain Rule due to the fact that the 
people in the case did not have a fiduciary duty to the shareholders. However, there are 
                                                 
51
 Henry Cheeseman, Business Law: Legal Environment, Online Commerce, Business Ethics and 
International Issues (8th edn, Pearson Education 2013) 701.  
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445 US 222 (1980), Vincent Chiarella got the names of the tender offer target companies from his job 
in a printing company. The information was in documents that had been given to him for printing. Based 
on this information, he made transactions  sales or purchases and was prosecuted in a criminal court for 
insider dealing. 
53
463 US 646 (1983), some facts in Dirks v SEC include fraud by a firm that was discovered by a 
financial analyst, who then informed The Wall Street Journal. When the Journal disregarded the 
information, the analyst passed the information to his clients to sell their stocks.  
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two essential ways in which the rule could cover the outsiders of a company. In these 
situations, a breach of fiduciary duty must also be found in order to apply this rule.
54
 
 
The first group of nominal outsiders to whom this rule can be applied are those who 
have a sufficiently close relationship with the issuer of the affected securities, and 
therefore they are a ‘constructive insider’55. The three following conditions must be 
satisfied. The first occurs when the issuer gives the material non-public information to 
the outsider. The second occurs when the outsider is expected by the issuer to keep the 
information confidential. Finally, the relationship between the parties must be implied 
by such a duty. If any of these three conditions is not met, the rule does not apply. The 
second group of outsiders to whom this rule can be applied are those who obtain the 
information from a true or constructive insider. 
 
The loophole in the law at that stage whereby outsiders could not be liable for insider 
dealing was filled by  Rule14e-3 and the misappropriation theory.
56
 
 
3.5.2.2 Rule 14e-3 
 
In the wake of Chiarella the SEC passed Rule 14e-3 to remove the Chiarella duty 
requirement.  The application of this rule does not require a breach of any fiduciary 
duty. According to Rule 14e-3, any person who is in possession of non-public 
information about a tender offer
57
 that the person knows has come from an insider is 
banned from revealing the non-public information to any person who can trade based on 
                                                 
54
 Stephen Bainbridge, Insider (n 1) 702. 
55
 ibid. 
56
 ibid. 
57
 A tender offer is a type of public takeover bid when by shareholders of the company are invited by a 
prospective buyer to tender their shares for sale at specified price during a specified time. 
<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tender_offer> accessed 22 June 2015. 
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this information. However, the scope of the ban’s application is very narrow in that it is 
limited to tender offers. Another consideration that may limit the scope of the 
application of this rule is the extent to which the offeror has started or has taken 
substantial steps toward the commencement of the offer. 
 
Rule 14e-3 combats the improper use of inside information related to a tender offer. 
There remain gaps in the extent of the protection of the use of inside information for 
which additional rules are required. The sanctions for breach of these rules are 
regulatory and are enforced by the SEC. 
 
3.5.2.3 Misappropriation 
 
The misappropriation theory or rule is another part of American law governing insider 
dealing. The misappropriation theory means that a person who uses confidential 
information belonging to his employer to buy or sell securities breaches the duty owed 
to the source of the data. Such a person infringes a duty of confidentiality and loyalty. 
Generally, the theory relates to using the information belonging to his principal 
regardless of the fact that the person has no fiduciary duty regarding with whom he 
trades. The misappropriation theory says that insider dealing is part of a ‘deceptive 
device or contrivance’ (included in Section 10b). That is, the misappropriation theory is 
linked to insider dealing by section 10(b).
58
 
 
The misappropriation theory was born when Chief Justice Burger who dissented in 
Chiarella case argued that although Chiarella was not bound by confidentiality to 
investors with whom he traded he did owe a duty of confidentiality to his employers and 
thereby to bidders. By misappropriating information which had been entrusted to his 
employers he had breached his duty sufficiently to justify imposing rule 10b5 liability. 
Although the Chiarella case failed, this theory was subsequently adopted by the Second 
Circuit court of appeal as a basis for insider trading liability in the US in US v 
                                                 
58
 Stephen Bainbridge, An Overview (n 7) 11. 
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Newman
59
 and others. However, it took another 10 years before the supreme court in 
1997 would affirm in that this theory valid for apply rule 10b5.  
 
The United States Supreme Court accepted the theory as legally binding in US v 
O’Hagan60 . In July 1988, James O’Hagan worked as a partner in the Minneapolis law 
firm Dorsey & Whitney, which was retained by Grand Metropolitan PLC (Grand Met) 
relating to its plan to take over the Pillsbury Company. Through his position at the firm, 
O’Hagan obtained non-public material information upon which he relied in buying 
Pillsbury shares and call options. The most important point here was that O’Hagan did 
not work with any of the parties to the tender offer and, as a result, did not breach a 
fiduciary duty. After approximately four months, Grand Met declared its tender offer, at 
which time O’Hagan sold shares and  made a huge profit of more than $4.3 million, 
which resulted from an approximately $60 per share price increase in Pillsbury’s stock. 
The Supreme Court confirmed his criminal conviction and applied the theory of 
misappropriation to protect the integrity of the stock exchange from abuse by an 
outsider, who owed no duty to the company’s shareholders or fiduciary duty to the 
company. The Court affirmed O’Hagan’s conviction on the charge that he violated 
section 10(b) of the 1934 Act and Rule 14e-3 by dealing with misappropriated non-
public information and on the charge that he violated Rule 14e-3 by trading while in 
possession of non-public information relating to a tender offer.
61
 
 
In conclusion, the misappropriation theory means simply that any person who deals in 
any shares on the basis of his or her employer’s information will be guilty of insider 
trading. 
 
 
 
                                                 
59
 664 F 2d 12 (2
nd
 Cir 1981). 
60
117 S Ct 2199, 2211 (1997). 
61
 Stephen Bainbridge, Insider (n 1) 704. 
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3.5.2.4 Tipping  
 
The original fraud provision of 10(b) and 10b-5 which applied to a tippee was extended 
in common law in Dirks v SEC to include tippees. According to Dirks v SEC, two 
important conditions must be met to hold liable someone who receives confidential 
information (tippee). The first condition, relating to insiders (tippers), is that insiders 
breach a fiduciary duty by giving a tip to a tippee. The second condition, relating to a 
tippee, is that a tippee must know or have reason to know about the breach of a 
fiduciary duty (the first condition).62 
 
In the Dirks case, simply breaching a duty was not sufficient; the duty of loyalty had to 
be breached by profiting from information entrusted to the tipper. In addition, some 
scholars said that the directors or other insiders had to benefit from the disclosure.
63
 
Consequently, while it may be careless to discuss business in a public place, it does not 
constitute a breach of loyalty.
64
 
 
As an example of illegal tipping, Gen Tek Inc CEO, William E Redmond tipped his 
close friend, Stefano Signorastri the manager of Manhattan restaurant, with confidential 
information about the company which enabled the latter to make $164,000 in illicit 
trading profits. Both agreed to pay more than $324,000 to settle the SEC’s charges 
related to dealing in Gen Tek Inc shares. The CEO also agreed to be barred from acting 
as an officer or director of a public company for five years.
65
 
 
This is a serious problem in Kuwait, because Kuwait is a small country and it is difficult 
to keep anything secret. 
                                                 
62
 ibid 9. 
63
 ibid. 
64
 ibid 16. 
65
<http://www.sec.gov/News/PressRelease/Detail/PressRelease/1370543516329#.VONAwNIcTIU> 
accessed 17 February 2015. 
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3.5.2.5 Rule 10b5-1 and rule 10b5-2 in 2000 
 
Despite the courts’ adoption of the misappropriation theory, there still remained 
unresolved issues. In a number of cases the Supreme Court described the insider 
violation as trading ‘on the basis of material non-public information’ but it did not 
address the issue of use versus possession. Three Court of Appeal cases reached 
different conclusions. In United States v Teicher
66
 it ruled that ‘knowing possession’ is 
sufficient, in SEC v Adler
67
 it ruled ‘use is required, but proof of possession provides 
strong inference of use and in United States v Smith
68
 it required that ‘use’ be proven in 
a criminal case.
69
 Another unresolved issue that came to light in United States v 
Chessman
70
 concerned the duty of trust or confidence in non-business relationships such 
as family and other personal relationships.  
 
This was unsatisfactory from the SEC’s point of view. One of the major responsibilities 
of the SEC is to promulgate regulations and rules that have the force of law and that 
help to achieve the aim of the Federal Securities Act.
71
 Pursuant to that responsibility, 
the SEC promulgated rules 10b5-1 and 10b5-2 to attempt to resolve the two issues 
mentioned above.
72
 Part (A)
73
 of the former rule consisted of a general rule formalising 
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 987 F 2d 112, 120-21 (2d Cir) cert denied, 510 US 976 (1993). 
67
 137 F 3d 1325, 1337 (11
th
 Cir 1998). 
68
 155 F 3d 1051, 1069 & n 27 (9
th
 Cir 1998), cert denied, 525 US 1071 (1999). 
69
 <http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/33-7881.htm#P233_90511> accessed 14 March 2013.  
70
947 F 2d 551 (2d Cir 1991); the Second Circuit said that ‘marriage does not, without more, create a 
fiduciary duty’.   
71
 Henry Chessman (n 51). 
72
<http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/33-7881.htm> accessed 12 March 2013.   
73
  
(A) General. The ‘manipulative and deceptive devices’ prohibited by Section 10(b) of 
the Act (15 U.S.C. 78j) and § 240.10b-5 there under include, among other things, the 
purchase or sale of a security of any issuer, on the basis of material non-public 
information about that security or issuer, in breach of a duty of trust or confidence that 
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the decision in O’Hagan while (b) introduced a definition of ‘on the basis of’ material 
non-public information as being aware of material non-public information when making 
a purchase or sale. In addition, the rule adds affirmative defences, which means that 
insiders can in certain circumstances be exempt from liability for insider trading, such 
as when the insiders had had a commitment contract for trading or a written trading plan 
before being aware of the inside information. Rule 10b5-2 provides three non-exclusive 
situations in which a person is deemed to have a trust or confidence duty.
74
 
 
In the United States, three sources of law have contributed to the development of the 
insider trading regime: the 1934 Act (statute), the courts (common law), and the rules 
promulgated by the SEC. Each of the three sources has affected the insider trading 
regime over time, starting in 1934 and most recently in 2000, as shown below.
75
  
                                                                                                                                               
is owed directly, indirectly, or derivatively, to the issuer of that security or the 
shareholders of that issuer, or to any other person who is the source of the material non-
public information. 
74
 For purposes of this section, a ‘duty of trust or confidence’ exists in the following circumstances, 
among others:  
Whenever a person agrees to maintain information in confidence... Whenever the 
person communicating the material non-public information and the person to whom it is 
communicated have a history, pattern, or practice of sharing confidences... Whenever a 
person receives or obtains material non-public information from his or her spouse, 
parent, child, or sibling. 
75
 <http://www.sechistorical.org/museum/galleries/it/takeCommand_d.php>  accessed 19 Nov. 2015 
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Year  Event  Important points  
1934  1- The Securities Exchange Act 
1934 was enacted. 
2- SEC Established. 
1- There is no specific provision banning insider 
trading directly. 
2- Section 10b makes it illegal ‘to use or employ... 
any manipulative or deceptive device or 
contrivance...’ 
1942 SEC promulgates Rule 10b-5 To enforce section 10b above.  
1961 Re Cady, Roberts & Co.
76
 1- The first case in which a court banned insider 
trading under section 10b and rule 10b-5. 
2- Adopted the ‘Disclose or Abstain’ Rule (needed a 
breach of a fiduciary duty). 
1980  Chiarella v United States
77
 1- US Supreme Court narrowed the scope of the 
‘Disclose or Abstain’ Rule. 
2- Adopted rule 14e-3 regarding tender offer. 
1984  Dirks v SEC
78
  1- Adopting tippee and tipper liability. 
2- In Dirks, the tippees were not liable, because the 
tipper did not personally benefit from the 
disclosure. 
1997 United States v O’Hagan
79
  1- Adopted the ‘misappropriation’ theory (needed a 
breach of a duty of trust or confidence).  
2- Extended the scope of the ban to include 
‘outsiders’. 
1998 -
1999 
United States v Teicher
80
 
SEC v Adler
81
 
United States v Smith
82
 
Three Court of Appeal cases reached different 
conclusions 
2000 SEC promulgated rules 10b5-1 Resolved two issues 
                                                 
76
 40 SEC 907 (1961).  
77
 445 US 222 (1980). 
78
 463 US 646 (1983). 
79
 117 S Ct 2199, 2211 (1997). 
80
 987 F 2d 112, 120-21 (2d Cir) cert denied, 510 US 976 (1993). 
81
 137 F 3d 1325, 1337 (11
th
 Cir 1998). 
82
 155 F 3d 1051, 1069 & n 27 (9
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 Cir 1998), cert denied, 525 US 1071 (1999). 
 118 
 
and rules 10b5-2 
1- Whether possession of inside information was 
enough or whether it had to be used. 
2- When a duty of trust or confidence exists for the 
purpose of the misappropriation theory. For 
example, family members. 
Table 3.1 Milestones in the Development of Insider Trading in the USA 
 
3.6 Developments in the United Kingdom against insider dealing  
 
The UK has not faced the problem of  the USA arising from the presence of legislation 
at state level and at federal level. Moreover, the UK legislated specifically against 
insider dealing from the outset unlike the USA  where for nearly half a century. There 
was reliance on case law and secondary legislation in the form of rules.
83
 With the 
arrival of the EU, UK law was expanded. The range of actionable insider dealing 
activities was increased under the term market abuse which also comprised actionable 
activities other than insider dealing. 
 
The following discusses the evolution of financial regulation related to insider dealing. 
3.6.1 1980 - 1993  
 
Before 1980, prohibiting insider dealing was limited to requiring company directors and 
their families to report their trading in shares of their own companies.
84
 According to 
                                                 
83
 It is difficult to compare the insider dealing laws of the United States and the United Kingdom, because 
the situation in the United States is and has been complicated by the evolution of many theories over time 
and by the complicated manner in which the American legal system addresses insider dealing (common 
law, statutes and SEC rules). However, in the United Kingdom, a fiduciary duty does not have to be 
breached, and insider dealing is defined more clearly than in the United States. 
 
84
 Kern Alexander, ‘UK Insider and Market Abuse Law: Strengthening Regulatory Law to Combat 
Market Misconduct’ in Stephen Bainbridge (ed), Research Handbook on Insider Trading (Edward Elgar 
2013) 410.   
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Clarke, insider dealing first became a crime in the UK in 1980 in limited circumstances 
under the Companies Act 1980.
85 
 
Legislation to regulate insider dealing in a wider way in the UK was first introduced in 
1993 with the promulgation of the Criminal Justice Act (CJA), which made insider 
dealing a criminal offence punishable with an unlimited fine or imprisonment not 
exceeding seven years or both.
86
  
 
3.6.2 2000 
 
The UK government felt that the 1993 Act, particularly relating to insider dealing, did 
not adequately address all forms of abusive conduct. Thus, it introduced the Financial 
Services and Markets Act 2000 (FSMA) in order to extend the scope of the law and to 
make it possible to take civil action to complement the criminal law, because the latter 
required a standard of proof which made it difficult to effectively police the UK 
markets. In 2005, the Act was amended  to   implement the European Union Market 
Abuse Directive 2003/6/EC. In accordance  with the directive Section 118  of  the 2000 
Act, extended the types of market abuse to seven from the original three, including 
insider dealing. .UK legislation on insider dealing and market abuse is based on  
European Union Market Abuse Directive 2003/6/EC. 
 
In the United Kingdom, criminal lawsuits and civil sanctions for insider dealing 
offences are brought by the Financial Services Authority (FSA) (now FCA). Few 
criminal prosecutions have been pursued, because the standard of proof required to 
convict is higher than in civil actions. The criminal standard must show culpability 
beyond reasonable doubt, which is not easy to do with the type of evidence in such 
cases, because ‘insiders’ have many ways of concealing their tracks, including the use 
                                                 
85
 Sarah Clarke, Insider Dealing: Law and Practice (OUP 2013) 22. 
86
 CJA 1993 s61. 
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of nominees, offshore companies and the like. Even if the evidence is uncovered, it 
must be corroborated, which is also difficult. The prosecution needs to establish that: 
- An individual possessed inside information. 
- He or she knew that such information was inside information. 
- An individual traded in such inside information. 
- The individual traded knowing that such information had come from an inside 
source. 
 
In the majority of cases, there will be no direct evidence that a person possessed inside 
information. In the case of R v Holyoak, Hill and Morl (unreported),
87
 the prosecution 
failed to prove that when the defendants traded in the shares of a takeover target, the 
information that the defendants held was price-sensitive inside information. The 
defendants effectively disputed the charge by establishing that they thought that the 
information upon which they relied in their dealings had been publicly disclosed. 
 
On the other hand, in the case of R v (1) McQuoid (2) Melbourne,
88
 the prosecution was 
successful. The jury found that Melbourne had received inside information from 
McQuoid, in reliance upon which Melbourne made a profit. The court ordered the FSA 
(now FCA) to freeze the profit and sentenced each defendant to eight months in prison. 
 
The 2008 financial crisis in the UK has led the FSA (now FCA) to prosecute more 
criminal cases in an effort to deter insiders. This policy of ‘credible deterrence’ has paid 
dividends with six successful prosecutions between 2009 and 2011.
89
 Between there and 
now there have been 27 convictions.
90
 The FSA (now FCA) uses its power of 
                                                 
87
 An account of the case is given by Jane Mayfield in an article entitled ‘The FSA’s approach to insider 
dealing’ [2009] 159 NLJ 7373. 
88
 (2009) Southwark Crown Court. After the buying process on 1 June, the price jumped to 45 pence per 
share after the takeover offer was announced. Melbourne earned approximately £48,900. Three months 
later, he gave half of the money that he had made from the deal to McQuoid. 
89
 Iain Macneil, An Introduction to The Law on Financial Investment (2
nd
 edn, Hart Publishing Ltd ) 414. 
90
< http://www.fca.org.uk/news/three-charged-with-insider-dealing> accessed 19 June 2015 
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investigation provided by the FSMA 2000 to achieve this success, present evidence and 
prosecute insider dealing as defined in the CJA 1993.
91
 It is beyond the scope of this 
thesis to study methods of proof and investigation.  
 
3.6.3 2005  
 
The EU  have expanded the regime to cover different types of market abuse not just  
insider dealing which is different from some other jurisdictions which have specific 
provisions for insider dealing.
92
 The EU market abuse regime is mostly based on Market 
Abuse Directive (The 2003 MAD)
93
. In 2014 new directives repealed the 2003 
directive.
94
 
 
Undeniably, insider dealing is a form of market abuse. How the legislation defines 
market abuse depends on the jurisdiction. For example, in Kuwait there is no legal 
definition of market abuse. On the other hand, in the UK the FSMA 2000
95
 defines 
                                                 
91
 Jane Mayfield (n 87). 
92
 Niamh Moloney, EU Securities And Financial Markets Regulation (3
rd
 end, Oxford University Press 
2014) 699.  
93
 In terms of European law, the so-called Segre Report in 1966 contained the first proposal to standardise 
insider dealing and said that the problem could arise only in securities from directors or executives in 
their own companies. The next step occurred in 1989, when the vast majority of the member states had no 
insider dealing regulations. The battle against insider dealing started with the adoption of Council 
Directive (89/592/EEC) of November, 1989, which coordinated regulations on insider dealing. In 
addition, the introduction of insider dealing prohibition in all member states was the most important 
objective. Following the previously mentioned Directive, in 2003, a new Market Abuse Directive (MAD) 
was passed, which has a much broader range of application than the previous Directive. Iwona 
Seredynska,  Insider Dealing and Criminal Law; Dangerous Liaisons (Springer 2012) 3-4 
94
 ibid. 
95The seven types of behaviour that constitute a form of market abuse fall within ‘market abuse’ as that 
term is defined by the British Parliament in direction-driven amendments to the Financial Services and 
Markets Act 2000 (FSMA), Section 118 changed the statutory definition of market abuse in Part VII 
Control of Business Transfers:s118 Market abuse.  
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seven types of market abuse contained in the EU 2003 directive and is probably the 
most comprehensive definition of this activity. This is in addition to the definition of 
insider dealing in the 1993 Act. 
 
The UK has a dual criminal and civil regime for insider dealing.
96
 Thus, the FCA has 
two options to follow. First, under the CJA it may prosecute an insider dealer through 
the courts. This can lead to prison. The second option is under the market abuse regime, 
which can lead to an unlimited fine. This is effected without going to court, through the 
FCA discipline committee.  
 
The first three forms of market abuse are considered to be types of insider dealing.
97
 
These three types of market abuse are defined in the 2000 Act as follows:  
 
The first type is defined as follows: ‘(2) The first type of behaviour is where an insider 
deals, or attempts to deal, in a qualifying investment or related investment on the basis 
of inside information relating to the investment in question’. This type of abuse can be 
described as insider dealing. 
 
The second type of market abuse is defined as follows: ‘(3) the second is where an 
insider discloses inside information to another person otherwise than in the proper 
                                                                                                                                               
(1) For the purposes of this Act, market abuse is behaviour (whether by one person 
alone or by two or more persons jointly or in concert) which— (a) occurs in relation to 
(i) qualifying investments admitted to trading on a prescribed market, (ii) qualifying 
investments in respect of which a request for admission to trading on such a market has 
been made, or (iii) in the case of subsections (2) or (3) behaviour, investments which 
are related investments in relation to such qualifying investments, and (b) falls within 
any one or more of the types of behaviour set out in subsections (2) to (8). 
96
 Marten Hopper, ‘Overview of Market Conduct Regulation in the UK’ in Martin Hopper and others 
(eds) A Practitioner’s Guide to the Law and Regulation of Market Abuse (Sweet & Maxwell 2013) 10 -
11.   
97
 ibid 11.  
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course of the exercise of his employment, profession or duties’. This type of abuse can 
be described as the wrongful disclosure of inside information. 
The third type of behaviour is defined as follows:  
(4) The third is where the behaviour (not falling within subsection (2) or (3) (a) 
is based on information, which is not generally available to those using the 
market, but which, if available to a regular user of the market, would be, or 
would be likely to be, regarded by him as relevant when deciding the terms on 
which transactions in qualifying investments should be effected, and (b)is likely 
to be regarded by a regular user of the market as a failure on the part of the 
person concerned to observe the standard of behaviour reasonably expected of a 
person in his position in relation to the market.  
This type of abuse can be described as the wrongful use of inside information.  
 
As can be seen from the foregoing, market abuse is defined very broadly to cover 
market and off-market behaviour.
98
 Market abuse can be committed by one person or 
more and according to the 2000 Act it is likely to be flexible.
99
  
 
Market abuse has a destructive influence on the securities market and damages the 
integrity of the market.
100
 An example of market abuse action can be seen from the FSA 
(now FCA) enforcement decision against Andrew Osborne, who worked as a broker at 
Merrill Lynch International.
101
 He engaged in serious market abuse and was fined 
£350,000 because he failed in his duty not to disclose inside information to one of his 
customers in 2009. The customer avoided losses of around £5.8 million as a result of 
having inside information. The former FSA (now FCA) Director of Enforcement and 
Financial Crime, Tracey McDermott, stated: ‘There should be no doubt about the FSA’s 
                                                 
98
 Barry Rider and Kern Alexander, Market Abuse and Insider Dealing (2
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edn, Tottole 2009) 78. 
99
 Edward Swan and John Virgo, Market Abuse Regulation (2
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 edn, OUP 2010) 215. 
100
 This idea is supported by Article 2 of Directive 2003/6/EC of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 28 January 2003 on insider dealing and market manipulation (market abuse). ‘(2) An 
integrated and efficient financial market requires market integrity. The smooth functioning of securities 
markets and public confidence in markets are prerequisites for economic growth and wealth. Market 
abuse harms the integrity of financial markets and public confidence in securities and derivatives.’ 
101
 <http://www.fsac.org.uk/library/communication/pr/2012/014.html > accessed 22 June 2015 
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commitment to take tough action where approved persons fail in their 
responsibilities’.102  
 
UK law is set to change again in 2016 as a result of two new market abuse directives 
created in 2014 which replace the previous directive. . The first one is the directive No. 
596/214 (Regulation No.596/2014 the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 
April 2014 on Market Abuse (Market Abuse Regulation) and repealing Directive 
2003/6/EC of the  European Parliament and the Council Commission Directives 
2003/124/EU, 2003/125/EC, 2004/72/EC) was replaced the previous directive relating 
to market abuse, As a result, of market and technological development has changed the 
financial landscape according to part 3 of the directive. The second one is directive No. 
2014/57/EC on the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 April 2014 on 
Criminal Sanctions for Market Abuse. These directives mention that market abuse 
harms the integrity of financial markets and public confidence in securities. Part 2 of the 
same directive states that the sanctioning regime in EU states is weak and a new 
legislative act is needed to make criminal sanctions available. Part 3 of the directive also 
mentions that administrative sanctions are insufficient to ensure compliance with rules 
on preventing and fighting market abuse. The UK has to apply the new directive from 3 
July 2016. Both directives will  not have a big effect on the UK regulations because the 
UK alreadycriminal  sanctions for serious types of offences  s such as insider dealing, 
manipulation and unlawful disclosure according to section 118 of the Financial Services 
and Markets Act 2000, the Financial Services Act 2012 and the Criminal Justice Act 
(CJA) 1993.
103
  
 
 
The table below shows the  milestones in the Development of insider dealing in the UK. 
 
 
                                                 
102
 FSA/PN/104/2012 an enforcement decision was taken by the FSA. 
103
<http://www.twobirds.com/~/media/PDFs/News/Articles/2014/Compliance%20officer%20bulletin%20
-%20market%20abuse.pdf> accessed 6 October 2015 
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Table 3.2 Milestones in the Development of Insider Dealing in the UK. 
 
 
 
3.7 Insider dealing under Kuwaiti, Saudi and Qatari laws 
 
The Gulf laws deal with the prevention of insider dealing in different ways. This thesis 
will focus on Kuwait, Qatar and Saudi Arabia.  
 
Year Event Important Points 
 
Before 1993 
 
Limited prohibition 
-Directors and their family have to 
report trading 
-Insider dealing criminalised in 
limited  circumstances 
 
1993 
Criminal Justice Act  
(CJA) was enacted. 
Insider dealing was made a 
criminal offence with unlimited 
fine or imprisonment not 
exceeding seven years or both.  
 
2000 
    -FSMA Act was passed 
- FSA was established 
FSA can take civil action against 
insider dealing. 
 
2005 
 
MAD was adopted by 
amending the FSMA 
-FSA can take civil action against 
seven types of market abuse. 
-Three forms of market abuse are 
considered to  be types of insider 
dealing. 
2016  Adopting new Market 
Abuse Directives 
Small changes 
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3.7.1 Regulation 
 
The following section explains the regulations in Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and Qatar. 
Kuwaiti law
104
 seems to be less effective in the campaign against insider dealing. No 
framework of exact laws regulating insider dealing exists in Kuwait, although the 
Kuwait Capital Markets Act 2010 was passed to regulate the administration of the Stock 
Exchange and the trading of securities. The main advantage of the 2010 Act is that it 
provides criminal protection through provisions set out in Chapter 11, which make 
insider dealing a crime.  
 
Before the 2010 Act, it could be clearly seen from the Kuwaiti Law of Commercial 
Companies Article No. 140
105
 that the article banned members of the board of directors 
from buying or selling shares of the company upon whose board they served. Some 
commentators describe this as a unique action in comparison with other laws.
106
 Article 
164 of the new Act provides: ‘This law is a special law, its provisions are also special 
                                                 
104
 As mentioned in Chapter One, Islamic law is one source of Kuwaiti law. Accordingly, it would be 
wise to know the attitude of Islamic law toward insider dealing. From the viewpoint of Islam, insider 
dealing is fraud, termed ‘taghrir’. In general, any kind of fraud in any matter between individuals is 
illegal in Islam. Fraud is defined as a heinous and serious moral wrong. Taghrir involves using actions or 
words to mislead another. Taghrir might also occur in certain conditions and agreements well-known as a 
‘trust sale’. So, the seller has the complete duty to disclose to the buyer all facts that could affect the price 
and the buyer’s decision to buy. In this respect, the definition of taghrir under the law of Islam is similar 
to the position of the American SEC Rule 10b-5. Abdul Jabbar Siti, ‘Insider dealing: Fraud in Islam?’ 
[2012] Journal of Financial Crime. 
105
 The Kuwaiti Law Of Commercial Companies Article No. 140 provides:  
No person, even though representing a legal entity, may be a director of more than three 
joint stock companies which have their head offices in Kuwait, neither may he be a 
delegated director or Board chairman for more than one joint stock company which has 
its head office in Kuwait. A director, even when representing a legal entity, may not 
take advantage of any information obtained by reason of his office, in order to obtain a 
benefit for him or another, nor may he sell or purchase the shares of a company so long 
as he is a director of such company. 
106
 Ahmed Almehem (n 13) 437. 
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provisions, and this law shall repeal all laws in public or private law that are contrary to 
its provisions.’ Consequently, the Act regulates the nature of the work of a member of 
the board of directors, because each such member is an insider according to Article 118 
of the Act. Based on the authority of Articles 164s and 118 of the 2010 Act, Article 140 
of the Kuwaiti Law of Commercial Company is consequently repealed. 
 
In Saudi Arabia, regulation is provided by part (c) in Article 50 of the Capital Market 
Law, which gives the Saudi Capital Market Authority (SCMA) the power to extend and 
establish the rules and to define the terms that help to apply and increase the 
effectiveness of investor protection.
107
 In addition, the Saudi legislature approved 
criminal sanctions for insider dealing, which appear in Article 57(c) of Chapter 10, 
entitled ‘Sanctions and Penalties for Violations’. The maximum punishment for persons 
is five years’ imprisonment.108 
 
In Qatar, the governing legal regulation of the financial markets is Law No 33 of 2005 
regarding Qatar’s financial markets authority, as amended by Article 2 of Law No 10 of 
2009. The law delegated to the Qatar Market Authority the power to provide more 
definitions and this is specifically stated in Article 90: ‘The Authority may issue rules in 
respect of the scope and effect of the application of the Articles in chapter fifteen 
including: (1) defining inside information...’. On 7 August 2012, Qatar passed a new 
law No 8 of 2012 regarding the Qatar Financial Markets Authority, which repealed the 
2005 law and subsequent amendments. Article 49 of 2012 makes insider trading a 
crime. The maximum punishment is three years’ imprisonment. 
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 Finally, Article 50(c) provides: ‘The Authority has the power to establish the rules for specifying and 
defining the terms provided for under paragraphs (a) and (b) of this Article, and such acts or practices 
which the Authority deems appropriate to exempt them from their application, as may be required for the 
safety of the market and the protection of investors’. 
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 Article 57(c) provides: ‘In addition to the penalties and financial compensation provided for under this 
Law, the Committee may, based on a claim filed by the Authority, punish the persons who violate 
Articles 49 and 50 with imprisonment terms not exceeding five years’. 
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It should be underlined that the idea of insider dealing is still not clear, although it was 
criminalised in Kuwait. As a result, there is much room for improvement; it is 
nonetheless a major step in the right direction. Combating insider dealing would be 
more effective if a new law were passed or if market rules were issued. In other words, 
the regulation of insider dealing in Kuwait must be improved in some way. Currently, 
the definition of insider dealing and the liability of the third party are not clear.  
 
3.7.2 Definition 
 
The following section defines insider dealing in Kuwaiti, Saudi and Qatari laws. The 
definition covers the insider, inside source, inside information and the prohibitive 
actions. 
 
3.7.2.1 Kuwaiti law 
 
The Kuwaiti legislature has not clearly defined the offence of insider dealing. Some 
researchers define the offence as an action by an insider, who personally benefits from 
inside information or who benefits others before the information becomes public in 
breach of the rules of justice, transparency and equality between dealers and 
outsiders.
109
 
 
The Kuwaiti legislature provides in Article 1 of the Kuwait Capital Markets Act 2010 
that an ‘insider is any person who, due to his position, is informed of fundamental 
information or data regarding a listed company, which was not available to the public’. 
This definition presents four conditions that must be met for a person to be classed as an 
insider. 1) Due to his position: The Kuwaiti legislation does not define ‘position’ in 
terms of the person’s relationship with the employer or with the shareholders with 
whom they deal. As a result, the extent to which a tippee, an outsider or a third party is 
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included within this definition is uncertain. 2) Fundamental information or data: While 
fundamental information or data consists of material information, this definition does 
not set out the boundaries of such information or data; nor does it identify the standard 
by which information or data are determined to be material. 3) Listed company: The 
same Article of the 2010 Act defines the listed company as any shareholding company 
listed on the stock exchange market. 4) Non-public information: While it is important to 
describe a person as an insider when the information is not public knowledge, how can 
one determine whether information is public or not when the law does not provide a test 
to do this? 
 
Consequently, the issues set out above identify shortcomings in the definition of an 
insider in the 2010 Act. Therefore, the definition should be improved by reference to 
English law, which has a fixed definition of insiders. Section 57 of the Criminal Justice 
Act 1993 provides: ‘Insiders: (1) for the purposes of this part, a person has information 
as an insider if and only if: (a) it is, and he knows that it is, insider information; (b) he 
has it, and knows that he has it, from an inside source.’ Part (1) (b) above is sometimes 
referred to as ‘tippee liability’ in the situation in which the insider gives a tip to another 
person, who trades on the basis of the tip.
110
 
 
According to Article 118 of the 2010 Act, Kuwaiti law only bans the insider from doing 
one of the following actions:
111
  
                                                 
110
 Iain MacNeil (n 79) 413. 
111
 Article 118 of the 2010 Act provides: 
Punishable by imprisonment for a term not exceeding five years and a fine not less than 
the value of the benefit achieved or losses that were avoided or the amount of ten 
thousand dinars, whichever is higher, shall not exceed three times the value of the 
benefit achieved or losses that were avoided or the amount of one hundred thousand 
dinars, whichever is higher, or either penalties, any insider benefited or took advantage 
of inside information by buying or selling securities or disclosure of inside information 
or to give advice on the basis of inside information to someone who will not be an 
insider. The person who is trading in securities during the possession of internal 
beneficial information is described as an insider if the person is aware of them when 
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1) Benefitting from inside information. The Legislature assumes that an insider 
can benefit from inside information if he knows the nature of the information 
when buying or selling securities. The insider can refute this simple presumption 
through proof that he or she did not trade on the basis of this information in 
Kuwait.
112
  
2) Taking advantage of inside information.  
3) Disclosing the inside information.  
4) Giving advice on the basis of inside information. Kuwaiti law limits the 
application of this article to the insider, which leaves unanswered the question of 
the outsider, especially the tippee. 
 
In the United Kingdom, there are three independent offences according to the 1993 Act 
section 52: 
1) Dealing based on inside information.  
2) Disclosing inside information.  
3) Encouraging another person to trade.  
It would be beneficial for Kuwait to adopt a similar provision because the position is not 
clear in Kuwait. 
 
3.7.2.2 Saudi law 
 
The following section defines the terms ‘insider’, ‘inside source’ and ‘inside 
information’ and the activities prohibited in Saudi law. The Saudi legislature has 
defined an insider
113
 as any person who obtains inside information through a family, 
business or contractual relationship. More specifically, the market conduct 
                                                                                                                                               
buying or selling only if he could prove he did not trade on the basis of that 
information. 
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regulations
114
 define an insider
115
 as anyone who gains access to inside information by 
reason of:  
a) Company relationship, such as a director, a senior executive or an employee 
of the issuer of a security related to inside information;  
b) Family relationship, such as a person who obtains inside information through 
a family relationship, including from a source related to the person who obtains 
the information;  
c) Business relationship, such as a person who obtains inside information 
through a business relationship, including obtaining the information from the 
issuer, or from any person who has a business relationship with the person who 
obtains the inside information, or from any person who is a business associate of 
the person who obtains the insider information;  
d) Contractual relationship, such as a person who obtains inside information 
through a contractual relationship, including obtaining the information from the 
issuer or from any person who has a contractual relationship with the person 
who obtains the inside information. 
 
It can be seen from the above that there is confusion over what constitutes an insider 
and what is an inside source and the scope of the inside source is limited to four types in 
Saudi law. Therefore, this confusion would be avoided if Saudi law separated the 
definitions of ‘insider’ and ‘inside source’ and had not limited the scope of the inside 
source. For example, in the UK the Criminal Justice Act 1993 section 57 part (2) 
provides:   
(2) For the purpose…a person has information from an inside source if and only 
if, (a) he has it through- (i) being a director, employee or shareholder of an 
issuer of securities; or (ii) having access to the information by virtue of his 
employment, office or profession; or (b) the direct or indirect source of his 
information is a person within paragraph (a). 
It would be also beneficial for Kuwait to adopt a similar provision. 
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In Article 50 of the Capital Market Law, the Saudi legislature defined inside 
information as information that meets three conditions: 1) Material Effect: this means 
that a normal person would realise that making this information available to the public 
would have a fundamental influence on the price or value of a security related to such 
information. 2) Non-public information: information that has not been disclosed and is 
not available to the general public. 3) Listed company: information that must be related 
to a traded security. 
 
Under the Saudi Market Conduct Regulations two prohibitions relate to insider dealing. 
The first prohibits the disclosure of inside information by both insiders and outsiders 
when they know or should have known that the other person may trade in security 
related to inside information.116 The second prohibition is trading, including both 
insiders and outsiders if they know that they have obtained inside information.
117
 
 
3.7.2.3 Qatari law 
 
This section considers the definitions of ‘insider’, ‘inside source’, ‘inside information’ 
and the activities prohibited in Qatari law. According to the Qatar Act 2012, insider 
dealing is prohibited as follows: 1) It is not allowed for any person to deal in the 
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securities market based on non-public information,
118
 or 2) to disclose a secret relating 
to his work or his dealing,
119
 or 3) to trade in the market based on inside information 
relating to his work.
120
 
 
It can be seen that, in part (2) above, Qatari law uses the word ‘secret’ instead of ‘inside 
information’ and that in part (1) sub section 3 the Act bans anyone from dealing in 
securities based on inside information. This is vague because there is no definition of an 
insider or of inside information or inside source, and therefore it is unfair to punish a 
person if he does not know he is dealing with inside information.  
 
3.8 Dealing with insider dealing in Kuwait 
 
There are three important issues which have to be addressed in order to deal effectively 
with insider dealing. These are: the definition of the activity, the sanctions which should 
be available and enforcing civil or criminal liability. 
 
3.8.1 A Sound Definition 
 
After discussing the situation in Kuwait, Qatar and Saudi Arabia, it should be 
underlined that in spite of the fact that these countries have passed new laws in order to 
combat insider trading, there are still shortcomings such as the lack of a clear definition, 
especially in Kuwait and Qatar. Moreover, tippee operation is not covered in Kuwait. It 
would be helpful to learn from the experience of the USA and the UK, who have a long 
history of improving their laws in this field. For example, in the United States the 
definitions of an insider have changed with the cases and have been extended as 
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follows.
121
 1) Insiders: this term covers all corporate employees. 2) Constructive 
Insiders: in some situations, information is revealed legitimately to a professional 
person, such as an accountant or a lawyer working for the company, but not employed 
by the company. Such an outsider may become a fiduciary of shareholders, because the 
outsider entered into a special confidential relationship with the company, and the 
information is disclosed to them in confidence. However, this idea of treating an 
outsider as an insider based on his or her relationship, in which there is an expectation 
of confidentiality, was not universally accepted. In Dirks, for example, the Court stated 
that an individual must expressly or implicitly enter into a fiduciary relationship with 
the issuer. 3) Tippers and tippees: Tippees can be held liable provided two conditions 
are met. The tipper must have breached a fiduciary duty to the company by making the 
tip, and the tippee must know or have reason to know of the breach. 4) Non-traditional 
relationship: Beyond the above traditional relationships, matters get very complicated, 
and each case must be examined on its merits. For example, is a doctor who learned 
confidential information from a patient an insider? Similarly, is there a fiduciary 
relationship between spouses? 5) Legislators: Another category of non-traditional 
insider is that of a legislator, like a member of Congress, who can access material non-
public information in a variety of ways, such as in a Congressional hearing. It should be 
noted that none of the Qatari, Saudi and Kuwaiti laws ban legislators from dealing with 
inside information. 
 
There is a time frame for the use of inside information, which is the period before the 
information reaches the public.
122
 Many scholars maintain that the ban against dealing 
should not end just when the inside information is made public: an insider must wait for 
public investors to have an opportunity to act on it.
123
 It should be noted that none of the 
Qatari, Saudi or Kuwaiti laws mention this point. 
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In the United States, two types of non-public information are specified. One is 
information that derives from internal corporate sources and is classed as ‘inside 
information’. The other is ‘market information’ that originates outside of the company 
and affects the price of its securities but does not relate to its assets or earning power. 
The use of either is prohibited.
124
 It should be noted that none of the Qatari, Saudi or 
Kuwaiti laws mention this point. 
 
It is important to have a clear definition of insider dealing. The perfect definition has to 
cover the following four areas: who is an insider, what is the inside information, how is 
the inside information transferred and what type of activity is banned. The UK Criminal 
Justice Act 1993 (CJA) is a good illustration whereby section 57(1) defines an insider, 
section 57(2) defines an inside source, section 56
125
 defines inside information and 
section 52 defines prohibited activities. It should be noted that none of the Qatari, Saudi 
or Kuwaiti laws define insider dealing in this way. 
 
One overriding difference between the US regime on insider trading and that of the UK 
regime is in the promulgation and application of the law. In the US, the Securities 
Exchange Act 1934 does not mention insider dealing let alone define it. Reference is 
made to ‘use or employ... any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance…’. It is 
left to the judges to decide according to common law whether an act constitutes insider 
dealing. On the other hand, the UK statute makes specific reference to insider dealing 
and prohibits it. Kuwait, Qatar and Saudi Arabia ought to follow the example of the UK 
rather than that of the USA if they need to improve their legislation.  
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Both principles-based and rules-based regulation are derived from statute. Principles 
based regulation means avoiding detailed and prescriptive rules in the statue and just 
relying on high level rules. It is used by giving a general definition or prohibition with 
the details left to secondary legislation ( rulemaking by a regulatory authority) or case 
law to develop and interpret the principle). Principles based regulation is more flexible 
and able to rapidly change in order  to stop any problems arising  in the future. 
Principles based regulation also uses general terms such as fair, reasonable, suitable and 
fair treatment of customers.
126
  
 
Rules based regulation is detailed and anticipates every possible situation. It is different 
from rules that are passed by a regulatory authority.  Rules based regulation can lead to 
gaps because it has to cover all the problems and if a new problem appears the 
regulation itself needs to be changed which would take time. One advantage of rules 
based regulation is that it is clear. However, it narrows the legal judgments power 
because it limits the interpretation and decision making power, It  has to follow the rules 
and it is like a mechanical decision.
127
   
 
For example, in USA they use the principles based regulation to ban insider trading by 
using general terms in the Securities Exchange Act 1934 ‘to use or employ..any 
manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance” and leaves secondary law and case 
law to interpret and develop that term which banned insider trading and still develops it 
by using rules and cases such as rule 10b-5 and misappropriation theory. However, in 
the UK they use rules based regulation that bans insider dealing directly and defines the 
insider dealing in the Criminal Justice Act 1993 and Financial Services and Market Act 
2000.  
 
In some situations the principles based regulation can be applied more easily by giving a 
regulatory authority the power to decide how to implement the principles but with the 
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complexity of insider dealing and some people still think there is nothing wrong with 
insider dealing action, it is better to have clear statutory rules passed to stop this debate. 
 
In Kuwait, the role of the Act is to provide a clear definition of insider dealing. The 
legal system in Kuwait is different from the situation in the USA where the secondary 
regulation (Rule- 10-b) and case law were involved in clarifying the unclear definition 
in 1934 Act relating to insider dealing. This means that the only way to clarify the 
Kuwaiti definition of insider dealing is by changing the Act itself. The Kuwait 2010 Act 
uses rule based regulation by banning insider dealing directly and defining it but the Act 
misses some important details such as  a tippee is  not included it in the definition.   
 
3.8.2 Sanctions 
 
Martin Wheatley, the FCA chief executive, mentions that fighting financial crime 
(including insider dealing) is not straightforward. The enforcement mechanism needs a 
new style of regulation, new powers, and a new philosophy, with a clear mandate to 
pursue prosecution, impose unlimited fines, ban individuals from financial services and 
prevent, reduce and deter future insider dealing.
128
 That cannot be achieved without 
having a sound regulatory authority. This will be discussed in detail in chapter six. 
 
There are two types of sanctions related to insider dealing: administrative (civil) and 
criminal sanctions. There are a number of administrative sanctions such as a temporary 
suspension from trading and fines. Criminal sanctions include prison, but not for 
companies, and criminal fines. 
  
A question that is often asked is why do securities regulations not have provision for 
victims of insider dealing to sue inside dealers for damages to compensate them for any 
losses which they sustained as a result of the inside dealer’s actions. One argument 
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against having such provision is that it is difficult to prove that someone has been the 
victim of insider dealing. Neither the UK, Kuwait,
129
 Saudi nor Qatar allow for specific 
civil liability arising from insider dealing. The Saudi legislature prescribes civil and 
criminal liabilities for so-called ‘manipulation’,130 while insider dealing is subject only 
to criminal sanctions even though both manipulation and insider dealing are forms of 
market abuse.
131
 
 
Some say that administrative (civil) sanctions for insider dealing should always be a 
financial penalty. A person convicted of insider dealing must return the profit made or 
the loss avoided. Some say that the funds should not go to the market players but should 
go to the state.
132
 In one year the FCA handed out a record of £1,471,431,800  in fines 
in 2014.
133
 
 
This section discusses the administrative (civil) fines, settlement and legal entity’s 
responsibility in Kuwait, Qatar and Saudi. It should be noted that in the UK, the FCA 
has an extensive range of disciplinary, criminal and civil powers according to FSMA 
2000. This means that the FCA has two choices. It could use one or all of them, as in the 
case of insider dealing, where it can resort to criminal proceedings or use its 
administrative powers to apply sanctions.
134
 In the case of the latter, a prescribed 
enforcement procedure has to be followed (See appendix 1). 
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Article 146 of the Kuwaiti Act 2010 provides that the disciplinary board may impose 
any of seventeen different kinds of penalties, including a caution or warning, but it does 
not include any financial penalty. By comparison, the sanctions available to the FCA in 
the UK include an unlimited financial penalty.
135
 However, in Saudi, the Capital Market 
Authority may impose a financial fine, which shall not be less than SR 10,000 and shall 
not exceed SR 100,000 for each violation committed by the defendant.
136
 Moreover, in 
Article 35 of the Qatari Law 2012 No 8, the limit of fines shall not exceed QR 
10,000,000. It would be a good idea to give the Kuwait Capital Market Authority 
(KCMA) the power to impose fines. 
 
Article 131 of the Kuwaiti Act 2010 gives the defendant and the Authority the option to 
reach a financial settlement at any time during the criminal trial. The offer of a 
settlement can be initiated by either party. The settlement amount shall not exceed the 
maximum fine and shall not be less than the minimum criminal fine stipulated in Article 
118 of the 2010 Act. In Article 64 of the Saudi Capital Market Law there is a similar 
provision to avoid criminal proceedings, but any settlement must be reached before 
proceedings have commenced. In Qatar, Article 49 of the Qatari Law 2012 gives the 
chairman of the Authority the option to reach a financial settlement before proceedings 
have commenced or at any time during the trial. Therefore, the Qatari legislator gives 
greater rights to the Authority because a settlement can be reached either before or 
during the proceedings. Apart from the potential financial advantage of reaching a 
settlement, there are other advantages, such as avoiding imprisonment and salvaging 
one’s reputation. 
 
The Kuwaiti Act 2010 should mention the legal entity that is liable, because criminal 
responsibility for a non-natural person is not accepted under the general rules. As a 
result, the legislature did not draw a clear policy for dealing with this issue. Kuwaiti law 
needs a special organisation to address this insufficiency, such as Law 35 of 2002 
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Regarding Combating Money Laundering Operations, which provides in Article 12: 
‘without prejudice to the criminal liability of a natural person stated therein, the 
companies of those persons who are criminally questionable for the crimes.... shall be 
punished with a fine not exceeding one million dinars if the crime is committed in its 
interest ...’.137 Even though both Saudi and Kuwaiti laws fail to clarify the legal entity’s 
criminal responsibility, the Qatari legislator holds a company manager criminally 
responsible if he knows or if he breaches his administrative duties according to Article 
42 of Qatari Law No 8 2012.
138
 
 
3.8.3 Criminal or civil enforcement 
 
Although some scholars completely disagree with the criminal provision in insider 
dealing, keeping the criminal sanction as an option is an excellent idea.
139
 It is argued 
that a criminal sanction is a major deterrent to insider dealing, because there is the 
possibility of imprisonment. There is also the potential for the stigma of having been 
convicted of a crime that will follow the person throughout his or her life.
140
 Applying 
administrative sanctions is easier than applying criminal sanctions. For example, in the 
UK, until 2009, the FSA (now FCA) was reluctant to prosecute cases under criminal 
law because of the higher standard of proof required. However, with the arrival of the 
financial crisis, the FSA (now FCA) has increased the number of criminal prosecutions, 
with a considerable rate of success. The FCA has secured 27 convictions related to 
                                                 
137
 Adel Almane (n 18) 31. 
138
 Qatar Capital Market Act 2012 Article (42) mentions that: 
The person who is in charge of the management of a legal person de facto shall be 
punished by the same sanctions set out for acts that contravene the provisions of this 
law, if its knowledge is evidenced; or if its failure to duties imposed such management 
contributed in occurrence of the crime. A legal person shall be jointly liable to pay the 
ordered fines and compensations if the violation is committed by one of legal person’s 
employees in the name of or for the legal person. 
139
 Alexander (n 14) 231. 
140
 ibid 232. 
 131 
 
insider dealing till present time.
141
Therefore, one should not be put off bringing criminal 
prosecutions, which some people feel is a bigger deterrent than a civil action. 
 
The most inflexible problem with proving insider dealing is obtaining evidence, which 
can hinder prosecuting those involved in this crime.
142
 One effective method of 
overcoming this problem is to award ‘bounty rewards’ to those who provide evidence 
that leads to a conviction. This practice exists in the USA. For example, a bounty may 
be offered in the amount of 10 percent of the civil penalty collected, if a person provides 
information that leads to civil penalties. Such a bounty encourages informants
143
 and 
eases the difficulties involved in collecting evidence.
144
 
 
Despite the fact that insider dealing has been criminalised in Kuwait, the need for 
comprehensive and effective laws is still not taken seriously in all developing countries, 
including Kuwait. 
 
3.9 Conclusion  
 
This chapter has dealt with the protection of investors in Kuwait from insider dealing 
under the 2010 Act. The laws on insider dealing have a long and controversial history, 
because some people believe that insider dealing should not be illegal. Nevertheless, 
nearly every country bans insider dealing.  
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Insider dealing has been defined in terms of what constitutes an insider and inside 
information and the manner in which the latter is transferred. Moreover, the chapter has 
examined the ways in which it is combated in various countries. By comparing Qatari, 
Saudi, UK and US legislation, it has found that Kuwaiti law has not properly defined 
insider dealing. For example, a tippee is not considered an insider. The existing legal 
framework for the regulation of insider dealing in the Kuwait stock market was 
discussed by reference to American law, because the United States has a long history 
and extensive experience in this regard. Some important issues that must be addressed 
to deal effectively with insider dealing have been highlighted, such as having a proper 
definition and appropriate administrative, civil and criminal sanctions. Kuwaiti law does 
not empower its regulatory authority to pass administrative fines to combat insider 
dealing.   
  
Insider dealing is a complicated crime that is not easy to combat. It is particularly 
difficult to bring a criminal prosecution because of the high burden of proof that is 
required. For example, in the UK, even though insider dealing was criminalised in 1993, 
the first case did not come to court until 2009.
145
 In the US, the law against insider 
dealing has been developed over the last eighteen years. In Qatar, Saudi Arabia and 
Kuwait, no case involving insider dealing has ever been brought. Because of the 
complexity of insider dealing, passing laws to regulate it and establishing appropriate 
authorities to enforce it takes a long time; furthermore, it needs to be accompanied by a 
change the financial culture. 
 
Requiring fair disclosure is one way to combat insider dealing. The next chapter will 
discuss fair disclosure and examine the 2010 Act in terms of protecting investors 
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Chapter Four 
Disclosure of Inside Information by Listed Companies 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter aims to answer the question about whether the 2010 Act provides adequate 
protection to individual investors in terms of unfair disclosure. Inside information 
means that specific information related to the company if published, would be likely to 
have a significant effect on share prices. It is a piece of key information that makes 
individual investors aware of fundamental benefits and risks when making an 
investment decision (buying, selling or deferring investment). Disclosure of inside 
information should be accurate, honest, understandable, full, timely and not 
misleading.
1
 
 
Fair disclosure is one way to protect investors by ensuring that all investors have equal 
opportunity to access and know about inside information at an appropriate time and in 
an appropriate way. Some say that ‘informed investors are protected investors’.2 
 
The disclosure of inside information by listed companies is one of the most important 
objectives of the Kuwait, securities market. For instance, the Kuwait legislation stresses 
the importance of disclosure of information in accordance with the provision of Article 
3 of Kuwaiti Law No 7 of 2010, which says that one of the Kuwaiti Capital Market 
                                                 
1
 Georgina Philippuo, the FCA’s acting director of enforcement and market oversight, confirmed that by 
saying ‘clear and timely disclosure of share dealings is an important way of ensuring that markets are fair 
and are seen to be fair’. An enforcement decision made by the FCA to fine Reckitt Benckiser £ 539,800 
for listing rule failures in 2015.  
2
 John T A Burke, ‘Re-examining investor protection in Europe and the US’ [2009] eLaw Journal: 
Murdoch University Electronic Journal of Law 16 (2) 10. 
<http://elaw.murdoch.edu.au/index.php/elawmurdoch/article/viewFile/38/13> accessed 2 May 2015. 
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Authority’s objectives is ‘implementation of a policy of full disclosure in order to 
achieve justice, transparency and prevent conflicts of interest and the exploitation of 
inside information’. 
 
The question here is how to enhance the information disclosure regime in Kuwait and 
avoid the lack of access to information in order to protect investors. Without doubt, 
disclosure of inside information plays a significant role in protecting investors, because 
they rely on this information to make their investment decisions. Information disclosure 
is a key element in the protection of investors.
3
 
 
Several forms of disclosure are required from  companies, such as notification of 
transactions by persons discharging managerial responsibilities (disclosure of dealing), 
periodic reporting (annual and half-yearly reports), notification of the acquisition or 
disposal of major shareholdings,
4
 including, for example, acquisition or disposal of any 
fixed assets of the listed company by issuers, and finally the continuing obligations to 
disclose inside information from the moment the company applies for listing and 
throughout its life. This thesis will concentrate on inside information, because it plays a 
significant role in the market and is related to investor protection.. Importantly, in some 
situations, other disclosures have the potential to be considered inside information, such 
as early profit warnings.
5
 
                                                 
3
 ibid.  
4
 For instance, in the enforcement decision taken by the FSA in August 2011 against a retired chairman of 
Wm Morrison Supermarkets PLC, Sir Ken Morrison was fined £210,000 for violating Disclosure and 
Transparency Rules by reducing his shareholding and voting rights without disclosure. 
FSA/PN/072/2011. <http://www.fsa.gov.uk/library/communication/pr/2011/072.shtml> accessed 20 May 
2013. 
5
 In addition to financial information, there is non-financial information such as changing of members of 
the board and key executives.  
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This chapter will discuss the existing Kuwait, Qatar and Saudi disclosure regime when a 
company lists its shares to trade on a public market, such as the stock exchange, but 
does not include a public offer
6
 of its shares. 
 
The question is how to enhance the disclosure regime in Kuwait to be able to prevent a 
future problem in equities markets and attempt to control that regime by highlighting 
some shortcomings in the recent rules or closing existing loopholes so that listed 
companies cannot abuse the rules by breaching information disclosure regulations or 
avoid them by using a legal loophole.  
 
This chapter will examine the existing disclosure rules which apply to equity shares in 
Kuwait compared to Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the UK’s disclosure regimes as examples 
of developed countries.
7
 
 
4.2 The Regulatory Framework for Disclosure 
 
The disclosure of inside information by listed companies is governed by several rules, 
which often overlap. The first set of rules consists of the Listing Rules, which impose a 
continuing obligation under the listing rules of equity shares for listed companies to 
disclose meaningful information. The second set of rules for listed companies is 
comprised of the Disclosure Rules. For example, the UK and Kuwait have specific rules 
for disclosure. The third set is comprised of the Market Abuse Rules and the fourth set 
is comprised of the criminal offences associated with disclosure. Some describe the first 
two as positive obligations of disclosure and the last two as negative obligations relating 
to disclosure.
8
 These rules have the potential to provide better protection for investors 
                                                 
6
 There are three kinds of public offers. The first is offering new shares that are to be issued by the 
company; the second is offering shares that are already in issue; the third is a combination of both.  Iain 
MacNeil, An Introduction to The Law on Financial Investment, (2
nd
 edn, Hart Publishing Ltd ) 277 
7
 In this chapter, the disclosure regime of the USA will not be covered because it is believed that it is 
sufficient to consider the UK as an example of a developed county.  
8
 Brian McDonnell, A Practitioner’s Guide to Inside Information (2nd edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2012) 7. 
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by ensuring that the market operates on the basis of equal access and fair disclosure of 
inside information and by ensuring that the disclosure does not mislead investors’ 
decisions. The above rules overlap in certain circumstances; for instance, according to 
the listing rules in the UK, which also includes listing principles, LR (9.2.5G), a listed 
company must comply with the Disclosure and Transparency Rules (DTRs). In 
addition, there is an overlap with s118 (market abuse) and s397 (misleading statements 
and practices) that will be discussed later. 
 
 Both the listing rules and the disclosure rules have provisions governing the disclosure 
of inside information. These overlaps are too numerous to list.  However an illustration 
of such overlaps can be seen in the enforcement decision of the FSA (now FCA) in the 
UK against Woolworths Group plc for breaching of disclosure rule 2.2.1 and listing 
principle 4  which saw the company fined £350,000 pounds in 2008.
9
 
 
The following section considers regulation in the UK, Kuwait, Qatar and Saudi. 
 
4.2.1 United Kingdom 
 
EU legislation on ongoing disclosure of insider information is based on the European 
Union Market Abuse Directive 2003/6/EC
10
 and the Transparency Directive
11
 The 
issuer has to disclose inside information ‘as soon as possible’. This is one obligation 
which the issuer has to meet. The aim of this obligation is to limit the opportunity for 
abuse of the market.
12
 According to the MAD the issuer could delay the disclosure if the 
delay would not mislead the public.
13
 
 
                                                 
9
 FSA/PN/056/2008, an enforcement decision was made by the FSA.  
10
 Directive 2003/6/EC. 
11
 Directive 2004/109/ EC. 
12
 Niamh Moloney, EU Securities And Financial Markets Regulation (3
rd
 end, Oxford University Press 
2014) 730 
13
 ibid 731 
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Only continuing disclosure obligations and not periodic ones will be considered here. 
Before 2005, the disclosure obligations were part of the listing rules which are known as 
Admission of Securities to Quotation or Admission of Securities to Listing.
14
 In 2005, 
the Disclosure Rules were introduced to implement the Market Abuse Directive 
(MAD).
15
 During that same year, in the UK the FSA (now FCA) extended the listing 
regime by adding Listing Principles (11 Principles) to implement the MAD. The 
Financial Services Authority believed that these principles would support the 
requirements of European Law.
16
 For example, Listing Principle 2 establishes 
procedures, systems and controls for disclosing information and is one of the positive 
obligations imposed on an issuer to comply with the rules of the UK Listing Authority 
(UKLA).
17
 UK legislation on fair disclosure of insider information  is based on   
European Union Market Abuse Directive 2003/6/EC. 
 
 
In 2007, to implement the Transparency Directive
18
 new rules were added to the 
Disclosure Rules, which then became the Disclosure and Transparency Rules (DTR). 
Moreover, in 2008, DTRs 1B and 7 (Corporate Governance Code) were added to 
implement parts of the Statutory Audit Directive
19
 and the Company Reporting 
Directive.
20,21
 In this chapter, DTR will be used to mean the Disclosure and 
Transparency Rules. 
                                                 
14
 <http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pages/library/policy/listing_rules/index.shtml> accessed 21 February 2015.  
15
 Directive 2003/6/EC. 
16
 Brian McDonnell (n 8) 16. 
17
 ibid 8. 
18
 Directive 2004/109/ EC. 
19
 Directive 2006/43/EC. 
20
 Directive 2006/46/EC. 
21
 Brian McDonnell (n 8) 19. 
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MAD applies to all issuers of securities that are admitted to trading on a regulated 
market.
22
 Therefore, this chapter regarding the UK regime is limited to a premium 
listing of equity shares.   
 
In 2014 a new directive (MAD)
23
 was passed to address and clarify some issues related 
to disclosure of inside information such as delaying mechanism, selective disclosure and 
insider lists. 
24
Small changes have been   introduced.  The definition of inside 
information has been slightly changed, to apply  to more financial instruments, delay 
inside information disclosure is not for the legitimate interest, there is a new format of 
insider lists and a written form of delay explanation.
25
  
 
4.2.2 Kuwait, Qatar and Saudi 
 
In some GCC countries, like Qatar and Saudi, there is no distinction between disclosure 
rules and listing rules. There are only listing rules which comprise rules about how to 
access the market as well as rules about the disclosure of information. However, Kuwait 
relies on listing rules as well as disclosure rules to control the disclosure of information. 
Although the name of these rules is similar to the UK, their provisions are not as 
comprehensive as the UK.  
 
Saudi and Qatari legislation regulates disclosure according to Listing Rules passed on 
25 November 2012 and the Offering and Listing Rulebook of Securities issued in 
November 2010, respectively. However, the basic statutory framework for disclosure of 
                                                 
22
 Louise Wolfson, Continuing Obligations: A Practitioner’s Guide to the Financial Services Authority 
Listing Regime 2012/2013 (25
th
 edn, Thompson Reuters 2012) 224. 
23
 Directive No. 596/214 (Regulation No.596/2014 the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 
April 2014 on Market Abuse (Market Abuse Regulation) and repealing Directive 2003/6/EC of the  
European Parliament and the Council Commission Directives 2003/124/EU, 2003/125/EC, 2004/72/EC).  
24
 ibid 733-736 
25
<http://www.twobirds.com/~/media/PDFs/News/Articles/2014/Compliance%20officer%20bulletin%20-
%20market%20abuse.pdf> accessed 6 October 2015 
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securities in Kuwait is set by the Capital Market Authority in two rules, Rule No 3 of 
2011, relating to listing, and Rule No 2 of 2012, relating to disclosure.    
 
Listing rules and disclosure rules will now be considered in more detail. 
 
4.3 Listing Rules 
 
The following sets out the definition of listing rules and sanctions for breach of listing 
rules. 
 
4.3.1 What are Listing Rules? 
 
An important role in the protection of investors is fulfilled by listing. Before securities 
can be listed the authorities ensure that disclosure requirements are met and in order for 
the securities to continue to be listed, a complete and exact disclosure of relevant 
information must be made on a timely basis to facilitate the orderly operation of the 
stock exchange market.
26
 
 
Listing rules can be described as private law that is binding only as a matter of contract 
between the listed company (any shareholding company listed on the stock exchange 
market) and the stock exchange.
27
 The part of the listing rules governing disclosure is 
different from the part stipulating the conditions for listing, which have to be satisfied 
before any shares of a company can be traded on a stock exchange.
28
 
                                                 
26
 Jonathan Fisher, Jane Bewsey, Malcolm Wayers and Elizabeth Ovey, The Law of Investor Protection 
(2
nd
 edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2003) 120. 
27
 Gordon Walker, Terry Reid, Pamela Hanrahan, Ian Ramsay, Geoff Stapledon, Commercial 
Applications of Company Law in New Zealand (5
th
 edn, CCH 2015) 35. 
28
 Jonathan Fisher and others (n 26) 119. 
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There is a difference between listing and public offers. The former means a regulatory 
method that makes the securities of a company eligible for trading on a regulated 
market, while the latter is an invitation to the general public to purchase securities. 
Listed or unlisted securities can be the subject of a public offer.
29
  
 
The question here is how listing rules can protect investors by ensuring that they have 
reasonable access to inside information. History has shown that the conversion of stock 
exchanges themselves to listed companies in their own right has resulted in a lot of 
competition for profits. This affects the regulation of stock exchanges and can increase 
the risk of a regulatory ‘race to the bottom’ as a result of the conflicts of interest 
between the profit of the stock exchange and the responsibility to regulate.
30
 This 
development has also led to the rapid development of technology, and the creation of 
new financial instruments has increased the importance of the stock exchange as a 
provider, in a competitive market, of specific services, such as trading.
31
 Further, today 
there is international competition between stock exchanges in different countries.
32
 For 
example, although Kuwaiti companies sought in the past to list their shares on the 
Kuwait Stock Exchange (KSE), recently some listed companies have considered 
withdrawing from the stock market, possibly to seek listing on another exchange. 
During the last five years, seven non-Kuwaiti companies have de-listed the Kuwait 
Stock Market. In the past, the Kuwait Stock Exchange comprised 215 companies. After 
the new listing rules were passed in 2011 that number  shrank to about 198 companies.
33
 
Today, that number is 205.
34
 
 
                                                 
29
 Iain MacNeil, An Introduction to The Law on Financial Investment, (2
nd
 edn, Hart Publishing Ltd ) 279 
30
 Hans Christiansen and Alissa Koldertsova, The Role Of Stock Exchanges in Corporate Governance, 
(OECD 2009) 1. 
31
 ibid 13. 
32
 ibid. 
33
 <http://www.alanba.com.kw/ar/economy-news/357596/31-01-2013> accessed 2 May 2015. 
34
 <http://www.kuwaitse.com/A/Stock/Companies.aspx>  accessed 12 June 2015. 
 141 
 
It is important to note that the fewer the companies in the stock market, the lower the 
profits
35
 to the stock exchange. On the other hand, when the listing rules are less 
stringent, there is the potential to increase the likelihood of damage to the small 
investors and affect the reputation of the market international. One way of solving this 
problem is to apply a compulsory listing. In Kuwait, for example, Article 2 of the 
Capital Markets Authority Decision No 3 of 2011 regarding the listing system in the 
Stock Exchange mentions that public shareholding companies established in Kuwait  
cannot  apply for listing in Kuwait before  the second fiscal year of the company. If the 
company does not request listing during this period, the Authority must halt the 
activities of the company. Companies wholly owned by the state are exempt. Saudi 
Article 3b of Listing Rules 2012 creates a mandatory relationship between offering 
securities to the public and the listing by requiring the issuer to submit to the Authority 
an application for registration and admission to listing. In Qatar, according to Article 62 
of the Offering and Listing Rulebook of Securities 2011, every Qatari shareholding 
company must apply to the Qatar Financial Markets Authority within a maximum of 
three months from the end of the public offer. The longer period between establishment 
and listing period provided for in Kuwait is preferable, because it is a period during 
which investors can evaluate the company’s activity and the fair price of its shares, as 
can be clearly seen from the past experiences with the listing of Saudi and Qatari 
companies after a short period. 
 
Gulf States differ in terms of listing rules. It is important to separate the body that 
establishes the rules from that which gives permission for listing, from stock exchanges. 
In Kuwait, admission to listing and the setting of the rules are controlled by an 
organisation, the Capital Market Authority, which is separate from the Kuwaiti Stock 
Exchange. Kuwait Decision No 3 of 2011 sets out listing rules. The first rule is that the 
Stock Exchange shall not list any company without the approval of the Authority. This 
condition applies to both the official market and the parallel market.
36
 According to 
                                                 
35
 According to Article 7 of Resolution No. 3 2011, in the Kuwaiti Stock Exchange, the listing companies 
are required to pay an annual subscription of 0.05% of paid-up capital, not to exceed 50 thousand KD.  
36
 In Kuwait, there are two markets: the official market and the parallel market. The parallel market was 
established in 2000 and has a lower threshold for admission. For example, in the official market a 
company must have at least two hundred shareholders; the parallel market requires only fifty. 
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Article 30 of the previous decision No 3, the Kuwaiti legislature has given the Authority 
the power to refuse any application  for listing, if it is not in the best interests of the 
country. The Saudi Arabian legislature has given this power to the exchange market 
indirectly by separating the proposal and approval according to Article 23 of the Saudi 
Capital Market Authority (SCMA) Law. This requires that the Authority submit the 
conditions for the listing of and trading in securities for approval after the Board of 
Directors of the Exchange proposes them. Therefore, it would be better if the Saudi 
legislature had given the power to suggest the listing rules to the Saudi Authority, as did 
the Kuwaiti legislature. 
 
The Kuwait, Qatar and Saudi Stock Exchanges have a number of general conditions for 
listing, such as an appropriate record of the capital,
37
 profits,
38
 general assembly,
39
 and 
number of shareholders.
40
 Listing rules have developed over time. For example, in the 
past the Kuwaiti listing rules covered some kinds of companies but, at the same time, 
                                                 
37
 In Kuwait, the company’s issued capital should be fully paid and should not be less than 10 million 
Kuwaiti Dinars. Compared with Saudi and Qatar, the Saudi Arabian Stock Exchange requires almost the 
same value, while the Qatar Stock Exchange requires less than half the capital value. This requirement 
gives the Qatar Exchange preference in the region, but it may face a serious risk in future.  
38
 In Kuwait, the company shall have achieved a net profit in the last two fiscal years. The annual net 
profit shall not be less than 7.5% of the paid-in capital. The Saudi Legislation does not mention profits 
and losses, but says only that, in the last three financial years, an issuer must have announced its audited 
financial statements. The same requirement is found in the Qatar Listing Rules. 
39
 In Kuwait, the company should obtain the approval of its general assembly to list its share stock 
exchange. In Saudi Arabia, each Saudi company wishing to be listed in the Saudi market must offer part 
of its securities by way of a public offering, and, without the approval of the issuer’s board the offeror 
cannot offer securities to the public. The Kuwaiti legislature is sure to obtain the approval of the General 
Assembly, while the Saudi legislation requires the approval of the Board. Qatari legislation, in Article 38 
2010 Rulebook, requires the approval of the Board of Directors and of the General Assembly depending 
on the conditional documents of the issuer. 
40
 In Kuwait, there must be at least two hundred shareholders. Compared with Saudi and Qatar, Saudi 
Arabia’s Stock Exchange requires almost the same number of shareholders, while the Qatar Stock 
Exchange requires that the company have at least thirty shareholders. This requirement also gives the 
Qatar Exchange preference in the region, but it may face a serious risk in the future. 
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ignored other types of companies, such as overseas listings. However, Rule No 3 of 
2011 covers them. 
 
In the UK, the official list has two segments: the first is the premium (formerly primary) 
segment, and the second is the standard (formerly secondary) segment. The issuer can 
apply to either of them. In general, transferring between the two segments can be done 
without cancelling the issuer’s listing but with twenty days’ notice to the FSA (now 
FCA).
41
 There are minimum requirements
42
 for both segments. These requirements are 
known as Directive Minimum Standards derived from EU directive standards. However, 
the premium segment has additional requirements known as super-equivalent standards. 
The premium segment is only for equity shares.
43
 The issuers must have two admissions 
to be able to trade their securities. The first is admission to listing from the UKLA;
44
 the 
second is admission to trading from the London Stock Exchange
45
 (LSE).
46
 
 
4.3.2 Sanctions for Breach of Listing Rules 
 
Administrative actions are usually imposed against the listed company for breach of 
listed rules, including suspension, cancellation and restoring listing. This chapter will 
discuss suspension and cancellation. 
                                                 
41
 According to LR 5.4A.3 part 3. See also Michael Blair QC, George Walker and Stuart Willey, 
Financial Markets and Exchanges Law (2012, 2
nd
 edn, Oxford University Press) 175 -178. 
42
 That includes validly issued and freely transferable shares, due incorporation and  a minimum 
capitalisation. For example, LR 2.2.7 mentions that ‘the expected aggregate market value of all securities 
to be listed must be at least £ 700,000 for shares’. 
43
 Herbert Smith, A Practical Guide to the UK Listing Regime (2
nd
 edn, ICSA 2011) 48-49. 
44
 The UKLA is one of the FCA divisions. The UKLA is responsible for regulation of the granting of 
right to securities listed in the official List (premium or standard segment).  
45
 LSE has market rules with which companies must comply, such as Rule 1.8, which requires the listed 
company to have a contact person who is responsible for ongoing disclosure and to inform the LSE of any 
change in this person; Herbert Smith (n43) 35. 
46
  <http://www.londonstockexchange.com/companies-and-advisors/main-
market/companies/listing/process.htm>  accessed 26 June 2015 
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4.3.2.1 Cancellation 
 
Cancellation means de-listing a company from the stock exchange. In the UK, 
according to LR 5.2.1 R the FCA has a power to cancel any companies from listing if it 
is satisfied that there are special circumstances that preclude normal regular dealing in 
them. LR 5.2.2 G gives examples of these situations when:  
1) the securities are no longer admitted to trading as required by 
these rules; 
2) the issuer no longer satisfies its continuing obligations for 
listing, for example, if the percentage of shares in public hands 
falls below 25% or such lower percentage as the FCA may permit; 
3) the securities listing has been suspended for more than six 
months; 
4) the securities are equity shares with a standard listing issued by 
an investment entity where the investment entity no longer has a 
premium listing of equity shares.  
 
The Kuwaiti legislation provides six grounds for cancellation:  
(a) if a decision was issued to liquidate and dissolve the company;  
(b) where a merger process leads to the disappearance of the legal personality of 
the company;  
(c) if the company requests cancellation;  
(d) if the company stops its activity;  
(e) if the company has lost a condition of listing requirements;  
(f) if the suspension continues for a period of six months with no suitable 
measures taken by the company to continue trading.
47
  
                                                 
47
 Kuwaiti Resolution No. 3 2011 Article 25. 
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The final ground is the most important. It links the suspension and cancellation, which 
means that if the Authority finds a good reason to cancel any listing company, except on 
the previously stated grounds, the Authority must use its power to suspend the company 
for six months. The suspension is essentially an initial warning. 
 
Under the Saudi legislation, the Saudi Authority has more power in terms of 
cancellation than the Kuwaiti Authority in that, at any time, the Saudi Authority may 
cancel the listing of a  company as it deems fit, including, as set out in one of the 
general provisions, to protect investors and to preserve the stability of the market.
48
 The 
same situation exists in Qatar, where Article 66 of the Offering and Listing Rulebook of 
Securities 2010 gives three examples of cancellation, after which it states generally that 
the Qatar Financial Markets Authority may cancel the listing on any other grounds 
regarding the public interest or investor protection. In these three countries, the power to 
cancel rests with the authorities, but the situation is different with regard to suspension, 
because Kuwait’s legislation empowers both the Kuwait Capital Authority and the 
Stock Exchange to suspend temporarily. 
 
4.3.2.2 Suspension 
 
Suspension means temporarily stopping a company’s shares from trading in the stock 
market for an extended period of time. Suspension is used as one of the administrative 
sanctions.  
 
The Saudi legislation mentions the cases of suspension and cancellation in the same 
Article 35 of the Listing Rules 2012 and also gives the Authority the power to select 
between cancellation and suspension in the same circumstances. Thus, the Authority has 
the freedom to suspend or cancel as it deems appropriate. 
 
                                                 
48
 Saudi Listing Rules 2012 Article 35. 
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In Qatar, the legislation discusses the cases of suspension differently. According to 
Article 63 of the Listing Rules 2010, the Authority has absolute power to suspend any 
company if the market is at risk or is likely to be at risk and if the suspension is 
important to protect investors. After that, the previous article gives examples of cases, 
but these are not in any way limiting. 
 
The situation in Kuwait is complicated, because Act No 7 of 2010 gives the power of 
suspension to the Authority
49
 and to the Stock Exchange
50
 at the same time. This is an 
overlapping of mandates, which sometimes could cause difficulties although to date this 
has not occurred. If the period of suspension continues for six months, the company 
must take appropriate action during this period to resume its trading or the Authority 
may cancel the listing. The Kuwaiti legislation gives the stock market the right to cancel 
a listing indirectly by suspension for more than six months. Since overlap in the 
functions and responsibilities has the potential to cause future problems, it would be 
better if the Kuwaiti legislation gave the Authority the sole power to suspend without 
extending it to the Stock exchange as well. 
 
In the UK, according to LR 5.1.1 R the FCA has a power to suspend any companies 
from listing if the smooth operation of the market is, or may be, temporarily jeopardised 
or it is necessary to protect investors. LR 5.1.2 G gives examples of these situations; for 
example when: 
1) the issuer has failed to meet its continuing obligations for 
listing; 
2) the issuer has failed to publish financial information in 
accordance with the listing rules; 
3) the issuer is unable to assess accurately its financial position and 
inform the market accordingly; 
                                                 
49
 Kuwaiti Law No.7 2010 Article 147 part 1.  
50
 ibid, Article 42. 
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4) the issuer has insufficient information in the market about a 
proposed transaction; 
5) the issuer’s securities have been suspended elsewhere;  
6) the issuer has appointed administrators, receivers, or is an 
investment trust and is winding up.  
 
In the UK, according to DTR 1.4.1, the FCA has the power to suspend any listed 
companies that do not comply with the Disclosure Rules, if there are reasonable 
grounds, such as a company’s failure to make a required announcement and the failure 
has the potential to affect investor protection or the smooth operation of the market. 
Another clear example comes from DTR 1.4.4G when the issuer is unwilling or unable 
to publish a suitable disclosure within a reasonable period of time and there is or could 
be a leak of inside information.
51
 The FSA (now FCA) can also suspend securities from 
listing if that action is useful to protect investors according to LR5 (suspension, 
cancelling and restoring listing).
52
 Accordingly, under the listing regime, the company 
must provide the FSA (now FCA) with such information or explanation that it may 
require to protect investors. 
 
4.4 What is Disclosure of Inside Information?  
 
Chapter Three of this thesis (Insider Dealing) defined inside information clearly. This 
chapter will illustrate some examples of inside information and the extent to which the 
definition varies from country to country. For example, Kuwaiti legislation provides 
approximately 25 examples of inside information, after which it gives a general 
standard for determining inside information.  
 
For the purposes of this thesis, disclosure of inside information means full, timely and 
accurate disclosure of information about a listed company’s activities to provide equal 
                                                 
51
 Louise Wolfson (n 22) 225. 
52
 Michael Blair QC, George Walker and Stuart Willey (n 41) 177. 
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opportunities of investment and to promote investor confidence and market integrity. 
Therefore, issuers
53
 are required to provide investors with information that could affect 
their investment decisions, because such information can affect the prices of securities. 
The FSA (now FCA) Director of Enforcement and Financial Crime, Tracey McDermott, 
stated: ‘The integrity of our markets depends on listed companies making timely and 
accurate disclosures...’.54 Examples of inside information that needs to be disclosed are 
material events, major changes in company policies, and decisions related to a major 
investment or capital purchase. 
 
Ensuring that investors are sufficiently informed is one of the reasons for the regulatory 
intervention in financial markets that could help an investor to make a suitable 
investment assessment. The FSA (now FCA) Director of the Markets, Alexander 
Justham, stated: ‘JJB’s failure to disclose information...denied investors the ability to 
fully understand its financial position and make informed investment decisions’.55 If the 
market fails to protect investors from making bad decisions because of inadequate or 
incomplete information, and if, as a result, investors lose confidence in the market, 
investors will withdraw from the market forever, and the market will suffer from 
reduced liquidity.
56
 
 
In most jurisdictions, there is a difference between immediate disclosure and periodic 
disclosure. For example, the Qatari legislation distinguishes between immediate 
disclosure
57
 and periodic disclosure.
58
 The former requires that information and events 
that may affect the securities prices must be disclosed without delay to the Qatar 
                                                 
53
 According to Article 1 of the Kuwaiti Disclosure Rules 2/2012, the issuer means a legal person (legal 
entity) whose security has been listed on a stock market.   
54
 FSA/PN/024/2013; an enforcement decision was taken by the FSA. 
55
 FSA/PN/015/2011; an enforcement decision was taken by the FSA against JJB Sports PLC, which was 
fined £455,000 for failing to disclose information to the market. 
56
 Brian McDonnell (n 8) 3. 
57
 Qatari Listing Rules 2010 Article 47. 
58
 ibid Article 48. 
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Financial Markets Authority and the market. The latter requires that the listing 
companies prepare and publish financial periodic reports (quarterly, semi-annual and 
annual reports). However, in Qatar, Article 58 of the Listing Rules 2010 mentions the 
notifying of material events. The listing company has an ongoing obligation to notify 
the Qatar Financial Market Authority immediately of material events, such as 
suspension or cancellation in a foreign stock exchange, liquidation and dissolution of 
the company, the filing of any lawsuit by or against the company, etc. The Qatari 
legislation deals with the disclosure of inside information by giving examples of the 
material events without mentioning a general standard by which to identify inside 
information. However, more recently in Article 1 of Law No 8 of 2012 regarding the 
Qatar Financial Markets Authority, Qatar legislation defines inside information as 
information that is not made public. However, this is an incomplete definition, because 
some information does not affect the prices of shares.  
 
In the Saudi Market, in terms of material developments, an issuer must disclose the 
material developments to the Authority and the public without delay. Article 41 of 
Listing Rules 2012 defines the material developments that must be disclosed as any 
developments regarding the issuer’s activities, non-public knowledge, having the 
potential to affect its assets and liabilities or financial position or the general course of 
business of the company or its subsidiaries. In addition, these developments may change 
the securities’ prices and may affect the investors’ decisions. Part (b) of the same article 
provides a number of examples of material developments, which are not limited to the 
buying or selling of an asset or any losses equal to or greater than ten percent of the net 
assets of the company, changing the directors or executives of the company, etc. 
 
In Saudi, Article 26a of the Listing Rules 2012 gives the Authority the right to require 
any further information or to impose additional continuing obligations if it deems this 
appropriate. However, the Authority must notify the company and give it the 
opportunity to present its opinion before imposing any obligations or requirements. 
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4.5 Control of the Disclosure 
 
Several obligations are related to disclosure of inside information during the listing 
period, in terms of the type of information and the timing of its release. . Therefore, the 
questions here are: how to define the inside information and what is a suitable time for 
disclosure? 
 
This discussion reveals a number of criticisms of the system of disclosure of inside 
information which affect competition, because early disclosure can reveal the 
company’s plans and future projects to a competitor in the market. In addition, in 
practice, there is difficulty in identifying inside information because of the lack of an 
accurate standard and because issuers can differ in their understanding of fundamental 
information. 
 
It is a difficult challenge to identify material (inside) information and to determine the 
appropriate time to announce it. For example, in Kuwait, a seminar organised by the 
Kuwaiti Capital Markets Authority (KCMA) related to the disclosure of inside 
information was attended by a large number of legal advisers of listed companies and 
compliance managers from the Authority. A number of participants in the seminar 
expressed dissatisfaction because of the many grey areas that were in the answers given 
by the Authority officials present. KCMA officials stressed the need for the immediate 
disclosure of inside information. This was the subject of controversy when the audience 
asked about one of the criteria that determined what information is material. The 
Authority replied that this is determined by the issuers. Every piece of information that 
has an impact on the financial position is essential. Commission officials stressed that 
any information that can lead to a change in the share price and trading volumes 
requires disclosure, even if it is secret or if the company is in the process of completing 
some of the agreements, for example, if a company has signed a confidentiality 
agreement to restructure or study something with any of the consulting houses. The 
officials emphasised the need to disclose to the Commission and the Stock Exchange 
before publishing the announcement in the newspapers and the media in general or on 
the company’s website. One member of the audience complained that the Authority laid 
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down harsh sanctions despite having failed to set accurate and clear standards to 
identify inside information. One attendee expressed dismay, because these 
requirements, which require revealing to a competitor important information about 
pricing and secrets about the other company, may prove unfair to listed companies as 
most of their competitors are not listed in the Stock Exchange.
59
 So this is a 
disadvantage of listing. 
 
In Kuwait, prior to 2012, the situation was addressed only under the Listing Rules, 
especially according to Article 13, which mentions that members of the board of 
directors of the company must provide all of the information and data required by the 
Authority. The Stock Exchange and either the Authority or the Stock Exchange can 
select the inside information, the nature of the information, and the time of disclosure, 
which can lead to an unclear definition of material information. However, in 2012, the 
Kuwaiti legislature passed new disclosure rules 2/2012 that were supposed to fix these 
problems. This will be discussed later. 
 
In the UK, the disclosure should be made as soon as possible, and there should be 
legitimate reasons for any delay in making the disclosure. Therefore, it is unacceptable 
to delay the announcement because of a delay in obtaining approval from the board 
because the company is preparing the announcement, or because the presentation to 
analysts is not ready.
60
 A timely disclosure is very important even though a listed 
company feels that delaying the disclosure will reduce its impact. This can be clearly 
seen from the FSA (now FCA) enforcement decision in 2009 against Entertainment 
Rights plc, which was fined £245,000 for failing to disclose inside information in a 
timely manner with a 78-day delay in breach of disclosure rule 2.2.1 and listing 
principle (LP) 4. Entertainment Rights plc entered into an agreement in the US in 2006 
to distribute DVDs in the US. In July 2008, a variation to the agreement reduced the 
company’s profits by US $13.8 million. This variation was inside information that 
would have had a material impact on share price. Inside information must be disclosed 
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 <http://www.alqabas.com.kw/node/735010> accessed 29 January 2012. 
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 ‘Technical note: Disclosure and transparency rules: UKLA’ (Financial Services Authority) 4; It is not 
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as soon as possible. Thinking that it had a chance to reduce the effects of this inside 
information in the future, the company delayed the announcement until September 26. 
As a result its shares declined by 55 per cent that day.
61
 
 
Assessing what constitutes inside information is not straightforward, because it depends 
on different factors, such as changes in the issuer’s business, operations and capital. The 
issuer is best placed to determine whether inside information exists that could 
significantly affect securities prices. Therefore, the best solution for controlling the 
disclosure of inside information is to make an issuer responsible for a disclosure in a 
way that can be clearly seen from the listing principle in the UK, which mentions that 
adequate procedures, systems and controls must be established by an issuer (Listing 
Principle 2) to comply with its obligations.   
 
4.6 Delay and Extent of Disclosure 
 
The next section is a discussion of delay in full disclosure, limited disclosure, initial and 
final disclosure and exemption from disclosure. 
 
4.6.1 Delay in Full Disclosure 
 
In the UK, companies are allowed to delay their public disclosure of inside information 
if a number of conditions are met in certain circumstances according to the Disclosure 
and Transparency Rules (DTR) 2.5. Disclosure may be delayed to protect the legitimate 
interest of the company
62
, if it is not misleading to the public, or if a duty of 
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 FSA/PN/015/2009; an enforcement decision was taken by the FSA.  
62
 Example of the situations where disclosure might be delayed to protect the legitimate interests of the 
companies are provided in DTR 2.5 as  
 Negotiations in course, or related elements, where the outcome or normal pattern of those 
negations would be likely to be affected by public disclosure. 
 Impending developments which could be jeopardised by premature disclosure 
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confidentiality is owed to the issuer by whomever is receiving the inside information, 
and confidentiality is ensured by the issuer. Under no circumstances may the delay be 
based upon negative news, such as a financial difficulty. However, DTR 2.5.5AR 
allows a delay due to negative news if it is related to liquidity support from the Bank of 
England or another central bank.
63
 Therefore, either negative or positive news must be 
made public as soon as possible. This point is supported by the Managing Director of 
the Wholesale and Institutional Market at the FSA (now FCA), who said that ‘it is 
unacceptable for a company not to disclose negative news, because it believes other 
matters are likely to offset it. Doing this hampers an investor’s ability to make informed 
investment decisions and risks distorting the market value of a company’s shares’.64  
 
An example of positive and negative disclosure can be found in the FSA enforcement 
decision in June 2010, when Photo Me International plc was fined £500,000 for 
disclosing inside information 44 days late. In late 2006, Photo Me announced positive 
news about winning large sales contracts, as a result of which its share prices jumped. 
However, in January 2007, Photo Me learned that at least five other competitors were 
engaged in contract negotiations for the sale of a lot of minilabs. This was inside 
information that Photo Me was obliged to disclose as soon as possible. In addition, in 
February 2007 Photo Me could not reach its announced sales targets of 1,100 minilabs 
from 2006 to 2007, and forecasts were revised down by 40 per cent. Thus, it expected to 
sell 750 fewer minilabs during that period. This was also inside information that Photo 
Me was obliged to disclose as soon as possible under DTR 2.2.1 and listing principle 4. 
The inside information was closely monitored until the scheduled quarterly board 
meeting on 1 March 2007, when this was discussed. The day after the announcement, 
the price of its shares decreased by 24 percent.
65
 
 
                                                                                                                                               
 The provision of liquidity support by the Bank of England or by another central bank.  
 
63
 Louise Wolfson (n 22) 240. 
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 FSA/PN/011/2009; an enforcement decision was taken by the FSA regarding Wolfson Microelectronics 
plc (Wolfson). 
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 FSA/PN/102/2010; an enforcement decision was made by the FSA 
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In Kuwait, if inside information is delayed due to ongoing negotiations that have not yet 
been resolved, or if there are contracts or agreements requiring accreditation from 
another party to become effective, an issuer has the right to request a delay of disclosure 
from the KCMA, if there is no possibility of misleading the public and there is a 
guarantee from the issuer that the inside information will remain confidential.
66
 There is 
no evidence on whether this request is usually granted or not.   
 
According to Article 52 of Listing Rules 2010, the Qatari legislation allows the 
disclosure of information to be delayed under three conditions but there is no evidence 
of how this works in practice. The first condition is that the delay will not mislead the 
public. The second condition is that during the delay inside information will remain 
confidential. The third is that confidentiality of the information will be ensured by the 
issuer. Article 52 of the Listing Rules 2010 provides that the standard of postponement 
is to prevent damage to the company’s legitimate interests, such as when public 
disclosure is likely to affect ongoing negotiations or related events. The Article gives 
another example when the board of directors makes decisions or enters into contracts 
that must be approved by another entity to become enforceable, and if the disclosure 
were to take place before the approval, it would hinder the public’s ability to assess the 
information properly.  
 
4.6.2 Limited Disclosure  
 
Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi and the UK have a provision for limited disclosure in certain 
circumstances. Qatar’s Article 53 mentions that limited disclosure, referred to as 
selective disclosure, is allowed in some circumstances for certain persons. However, it 
does not mention any other conditions, such as requiring selective persons to pledge to 
keep inside information confidential and banning dealing on the basis of this 
information until it is made public. This condition is found in Article 7 of the Kuwait 
Rules 2/2012. In Saudi law, Article 26(c) of the Listing Rules 2012 deals with this point 
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 Kuwaiti Disclosure Rules 2012 Article 5. 
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in the same way as Kuwaiti law. In the UK, companies are allowed to disclose inside 
information to a person
67
 who owes a confidential duty to the issuer provided that other 
conditions are also met such as not breaching of other law and regulation. However, it is 
unacceptable to disclose inside information to journalists, for example, because they do 
not have a duty of confidentiality to the issuer.
68
 
 
4.6.3 Initial and Final Disclosure  
 
If a serious and unexpected event occurs, and the company needs more time to 
understand the situation before making a disclosure, it can apply to the regulatory 
authorities for a temporary halt in trading or make an initial disclosure to be followed 
later by a full disclosure. Kuwaiti, Saudi and Qatari rules all allow for a temporary halt 
in trading, but Qatar has a provision for initial disclosure. The Qatari legislation defines 
initial disclosure in Article 51 of the Listing Rules 2010 and allows it under certain 
conditions. Sometimes, a serious and unexpected event can happen, the company needs 
more time before disclosing the situation, and there is a risk that inside information will 
leak out before disclosure occurs. Under these circumstances, the company may make 
an initial disclosure giving enough relevant details, explaining why it cannot publish all 
of the details, and pledging to disclose more details as soon as possible. In addition, the 
Article mentions that the company must request that the trading of its shares stop if it is 
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 The guidance in DTR 2.5.7 G (2) provides examples of the categories of recipients to whom a listed 
company might make selective disclosure of inside information as 
 Its advisers and advisers of any other person involved in the matter in question 
 Persons with whom it is negotiating, or intends to negotiate, any commercial, financial or 
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 Employee representative or trade unions acting on behalf of an employee 
 Any government department, the Bank of England, the Competition Commission or any other 
statutory or regulatory body or authority. 
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 Credit-rating agencies. 
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 Technical note (n 60) 8. 
 156 
 
unable to publish the announcement or if it declines to publish it. Furthermore, 
according to Article 4, part 3 of the Kuwaiti Disclosure Rules, if something unexpected, 
sudden or significant happens, an issuer may request an interim cessation of dealing if 
the issuer wishes to delay the disclosure for a short period. Saudi Article 37 provides 
that a temporary trading halt may be requested by an issuer in certain circumstances 
when an event happens during trading hours, and the issuer cannot keep the 
confidentiality of information until the end of the trading period.  
 
4.6.4 Exemption from Disclosure  
 
Some legislation exempts a company from disclosure in certain circumstances. For 
example, in Qatar, exemption from disclosure of information is discussed in Article 54 
of Listing Rules 2010, which provides that the Qatar Financial Market Authority may 
accept non-disclosure of some information, such as when this kind of information 
would not damage or affect the investor’s knowledge about assessing the cost, benefits 
and investment risk. Other examples are when the disclosure is likely to affect the 
issuer’s interest and when the public interest is expected to be affected by the 
disclosure. There is no mention of what constitutes the public interest. In addition, 
Article 54 provides for obligations after approval of the non-disclosure of information. 
First, the issuer must control the information and limit its scope as much as possible. 
Second, any person who might know about this information shall not use it or disclose it 
to another person without written acknowledgment from that person that he shall not 
use the information for personal interest and shall not disclose the same to others. Third, 
the issuer must monitor the trading of any person who may know about this information 
and the trading by their relatives or others with whom the person has a close personal, 
commercial or financial relationship. 
  
It is a vague and strange text, because if information does not affect the prices of shares 
and is therefore not inside information, why is there an exemption? In addition, it is 
illogical to prevent disclosure because of negative news, because positive and negative 
news must be disclosed. The same posture appears in Article 26, part D of the Saudi 
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Listing Rules 2012, which provides that the company may request exemption from 
public disclosure, if the disclosure would harm the company, and the disclosure is not 
expected to mislead the investors. However, in this case, the issuer must notify the 
Authority in a strictly confidential way about the information and with the objective of 
maintaining the information undisclosed in this period. 
 
4.7 Dealing with Rumours 
 
The greater the delay in disclosure of the correct information the higher the risk of 
rumours. The disclosure rules also deal with rumours and false information which may 
arise as a result of a delay in disclosing the correct information. For example, in the 
foregoing circumstances the UKLA may ask the issuer to disclose inside information or 
to establish the truth.
69
 Otherwise, under DTR 1.3.3, the UKLA can use its powers to 
require the issuer to publish inside information to protect investors or to ensure the 
smooth operation of the market. The UKLA can also suspend an issuer’s securities from 
trading if the issuer refuses to disclose inside information.
70
 On the other hand under 
DTR 2.7 the issuer has an obligation to take appropriate action if there is press 
speculation and market rumours. This means that the issuer has to judge whether it 
needs to make a disclosure under DTR 2.2.1. The question here is whether such 
disclosure to make an announcement needs to be in a formal way. The UKLA usually 
does not require such an official announcement in the event of a rumour. However, in 
practice, if the announcement has the potential to affect the issuer’s share price it would 
be better to make a formal announcement.
71
 
 
In Kuwait, an issuer should immediately clarify, confirm or deny, without any delay, 
when there is speculation, news or current information related to the issuer’s shares that 
is likely to affect the prices of its securities or is linked to the investment decisions of 
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traders, regardless of whether the information is true or false.
72
 Here, if the unusual 
trading does not stop, the Kuwait Authority has the right to impose a temporary 
suspension of trading.  
 
In Qatar, if the same situation occurs, the issuer should only disclose at the request of 
the Qatari Authority, so disclosure is not a direct obligation of the issuer. This means 
that the Authority is supposed to monitor all securities trading and cannot rely on 
disclosure by the issuer.
73
 This is very different from the UK. 
 
Sometimes, some people may take advantage of a rumour that is the result of the lack of 
clear disclosure or of leaks. This can cause unusual trading activity. For example, in 
Kuwait, if unusual trading occurs the issuer must take one of the following actions:  
(a) re-disclose inside information if the issuer determines that it happened as a 
result of a previous disclosure;  
(b) consult with the Authority if an issuer believes that it happened as a result of 
the absence of interpretation or a misunderstanding;  
(c) comment immediately without delay if there are rumours;  
(d) disclose inside information if there are leaks of information;  
(e) make a general announcement, including that nothing new has happened, if 
the issuer does not find the reason for the unusual trading.  
 
Therefore, the Authority could apply a temporary suspension if the issuer could not fix 
the unusual trading.
74
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4.8 Improving the Disclosure Regime in Kuwait  
 
Disclosure should empower investors and give them the opportunity to make an 
informed decision. It is not enough simply to draft disclosure rules. There also has to be 
a suitable mechanism for implementing them.
75
 This is lacking in Kuwait in varying 
degrees and that could be improved by looking at the UK experience in this field. In the 
UK, several mechanisms exist namely the listing principles, director responsibilities, the 
insider list, the reasonable investor standard, the adviser and holiday disclosures which 
the Kuwait regime ought to adopt.   
 
4.8.1 Listing Principles 
 
In the UK, all listed companies with a premium listing of equity shares are subject to the 
Listing Principles. The main objective of the listing principles is to aid listed companies 
in identifying their duties under DTR and Listing Rules.
76
 None of the disclosure rules 
in Kuwait, Qatar or Saudi Arabia mention these principles. Listing principles are a part 
of the listing rules, and if they are breached, the FSA (now FCA) can apply disciplinary 
action against the listed company. However, investors cannot take any action against a 
listed company when it breaches the listing principles.
77
  
The three most important listing principles related to this thesis are Principles 1, 2, and 
4. 
 Listing Principle 1 relates to ‘reasonable steps’ to make the directors of the 
issuer aware of their responsibilities and obligations. For instance, receiving 
suitable continuing training to understand any change or update of listing rules 
or DTRs is one way to achieve the goal of Principle 1.
78
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 Listing Principle 2 sets out adequate procedures, systems and controls to be 
taken by an issuer in order to fulfil its obligations in an appropriate way. The 
two most important points are when such an obligation arises and how to 
achieve a timely and accurate disclosure. Directors must take reasonable steps to 
control the flow of the information in addition to assessing its significance 
according to Listing Principle 2.  
 Listing Principle 4 covers avoiding establishing false market information by 
communicating to holders and potential holders of shares. 
 
Recently, the FSA (now FCA) has placed more emphasis on the application of these 
principles. In 2013, the FSA (now FCA) fined Lamprell plc £2,428,000 for systems and 
controls failings. The company breached Principle 2, because it was unable adequately 
to monitor its financial performance, and it did not keep the market completely 
informed of its deteriorating financial position.
79
 
 
4.8.2 Directors’ Responsibilities for Controlling Disclosure 
 
There are two important points concerning how to control inside information. The first 
is how to determine that the information is inside information. The second is how to 
establish a suitable time for the disclosure. Making a limited group from the board of 
directors responsible for releasing inside information to the public could improve the 
situation and could make it highly susceptible to control.  
 
In the UK, this responsibility is frequently delegated by the issuer’s board of directors to 
a small group of directors, because they can deal with it quickly. Nevertheless the whole 
board remains responsible as a matter of law and as a matter of regulatory responsibility 
and under the listing rules. Principle 1 of the Listing Rules in the UK was created to 
make the directors responsible for the disclosure aware of their obligations (Principle 1). 
Thus, the rest of the board should not communicate with the press, analysts or investors 
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or talk about information if they are not aware of the issuer’s policy of inside 
information and they are not authorised to be responsible for identifying, controlling 
and disseminating inside information. This is a serious problem, which the issuer should 
face.
80
 
 
Also in the UK, Listing Rule 9.2.11R mentions ‘the contact person’, which means at 
least one suitable person (with knowledge about the company) who updates the contact 
with the FSA (now FCA) and whom the issuer must nominate as the first point of 
contact with the FSA (now FCA) regarding listing rules and DTRs. 
 
In Qatar, Article 55 provides that the issuer is responsible for three aspects of 
disclosure. The first is accuracy; the second is the authenticity of contents; and the third 
is the time when information should be disclosed. In addition, the same article provides 
that the Authority is not responsible for any of these three aspects. Therefore, the Qatari 
legislation sets a clear responsibility for the accuracy and timing of disclosure. The 
legislation does not specify how this works in practice. 
 
In Kuwait, the general requirement in the applications for listing is that the company’s 
board members must pledge to adhere to all of the rules and regulations set by the Stock 
Exchange and to provide the Authority and the Stock Exchange with all of the required 
data and information, provided that the information is correct and reliable according to 
                                                 
80
  The FSA (now FCA) confirmed this by saying:  
In our experience, a number of problems and uncertainties that issuers have faced in handling 
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Article 13 of decision No 3 of the Kuwaiti Disclosure Rules 2012. Article 3 of this rules 
states that the issuer is responsible for the disclosure and for selecting the appropriate 
time for the disclosure. In practice, it would be better if the responsibility for both 
disclosing and deciding a suitable time for the disclosure were limited to a small group 
of the issuer’s directors, who have ongoing training and are aware of updated disclosure 
rules.   
 
4.8.3 Insiders’ Lists 
 
In the UK, the issuer has to provide the FSA (now FCA) with an insider list detailing 
the persons who have access to inside information (DTR 2.8). The issuer must keep this 
list ready and when the FSA (now FCA) requests it, the issuer must provide this list as 
soon as possible. In the UK, ‘as soon as possible’ means without delay.81 
 
Any person working for the issuer with access to inside information directly or 
indirectly and anyone acting on behalf of the issuer is an insider and must be listed. The 
issuer must keep the list for at least five years (DTR 2.8.5 R) and it must include the 
identity of each person, why he or she is on the list, and the date on which the insider 
list is updated (DTR2.8.3R). The list must be immediately updated with any change 
about the insiders (DTR 2.8.2 R). This list should include how the person became an 
insider in order to monitor and regulate the person’s activities, because it is difficult to 
ensure that insiders and investors have equality of information at the same time. 
 
In theory, some people have access to inside information, but should not be included in 
the insider list. For example, the issuer may employ an adviser to help the issuer to 
determine whether information has reached the level of inside information, or to provide 
assistance if an issuer does not know how to apply the Disclosure and Transparency 
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Rules or Listing Rules. The adviser may employ someone to do photocopying. This 
person should not be included in the list of insiders.
82
  
 
Having an insider list is better than preventing directors and senior executives from 
trading. Although both would achieve the same goal, the latter is more restrictive and 
less effective. Saudi legislation adopted the latter approach in Article 50 of Listing 
Rules 2012 by banning certain position holders from dealing in securities for a period of 
time. The directors and senior executives of the company and any person related to 
them are banned from dealing in securities for fifteen days before the end of the 
financial quarter until publication of the information. They are also banned during the 
thirty days before the financial year until the company’s annual financial statements are 
published. 
 
Qatari legislation in Article 49 of Listing Rules 2010 gives the Qatari Authority the 
right to determine the period of the ban. The directors of the board and the executive 
officers of the company are prohibited from dealing, directly or indirectly, in any 
securities of the company. No specific time is specified for the ban, which is instead left 
to the discretion of the Authority.   
 
It would be better if Saudi and Qatar were to request issuers to prepare a list of insiders 
instead of relying on Articles 50 and 49 respectively. Kuwaiti legislation too should 
consider adding such a requirement to its disclosure regime. 
  
4.8.4 An Adviser  
 
In the UK, an issuer can use an appropriate adviser to consult about any information, 
especially to know whether the information reaches the level of inside information. The 
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FSA (now FCA) does not specify a particular type of adviser,
83
 and companies cannot 
rely on the adviser’s opinion to determine whether information needs to be disclosed. 
This can be clearly seen from the FSA’s (now FCA) enforcement of its decision 
regarding Wolfson Microelectronics plc (Wolfson), which the FSA (now FCA) fined 
£140,000 for delaying the disclosure of inside information for 16 days, although its 
investor relations adviser had erroneously advised that negative news did not have to be 
disclosed.
84
 The Managing Director of Wholesale and Institutional Markets at the FSA 
(now FCA), Sally Dewar, supports this point by saying that ‘companies have the 
primary responsibility for meeting their disclosure obligation… they cannot rely … on 
such advice’.85 
 
Kuwait, Qatar and Saudi have no mention in their rules regarding how to use an 
appropriate adviser to consult about any information. 
 
4.8.5 The Reasonable Investor Standard   
 
According to DTR 2.2.4G (1), an issuer must take into account the reasonable investor 
standard when determining whether the information is price sensitive; in other words, 
whether the investment decision of a reasonable investor would be significantly affected 
by undisclosed information if it were made public knowledge. In the David Massey case 
it can be seen that the Upper Tribunal took the reasonable investor test into account 
when it upheld an enforcement decision made by the FSA (now FCA) to impose a 
penalty of £150,000 against Mr. Massey.
86
 Mr. Massey made a short sale of £ 2.5 
million in an Alternative Investment Market (AIM) listed company of which he had 
been a former corporate financial adviser. In order to meet his obligations under the 
                                                 
83
 ibid 4. 
84
 FSA/PN/011/2009; an enforcement decision was taken by the FSA against Wolfson Microelectronics 
plc (Wolfson).  
85
 ibid. 
86
 49(TCC) UKUT [2011] Upper Tribunal reference FIN/2009/0024. 
 165 
 
short sale, he realised a net profit of £100,000, he subscribed to 2.5 million new shares 
at a greatly discounted price. The FSA claimed that he made the short sale on the basis 
of inside information that was readily available to him regarding the imminent issue of 
discounted shares to him. The Upper Tribunal believed that this kind of information 
would influence a reasonable investor by saying that ‘Information would be likely to 
have a significant effect on price if and only if it is information of a kind which a 
reasonable investor would be likely to use as part of the basis of his investment 
decision’.87  
 
This evaluation is broadly different from one issuer to another, because in fact it 
depends on different factors, such as the sector, the issuer’s activities, and the reliability 
of the sources of information.
88
 
 
Kuwaiti disclosure rules 2/2012 have taken a prudent person standard to determine 
inside information. The standard is defined as a person who seeks to maximise his 
benefits if he can use the inside information when making his investment decisions. 
Disclosure rules emphasise that a prudent person standard varies from one investor to 
another depending on several factors, such as the issuer’s size, recent developments, the 
general situation of the market, and in particular the issuer’s sector.  
 
4.8.6 Weekend Disclosure 
 
During the weekend, the UK stock exchanges are closed. So there have to be special 
provisions to deal with this. In the UK, there is what is known as the ‘Friday Night 
Drop’ case. The name comes from the fact that when a Regulatory Information Service 
(RIS)
89
 is closed on Friday evening, the permitted delay in disclosure to the authorities 
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is until the RISs reopen on Monday morning. However, over the weekend the 
information must be made public by the company in one newspaper.
90
 This situation is 
not clear in Kuwait, Qatar and Saudi Arabia. 
 
In Saudi Arabia, the subject of disclosure is dealt with differently. Article 40 provides 
for the conditions that must be met when disclosing. The disclosure of information or 
material developments must be clear, fair, and not misleading. It should also be made 
public at least two hours before the start of the trading period. A company must 
immediately disclose an event that occurs during trading hours, and it cannot keep 
information confidential until the end of the trading time. The company can request a 
temporary trading halt from the Authority, which may accept or reject the request at its 
discretion.
91
 
 
Article 4 of the Kuwaiti Disclosure Rules states when the disclosure should take place. 
It provides that the disclosure should occur immediately without delay during the 
trading time or before a dealing session. However, unlike the UK, there is no provision 
for holiday time. 
 
4.8.7 Form of the Disclosure  
 
Since Qatar’s Article 47 does not require a written form of disclosure, it allows any 
means available. A written announcement helps to explain the information and to 
provide clarity. Saudi and Kuwaiti laws do not require a special method of disclosure. It 
would be better if they required a written form for the disclosure. In the UK, regulatory 
disclosure must be written.
92
 
 
                                                 
90
 Technical note (n 60) 8. 
91
 Saudi Listing Rules 2012 Article 37. 
92
 Technical note (n 60) 2. 
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4.9 Sanctions for Failure to Disclosure 
 
Since laws must provide a regime to punish those who breach the information 
disclosure regime, the civil liability, the criminal liability and the administrative 
sanctions available must be considered. 
 
4.9.1 Administrative (civil) fines 
 
In the UK, the FSA (now FCA) can impose administrative sanctions in the form of a 
fine, a public censure. Under s118 of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 
(FSMA), the FSA (now FCA) can impose civil sanctions if the disclosure takes the form 
of market abuse. This regime also deals with misleading statements and practices. S118 
(c) defines inside information as follows. Unless the rules permit delay, an RIS must be 
notified by issuers about inside information as soon as possible if the information 
concerning the issuer
93
 is of a precise nature,
94
 has significant effect,
95
 and differs from 
issuer to issuer depending on different factors, such as recent developments and the 
issuer’s size.  
 
In the UK, the FSA (now FCA) adopted a new policy in 2010
96
 regarding the 
enforcement of financial penalties, as the result of which the amount of fines increased. 
                                                 
93
 Michael Blair QC, George Walker and Stuart Willey (n 41) 197. 
94
 s118 (d) states:  
information is precise if it (i) indicates circumstances that exist or may reasonably be 
expected to come into existence or an event that has occurred or may reasonably be 
expected to occur, and (ii) is specific enough to enable confusion to be drawn as to the 
possible effect of those circumstances or that event on the price of qualifying 
investment or related investments. 
95
 According to s118(d), ‘information would be likely to have a significant effect on price if it is 
information of the kind which a reasonable investor would be likely to use as part of the basis of his 
investment decisions’. 
96
 <http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pages/Library/Policy/Policy/2010/10_04.shtml>  accessed 9 June 2015   
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This was evidenced by the enormous size of the enforcement decision in 2013 against 
the Prudential Group which was fined £30 million for breaching FSA (now FCA) 
principles and UKLA listing principles.
97
 The new policy is based on income. The 
penalty will be up to twenty per cent of a firm’s revenue from its business area and 
products. The penalty imposed on individuals who breach regulations in non-market 
abuse cases will be up to forty per cent of the individual’s benefits and salary. The 
penalty in cases involving serious market abuse by an individual is a minimum of 
£100,000.
98
 This policy seeks to achieve three objectives: disgorgement, deterrence and 
discipline.
99
 Its purpose is to change the behaviour of the market, as pointed out by 
Margaret Cole, FSA (now FCA) Director of Enforcement and Financial Crime, who 
stated that ‘we believe enforcement penalties are a powerful tool to help change 
behaviour in the industry’.100 
 
In Kuwait, the KCMA can apply one of the administrative penalties included in Law No 
7 2010 if the issuer does not comply with the Disclosure Rules.
101
 However 
administrative penalties do not include fines.  
 
Article 80 of Qatar Listing Rules 2010 provides that any person violating these rules 
will be punished with any of the administrative penalties according to the Qatar 
Authority Law. The Saudi listing rules make no provision for punishing breaches of the 
listing rules.    
 
4.9.2 Criminal Sanctions 
                                                 
97
 FSA/PH/031/2013; an enforcement decision was made by the FSA against Prudential Group PLC.  
98
 < http://www.fsac.org.uk/library/communication/pr/2010/036.html> accessed 13 June 2015 
99
 ibid. 
100
 ibid. 
101
 Disclosure Rules 2/2012 Article 12. 
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With regard to regulations about the disclosure of inside information required of listing 
companies, some companies could make such a disclosure wrongly by including false 
or misleading information or by omitting information. 
 
In the UK, under s397 of the FSMA 2000, false disclosure can lead to a criminal 
offence when it creates a false impression in the market (misleading statements and 
conduct), which is punishable by up to seven years imprisonment or an unlimited fine. 
In 2005, Bailey, who was the chief financial officer, and Rigby, who was the chief 
executive officer of AIT Group Plc, were convicted of misleading, false and deceptive 
conduct under FSMA s397. They were sentenced to nine months and eighteen months 
in prison, respectively.
102
 
 
In Qatar, a criminally responsible person shall be punished in accordance with Article 
40 of Law No 8 of 2012 regarding the Qatar Financial Authority, part 4, if he or she has 
presented incorrect data, information or statements to influence the market transactions 
and if, according to part (7), he or she omitted, withheld or prevented material facts for 
which the law requires disclosure to the Authority. In Saudi Arabia, the situation is dealt 
with by Article 56 of the Capital Law which provides for the responsibility of ongoing 
obligations and civil liability
103
, but does not include a criminal penalty. 
 
In Kuwait, for criminal liability, a fine of a minimum of 1,000 but not exceeding 
100,000 KD, but no imprisonment, is imposed upon any person who has omitted, 
                                                 
102
 R v Rigby and Bailey (2005) EWCA Crim 3487. 
103
 In Saudi the scope of this responsibility includes any person who makes, or who is responsible for 
another person who makes, an untrue statement of material fact or omits material facts, whether orally or 
in written statements. He shall be liable for compensatory damages if the wrongdoing misleads another 
person in relation to buying or selling securities without the requirement of a relationship between the two 
parties. However, the claimant must prove first that he was not aware that the statement was untrue or 
omitted and, secondly, that he would not have sold or purchased if he had known about the information. 
Thirdly, the claimant must also prove that the person responsible for the disclosure knew about the untrue 
information included in the statement or was aware of the important material fact that was omitted. The 
third condition regarding the disclosure of false information seems to impose an unrealistic requirement 
that is almost impossible to accomplish, and it would be better if the burden of proof in this instance were 
on the Authority, because the Authority has powers of investigation, or alternatively the issuer has to 
prove that he did not know that the information was untrue. In addition, in same law subsequently 
provides that liability ends one year after the claimant becomes aware of the facts causing his loss or five 
years after the violation occurs.   
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withheld or prevented material information for which the law required disclosure to the 
Authority or Stock Exchange regarding dealing or advising about selling or buying 
securities.
104
 
 
4.10 Conclusion 
 
This chapter has dealt with the protection of investors from the perspective of the 
disclosure regime under the 2010 Act. To be protected, individual investors must have 
fair disclosure. Enhancing the disclosure regime mainly relies on rule-making, which is 
part of securities law. Disclosure is a positive action. Consequently, a firm that fails to 
disclose could face administrative sanctions even if the firm did nothing else wrong.  
 
There is an overlap between disclosure and listing rules. Listing rules are agreed by a 
listed company and a stock exchange. International competition can affect the 
responsibility for regulating the stock exchange. This chapter has also examined the 
disclosure regime in Kuwait and compared it with the situation in the UK, Saudi Arabia 
and Qatar. In Kuwait, the 2010 Act does not empower the Kuwaiti regulatory authority 
to pass fines, which makes the disclosure regime less effective. In the UK, the FCA can 
pass unlimited fines.  
 
It is difficult to assess what inside information needs to be disclosed and when. In some 
cases, the disclosure of such information can legally be delayed, limited or exempted. In 
addition, there is a relationship between rumours and disclosure rules. All of these 
require rules to regulate them. This chapter has found that a disclosure regime is a 
complicated subject, because many rules are related to disclosure; rules need to be 
updated over time, and some rules can affect stock market competition. Fair disclosure 
cannot be achieved without having sound regulatory authority, as will be discussed in 
Chapter Six.   
 
                                                 
104
 Kuwaiti Law 2010, Article 120. 
 171 
 
By comparing the situation in Kuwait with the situations in the UK, Saudi and Qatar, a 
number of recommendations have been made that could improve the effectiveness of 
the disclosure rules in Kuwait, such as having listing principles, increasing each 
director’s responsibilities and preparing lists of insiders. Kuwaiti securities law should 
give the regulatory authority the power to impose fines, which could play a significant 
role in enforcing disclosure rules.   
 
Managers could disclose false information. In connection with this, the next chapter will 
discuss corporate governance principles that could help to protect investors. 
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Chapter Five 
Corporate governance of listed companies 
 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
The previous two chapters have dealt with the regulation of information which affects 
the buying, offering or selling of shares. However as early as the 1970 s (Maxwell, 
Guinness) a few corporate scandals started to emerge which highlighted the risk to an 
investor’s shareholding from the irresponsible, negligent and even fraudulent or near 
fraudulent actions of those responsible for governing a company leading to a fall in 
company value and even its complete collapse.
1
 This trend continued into the 21
st
 
century culminating in the 2008 financial crisis.
2
 This chapter will consider the 
measures taken to regulate failures in Corporate Governance. 
 
Is corporate governance part of securities law or is it part of a country’s regulatory 
framework?  The term Securities law suggests that this is a law about securities and it is.  
However it is not the only such law.  There are corporate laws which also have a 
bearing on securities. Therefore when discussing securities it is preferable to use the 
term Regulatory Framework which encompasses different laws and secondary 
legislation all of which have a bearing on securities and holders thereof.  
 
Corporate governance taken as a whole is definitely part of the regulatory framework. 
However corporate governance is not a monolithic structure.  It has different facets to it 
and some facets may fall within the scope of securities law and others within the scope 
of Company Law (see chapter two 2.6.2), or other statutory instruments (listing and 
disclosure rules) and codes of practice. Corporate governance may be broken down into 
                                                 
1
 Bob Ticker, Corporate Governance: Principles, Polices and Practices (3
rd
 edn, Oxford University Press 
2015)  11 
2
 ibid 15 
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a number of key areas or facets namely internal controls, institutional investment, role 
the  effectiveness of non –executive directors, recruitment and development of non-
executive directors, audit committees and board diversity. 
 
In the 1990s a company’s responsibilities for these key areas were bundled into so 
called Codes which became part of a country’s regulatory framework for securities, 
complementing the existing components of that framework mentioned previously. In 
Kuwait Corporate Governance provisions became mandatory while in the UK some 
became mandatory and others discretionary on the principle of Comply or Explain.
3
 
 
In the UK CG is very much within  the regulatory framework in that it forms part of the 
DTR rules discussed in chapter 4. The CG requirement for audit committees (DTR 7.1) 
is subject to mandatory compliance while the remaining requirements (DTR 7.2) are 
discretionary. 
 
Having good corporate governance is one way to protect individual investors by 
preventing and reducing the occurrence of  company scandals in the future and ensuring 
that  the company  protects the value on behalf of shareholders.  This chapter aims to 
answer the question about whether the 2010 Act protects investors from poor corporate 
governance of listed companies. 
 
 The previous two chapters dealt with insider dealing and fair disclosure.
4
 Good 
corporate governance can play a significant role in addressing both of these issues. 
However, the effect of good corporate governance is not limited only to these issues, 
because corporate governance is multi-faceted, and other aspects of corporate 
governance affect listed companies, such as risk management, bribery, fraud, and poor 
                                                 
3
 Andy Ryde, Murray Cox, The Corporate governance review (editor Willem Calkoen, 5
th
 edn, Law 
Business Research Ltd 2015) 411 
4
 Sometimes there is an overlap between disclosure rules and the applicable corporate governance code. 
For example, in the UK, DTR 7.1.3 R ‘sets out minimum requirements on composition of the audit 
committee or equivalent body’. In addition, provision C.3.2 of the corporate governance code ‘sets out 
recommended composition of the audit committee’. 
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board practice. In recent years, a number of scandals and collapses have not only 
reduced shareholders’ financial investment, but have also affected other stakeholders, 
such as employees who have lost their jobs and, in many cases, their pension funds as 
well. Better enforcement methods of corporate governance compliance have the 
potential to reduce lapses of corporate governance and to boost investor confidence, 
economic efficiency and growth.  
 
In companies in which ownership and management are separate, as in the case of listed 
companies, there is a danger that a director, by virtue of his powers, could put the 
company at risk or abuse his or her position.
5
 This is a worldwide problem, as illustrated 
by the examples below.
6
 Numerous scandals and collapses have occurred in different 
countries as a result of the shortcomings in the way that companies are operated. 
Therefore, it is clear that no country is immune from such problems, including Kuwait. 
Where gaps exist between owners and managers (separation of ownership and control),
7
 
corporate governance principles can be used as one method of improving the 
                                                 
5
 Erik Vermeulen, ‘Beneficial Ownership and Control: A Comparative Study - Disclosure, Information 
and Enforcement’ (2013) OECD Corporate Governance Working Papers 7, 8 <http://www.oecd-
ilibrary.org/governance/oecd-corporate-governance-working-papers_22230939> accessed 9 September 
2013. 
6
  
Year  Country  Company  
2001 US Enron 
2003 Italy     Parmalat known as Europe’s 
Enron 
2008 UK Royal Bank of Scotland (RBS) 
2009    India Satyam 
2012   Japan Olympus Corporation 
Christine Mallin, Corporate Governance (4
th
 edn, Oxford University Press 2013) 2-7. 
7
 There are various theories about what corporate governance means, but the predominant theory is the 
‘agency theory’, which considers the shareholders to be the principals and the directors to be their agents. 
Thus, there is a separation of ownership and control; (ibid 16-18).   
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performance of listed companies and therefore better protecting retail investors against 
the risk of poor corporate governance.
8
  
 
The need for effective corporate governance rules is greater than ever before. The 
majority of such rules already exist in Kuwait, Qatar and Saudi, but they are not wide-
ranging enough and have not always adequately protected investors. Securities law can 
play a significant role in improving corporate governance, because both effective 
enforcement and law are needed to protect investors. In other words, the securities law 
could enhance the enforcement of corporate governance principles which have the 
potential to protect investors.   
 
It is unrealistic to try to fill these gaps with mandatory rules and regulations. A diversity 
of enforcement is required that is partly voluntary
9
 and partly mandatory, which is the 
approach adopted in the UK. Seventy countries have adopted corporate governance 
codes in some form or another.
10
 
 
Good corporate governance does not only aim to protect investors, but it also has the 
potential to affect a company’s overall success. Some say that there is a relationship 
between the success of the company and corporate governance. That is to say, that the 
                                                 
8
 Qatar’s Corporate Governance Code 2009 tries to explain this by saying that shareholders delegate 
powers to the board of directors, because in practical terms it is difficult for the shareholders to manage 
the company. The members of the board of directors delegate to executives the daily decision-making. As 
a result of these mandates, company executives have more power than members of the board of directors 
and shareholders, and they also have access to the important information in the easiest and quickest way. 
On the other hand, members of the board are in a better position to get important information and to 
control the company than shareholders. Thus, members of boards and executives may take advantage of 
this gap to achieve personal benefits at the expense of shareholders.  
9
 Such voluntary enforcement is generally referred to as ‘comply or explain’ and is underpinned by a 
regulatory framework that asks companies to send a report annually to the shareholders about the extent 
to which the principles have been adhered to and, if not, why not. 
10
 Brian Cheffins, ‘Corporate governance LLM Cambridge, An introduction part 2 (3CL)’ (Cambridge 
University I Tunes).    
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more a company applies governance rules, the greater are the company’s chances of 
success.
11
 That success can protect investors in different ways, such as by keeping share 
prices stable. Corporate governance rules are designed to protect not only investors, but 
also nations, because the behaviour of companies influences our daily lives by 
promoting economic growth.
12
 Consequently, some codes, such as the Kuwaiti Code 
2013, require companies to exercise corporate social responsibility.  
 
Corporate governance issues have attracted much attention in the last decade.
13
 Good 
corporate governance is established to prevent or reduce the occurrence of company 
scandals and collapses in the future. Therefore, the question is whether corporate 
governance in Kuwait is sufficient to protect investors against the people who control 
the company? 
 
Although corporate governance principles differ from one country to another, good 
corporate governance is important for investor protection. Consequently, this chapter 
will define corporate governance and review some of its better known failures. It will 
consider some of the corporate governance principles in existence in the UK, Saudi and 
Qatar, and the enforcement methods in the UK, in order to compare them with measures 
in place in Kuwait with a view to determining whether the latter adequately protect 
investors.  
 
5.2 What is Corporate Governance? 
 
This chapter will look at the definition and the principles of corporate governance.  
 
5.2.1 Definition 
                                                 
11
 Andrew Chambers, Corporate Governance Handbook (5
th
 edn, Bloomsbury Professional 2012) 351. 
12
 ibid 3. 
13
 Christine Mallin (n 6) 365.  
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Although the term ‘corporate governance’ is used every day in the financial press,  it is 
a complex term, because it relates to various matters, such as law, economics, 
management, accounting and other subjects, and each field has its own developments. 
Corporate governance issues also include culture, ownership and legal arrangements.
14
 
Therefore, defining corporate governance is not straightforward.
15
 There is no clear 
definition of corporate governance; it is multi-faceted. However, under the regulation of 
corporate governance, laws, rules and standards define the relationship between a 
company’s management on the one hand and shareholders and stakeholders, such as 
bondholders, workers, suppliers, creditors and consumers, on the other hand.  
 
Since the first version of the UK Corporate Governance Code was produced the 
generally accepted definition in the UK has remained, the following which was set out 
in the UK Corporate Governance Code 2014: 
Corporate governance is the system by which companies are directed and 
controlled. Boards of directors are responsible for the governance of their 
companies. The shareholders’ role in governance is to appoint the directors and 
the auditors and to satisfy themselves that an appropriate governance structure 
is in place. The responsibilities of the board include setting the company’s 
strategic aims, providing the leadership to put them into effect, supervising the 
management of the business and reporting to shareholders on their stewardship. 
The board’s actions are subject to laws, regulations and the shareholders in 
general meeting.
16
  
From this definition, corporate governance is about the relationship between the board 
and the shareholders in governing and controlling the company 
 
The GCC countries deal with the definition of corporate governance in different ways. 
For example, the Qatari legislature defines corporate governance as a system through 
which one can manage and control commercial companies in accordance with the Qatari 
Corporate Governance Code 2009.  The rules of the QCGC determine the distribution of 
                                                 
14
 Christine Mallin (n 6) 15. 
15
 Andrew Keay, The Enlightened Shareholder Value Principle and Corporate Governance (Routledge 
2013) 6. 
 
16
 <https://www.frc.org.uk/Our-Work/Publications/Corporate-Governance/UK-Corporate-Governance-
Code-2014.pdf >   accessed 24 June 2015. 
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rights and responsibilities among the various stakeholders
17
 in the company, such as the 
board of directors and managers, shareholders and other stakeholders, and describe the 
rules and procedures for making decisions about the company’s affairs. This is similar 
to the UK definition. However, the Saudi Code 2006 has no definition of corporate 
governance. The Kuwaiti legislature has defined governance in vague terms, stating that 
corporate governance is based on a set of rules that represent the foundation on which 
good governance practices in companies are based. These rules include a set of 
principles and methodology with the requirements needed to achieve the goals of 
governance. It seems that they define the code whilst trying to define corporate 
governance.  
 
Although there is no fixed definition of corporate governance, the idea is based on two 
points. One is about control of the day to day operation and the other about the future 
direction of the business of the company. Controlling corporate governance can be 
likened to controlling a car, which involves controlling the steering wheel, the brake and 
the accelerator to ensure that the car reaches its destination.
18
 This means that corporate 
governance rules have the potential to define the authority, the approach to risk 
management, and how to protect a company and  investors . Consequently, corporate 
governance is about the relationship between the boards and managers and between the 
boards and its investors by guiding company actions and monitoring their 
performance.
19
  
 
5.2.2 Aim of corporate governance 
 
                                                 
17
 In the stakeholder theory, the emphasis is not just on shareholders. The directors are seen as 
representing other groups. Stakeholders are any group or individual with an interest in the company’s 
activities or performance, including suppliers, customers, employees, banks, shareholders, local 
communities, providers of credit, and government. Some stakeholders are related to the company directly, 
while others are related indirectly; Christine Mallin (n 6) 69-70.  
 
18
 Donald Nordberg, Corporate Governance Principles and Issues (SAGE 2011) 7. 
19
 ibid 5.  
 179 
 
The objectives that the corporate governance codes seek to achieve vary from one 
country to another. According to the UK Code 2012, its goal is to deliver a company’s 
long-term success by facilitating effective, entrepreneurial and prudent management. 
Corporate governance is about good management; it is not about the day-to-day 
operation of the company. It is about the board. The code is a guide to good 
management.   
 
In Saudi Arabia, according to Article 1 of the Corporate Governance Code 2006, 
amended in 2010, the aim of the rules set out in section (a) is to guarantee the protection 
of the rights of the shareholders and the stakeholders. However, the Qatar 2009 
Corporate Governance Code states that the goals of the corporate governance rules are 
to protect the company from one of the most important risks to which it may be 
exposed, namely the failure and shortcomings in its performance and the achievement 
of personal benefits.
20
 In Kuwait, Resolution No 25 of 2013 places the issuing of 
corporate governance rules under the control of the Capital Markets Authority. It states 
the importance of establishing proper rules for corporate governance to achieve justice, 
competitiveness and transparency in the market. Rules of governance here are about 
principles, systems and procedures that better protect shareholders. In addition, they 
state that good governance is based on the promotion of three points. First, ethical 
behaviour to ensure commitment to ethics and good professional conduct; second, 
oversight and accountability and finally, administrative organisation to ensure the 
proper distribution of powers and responsibilities and the separation of functions.  
 
According to Chambers ‘Good governance means substance not just form, practices not 
just policies and performance not just conformance’.21 Thus, good governance requires 
performance and application, so that it is not just an expression. 
                                                 
20
 The Qatari legislature pointed out examples of the personal interests of the members of the board of 
directors and executives, such as the appointment of relatives and friends who are not eligible; receiving 
excessive wages, salaries, allowances, and other benefits; contracting business transactions with 
companies on unfair terms; and concealing, misleading or giving incorrect information to achieve a 
personal interest or to cover inadequate work, according to the Qatar Corporate Governance Code 2009. 
21
 Andrew Chambers (n 11) 349. 
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5.2.3 Corporate governance principles 
 
A number of possible corporate governance areas have developed over time. These 
include board composition (leadership), board effectiveness, the role of board 
committees, risk management, remuneration, relationships with shareholders, bribery 
and corruption, IT governance, mergers and acquisition, succession planning, 
sustainability and climate change, and proxy access. 
 
It is difficult to find fixed rules of governance that are suitable for every situation, 
because governance rules for protecting the nation differ from governance rules for 
shareholders and creditors, etc.
22
 Corporate governance needs to be developed over 
time. For example, in the UK, the Financial Reporting Council (FRC)
23
 has stated that, 
even though the level of corporate governance standards is high, there still is room for 
improvement.
24
 After the financial crisis of 2007/2008, Britain cannot say that its 
corporate governance is better than any other country’s, although before the crisis it was 
arguable that the level of governance standards in Britain was better than anywhere 
else.
25
 However, in the last ten years, corporate governance legislation has appeared in a 
number of countries to increase investor protection and confidence, especially in stock 
markets.
26
 
                                                 
22
 Donald Nordberg (n 16) 54. 
23
 The Financial Reporting Council (FRC) is an independent regulatory in the UK. One of the FRC 
mission is to promote high quality corporate governance by setting the code and monitoring its impact. In 
2003 the FRC took responsibility for the UK  corporate governance code. The FRC’s board comprise of  
14 members some of them executive and some non-executive members. The board has three committees. 
The first one is the Code and Standards Committee which advises the board on matter relating to codes, 
setting standards and policy questions. The second one is Executive Committee which advises the board 
on matter relating to strategic issues and provides day-to-day oversight of the work of the FRC. The third 
one is Conduct Committee which advises the board on matter relating to conduct activates to promote 
high-quality corporate reporting. <https://www.frc.org.uk/Home.aspx> accessed 24 June 2015.    
24
 Financial Reporting Council (FRC), ‘Development in Corporate Governance 2011: The Impact and 
Implementation of the UK Corporate Governance and Stewardship Codes’ (December 2011) 1. 
25
 Andrew Chambers (n 11) 350. 
26
 Christine Mallin (n 6) 26. 
 181 
 
Corporate governance principles do not remain static, but evolve with the surrounding 
developments and must continue to develop. For example, the Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) issued Principles of Corporate 
Governance in 1999. The OECD governments agreed to revise new principles in 2004.
27
 
Ensuring the basis for an effective corporate governance framework, ensuring the 
equitable treatment of shareholders (including minority and foreign shareholders), 
protecting the rights of shareholders, disclosure and transparency, the role of 
stakeholders in corporate governance and the effective monitoring of and by the board 
(responsibilities of the board) are among the most important areas covered by corporate 
governance principles.
28
 
 
In the UK 2012 Code there are main principles, supporting principles and provisions. 
There are five main principles (A-E) pertaining to leadership, effectiveness, 
accountability, remuneration and relations with shareholders. Accordingly, the UK code 
is a guide to effective board practice. Each main principle has supporting principles, and 
each supporting principle has provisions. For example, provision A.2.1 states that the 
same person should not exercise the roles of chairman and chief executive. The letter A 
refers to the first main principle, which is the ‘Leadership Principle’. The number 2 is 
about the second supporting principle, which is the ‘Division of Responsibilities’. The 
number 1 refers to what action should be taken or not taken by the company to comply 
with the code. What compels listed company to comply with the code in the UK and the 
sanctions for failure to comply will  be discussed later.    
  
5.3 The Effect on investors of failures of corporate governance 
 
There are different types of failure, such as poor risk management, fraud, fictitious 
transactions, corruption, financial manipulation (such as Libor manipulation), rogue 
trading and personal interest. The causes of the above problems are always due to 
                                                 
27
 Fianna Joesover and Grant Kirkkpatrick, ‘The Revised OECD Principles of Corporate Governance and 
Their Relevance to Non-OECD Countries’ (2005) 3.  
28
 ibid 7-9. 
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mismanagement. In the UK, many scandals have occurred; for example, those involving 
BAE Systems, BP, Barclays, GlaxoSmithKline, HSBC, HBOS, the Royal Bank of 
Scotland, Standard Chartered and the Natural Resources Corporation.
29
 Barclays alone 
has been responsible for several corporate failures, including selling retail customers 
largely redundant Payment Protection Insurance (PPI), tax scams, shifting toxic assets 
off the balance sheet into a new company called Protium, secret payments to Middle 
East investors, the betrayal of corporate customers, hiding the movement of funds from 
Iran to the United States, poor investment advice, failing to provide accurate data, 
falsifying the Libor rate, inflating executive bonuses, mixing customer and proprietary 
assets and mis-selling interest rate swaps to small and medium-sized businesses 
(SMEs).
30
  
 
It is thought that the reason for the corporate scandals is the result of the hijacking of 
management theory from the main economic opinions in the 1980s, by focusing on 
increasing shareholder returns, such as large dividends, at the expense of retaining and 
reinvesting profits, including research and development, which caused false economic 
progress beginning in the 1980s.
31
 The failures were caused by management problems, 
not economic problems. As a result, corporate governance principles can be described 
as an intervention in the management of the company that aims to reduce the likelihood 
of such company failures. 
 
One of the main influences that affect a company’s future is high risk management, of 
which there are several examples. The BP oil spill is a good example of poor risk 
management. Known as the ‘Deepwater Horizon disaster’, the incident in April 2010 
occurred because BP ignored standard safety procedures to decrease the cost of delay 
                                                 
29
 ‘Britain’s corporate failures invited a governance revolution’ <http://www.ianfraser.org/britains-
scandalous-corporate-failures-invite-a-governance-revolution/> accessed 25 October 2013.  
30
 ‘The 12 Barclays scandals that cast doubt on Diamond’s testimony’ < http://www.ianfraser.org/move-
on-you-crazy-diamond/> accessed 28 October 2013.   
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 Simon Caulkin, ‘Management theory was hijacked in the 1980s’The Guardian (London, 28 June 2013) 
<http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2012/nov/12/management-theory-hijacked > accessed 17 
October 2013.  
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that would have been approximately $1 million a day. The oil spill harmed 
shareholders, because the share price dropped dramatically, the company’s profits 
declined and affected BP’s employees, the environment, and the local community. 
Eleven people died and BP had to pay more than $14 billion for the cost of the clean-
up.
32
 The Gulf of Mexico environment was in crisis for 87 days as a result of the spill.
33
 
 
Lynn Stout states that the drive to maximise shareholder value by focusing on short-
term earnings affects stakeholder goals, including long-term investors. It stops the 
growth of the company as there is a conflict between the rising shareholder value and 
the development of the company. She mentions that the solution is to build good boards 
instead of shareholder value thinking.
34
 The idea of focusing only on shareholder value 
did not exist fifty years ago, because the company goals were not the same. The focus 
was not only on shareholders, but also on providing greater protection to employees and 
society in general.
35
 There is no law which requires managers to increase the share price 
of a company. The drive to do this is purely the doing of managers themselves.
36
 
 
Without doubt, proper risk management is likely to decrease the occurrence of company 
scandals and collapse.
37
 There are four major risk groups, and each company must 
identify the four categories and the links between them, knowing what is acceptable and 
what the company can bear. The first group is comprised of financial risks, including 
debt and interest rates, poor financial management, asset losses, and accounting 
problems. This type can be controlled by the company. The second is comprised of 
                                                 
32
 For more detail, see the new website that BP recently set up to defend its response. 
<http://www.thestateofthegulf.com/our-view/> accessed 10 November 2013. 
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 Lynn Stout, The Shareholder Value Myth: How Putting Shareholders First Harms Investors, 
Corporations, and the Public (Berrett Koehler Publishers 2012) 83-85.  
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 ibid 3.  
36
 ibid 4.  
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 Luca Enriques and Dirk Zetzsche, ‘The Risky Business of Regulating Risky Management In Listed 
Companies’ (2013) European Company and Financial Law Review 10 (3) 1, 2.  
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operational risks, including poor capacity management, employee issues (fraud, bribery 
and corruption), and cost overruns. This group can also be controlled by the company. 
The third group is comprised of strategic risks, including such external factors as pricing 
pressure, partner losses and industry downturns. The fourth group is comprised of 
hazard risks, including political issues, natural disasters, terrorism and legal issues. The 
last two groups cannot be controlled by the company. This analysis shows that there are 
financial and non-financial risks.
38
 The question here is how to protect investors from 
risk management by using corporate governance. Managers can misuse their position to 
achieve something at the expense of the company that is not in the company’s interests, 
such as gaining personal benefits, misbehaviour by managers, or just increasing the 
company’s profits.  
 
Some say that the core of the problem is caused by separating ownership and control in 
managing other people’s money,39 which is an agency theory. These problems may be 
avoided in the future by applying corporate governance principles. The question is how 
to find a proper way to enforce these principles. However, there is a danger that by 
introducing more regulations, economic growth will be affected. It is impossible to 
prevent such occurrences simply by passing laws and regulations. The quality of 
management must be improved to make it more ethical in an effort to stop managers 
engaging in and turning a blind eye to dishonest practices, with greater vigilance to stop 
others in the company from engaging in such practices.    
 
5.4 No One Size Fits All  
 
It is true that one size does not fit all listed companies in the corporate governance 
regime. For example, in the UK standard listed and AIM-quoted companies have more 
                                                 
38
 Alpesh Shah, ‘Corporate Governance for Main Market and AIM companies’ (2012) White Paper,  
London Stock Exchange  104.   
39
 Alessio Pacces, Rethinking Corporate Governance: The Law and Economics of Control Powers 
(Routledge 2012) 3. 
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flexibility about choosing what provisions they adopt than premium listed companies.
40
 
Moreover among premium listed companies there are differences in compliance 
requirements between big, small and mid-sized companies. This method of compliance 
will lead to development of the national stock exchange. The UK principles-based 
approach to corporate governance ensures the regime is valued and supports companies 
of all sizes because managers would do what is right for the company with ample room 
for firm choice that suits their own strategic and operational challenges.  
 
The FRC and QCA Quoted Companies Alliance
41
 agree about the regulatory burden for 
small listed companies and the QCA has advised the FRC to find a way of reducing  the 
burden areas.
42
 There are around 2000 small and medium size listed companies in the 
UK which represents  about 85% of the listed companies in the UK.
43
 From the number 
it can be said firstly that they are important to the liquidity and to the profits. 
 
Secondly small companies with limited recourse would avoid the statutory requirements 
or try to withdraw from being listed  on stock exchanges which would affect the growth 
of the economy as well as  the stock exchange and the small companies.  
 
Small companies are the engines of  economic growth. Small listed companies are 
important to the future development in the  growth of the economy
44
 Complying with 
compulsory rules is onerous for  small and middle  sized listed companies.
45
 It is also a 
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41
 QCA is independent member body that champions the interest of small and medium size listed 
company on London Stock exchange. One of its aims is to reduce the regulatory burden. 
<http://www.theqca.com/about-us/> accessed 12 November 2015 
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big challenge for small businesses because of the costs.
46
 If small companies are not 
encouraged to list their shares they cannot receive funding from the stock exchange 
which is a flexible source of capital and this process would avoid bad debts.
47
 
 
5.5 Corporate Governance in the UK 
 
In the UK, corporate governance is regulated by a mixture of laws, rules and codes, 
such as the Company Act 2006, the Bribery Act 2010, the Financial Services and 
Market Act 2000 (FSMA), Listing Rules that apply the Corporate Governance Code, 
business principles, the Takeover Code, and the Stewardship Code 2010. Some of these 
laws, rules and codes will be mentioned in later sections because of their effect on 
corporate governance in the UK. However, this section will discuss the UK Corporate 
Governance Code. 
 
Among the most important codes relating to corporate governance in the UK are the UK 
Corporate Governance Code 2010 and the UK Stewardship Code 2010, the latter of 
which is related to institutional investors.
48
 These investors can play a role in enforcing 
the corporate governance code and this will be shown later. Both are published by the 
Financial Reporting Council (FRC).
49
 In September 2012, the FRC published the new 
edition of the UK Corporate Governance Code. The first corporate governance code 
was published in 1992 (the Cadbury Code) and changes have been made to the Code 
since that time. The idea of ‘comply or explain’ by which a company has to comply 
with the code or explain why it has not, still exists, because it has flexibility (no one size 
fits all), and it works alongside the company law and listing rules to make the UK’s 
                                                 
46
 ibid.  
47
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accessed 12 November 
48
 Institutional investors can play a significant role in corporate governance developments and 
enforcement, as can be seen clearly in the UK and the US, but they do not act as owners; Christine Mallin 
(n 6) 367. 
49
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among the highest corporate governance standards in the world.
50
 After the Cadbury 
Code, there were a number of instruments, such as the Combined Code (1998) based on 
the ‘comply or explain’ idea (the company should comply with the law or explain the 
reason for its non-compliance). At that stage the code was purely voluntary,
51
 however, 
now it is not. This will be discussed later. This was revised in 2003, updated in 2008 
and reviewed in 2009. In 2010, the Combined Code was renamed the UK Corporate 
Governance Code and was issued with more changes.
52
 However, there is no code that 
can stop company failures; codes can only reduce them.   
 
In 2013, the FSA’s functions were taken over by the Financial Conduct Authority 
(FCA) and the Prudential Regulation Authority (PRA), as the result of which the FSA 
was renamed the FCA according to the Financial Services Act 2012, which amended the 
FSMA 2000. The FCA is responsible for ‘conduct of business regulation’ for all firms, 
while the PRA is responsible for prudential authority firms (such as banks, insurance, 
Lloyds of London, building societies, and some investment firms) for ‘supervision’ of 
prudential issues. ‘Conduct of business regulation’ means protecting investors, policing 
the market and promoting competition and protection for consumers.
53
 These functions 
will be discussed in more detail in chapter 6. The FCA is fully funded by the companies 
that it regulates,
54
 and it works independently of the government. The Treasury appoints 
the board that manages the FCA. The Finance Reporting Council (FRC) is responsible 
for publishing the Corporate Governance Code. The FRC is a non-profit organisation in 
the form of a company limited by guarantee. Funded partly by government and partly 
by industry, the FRC’s board is appointed by the Secretary of State for Business. The 
FRC is responsible for promoting high quality corporate governance, and it is an 
independent regulator.
55
 Many of the FRC’s functions, including setting the UK 
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Corporate Governance Code, are recognised in statute under the Company Act 2006 and 
the Companies (Audit, Investigations and Community Enterprise) Act 2004.
56
 In April 
2013, both the FCA and the FRC signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) for 
co-operation and co-ordination. This MoU sets out their different responsibilities: ‘3-
The FRC is responsible for promoting high quality corporate governance and reporting 
to foster investment, while the FCA is responsible for the integrity of the provision of 
financial services to users’.57  
 
Listing rules can play a significant role in applying corporate governance rules. In 2011, 
the FSA passed new Listing Rule 9.8.6 R, which helped to apply the Corporate 
Governance Code. This rule
58
 required that the listed company include the way that it 
has applied the main principles in its annual financial report. It must also show that all 
relevant provisions have been complied with and, if not, a statement of why the 
company cannot comply.
59
 In the UK, application of these principles by using listing 
rules, which were discussed in chapter four, has produced successful results, and 
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<http://frc.org.uk/Our-Work/Publications/FRC-Board/Memorandum-of-Understanding-between-the-
Financial.aspx> accessed 2 October 2013 
57
 ibid. 
58
 In the case of a listed company incorporated in the United Kingdom, the following additional items 
must be included in its annual financial report. 
(5) a statement of how the listed company has applied the ‘“Main Principles’ set out in 
the UK Corporate Governance Code
 
in a manner that would enable shareholders to 
evaluate how the principles have been applied;  
(6) a statement as to whether the listed company has:   (a) complied throughout the 
accounting period with all relevant provisions set out in the UK Corporate Governance 
Code or  (b) not complied throughout the accounting period with all relevant provisions 
set out in the UK Corporate Governance Code 
 
and, if so, setting out: (i) those 
provisions, if any, that it has not complied with; (ii) in the case of provisions whose 
requirements are of a continuing nature, the period within which, if any, it did not 
comply with some or all of those provisions; and (iii) the company’s reasons for non-
compliance… 
59
 Andrew Chambers (n 11) 355. 
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companies are beginning to realise the importance of the application of these principles 
according to the FRC Report 2011.
60
 
 
As mentioned above, in the UK, there is a body (FRC) that develops corporate 
governance rules. Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and Qatar would benefit from having an 
organisation like the FRC to develop their codes. 
 
5.6 Corporate Governance in Kuwait, Qatar and Saudi 
 
Corporate governance in Kuwait, Qatar and Saudi is lacking in two areas. First, 
coverage of the various areas of corporate governance, such as risk management, is 
inadequate. Secondly, the methods of enforcement of the corporate governance 
provisions that do exist can be improved. 
 
5.6.1 Existing Corporate Governance Provisions relating to Listed 
Companies  
 
In Kuwait, Qatar and Saudi, various laws affect companies. As in the UK, some laws 
apply to all companies, as do the Company Act 2006 in the UK, the Companies Act 
1965 in Saudi Arabia, the Companies Act 2002 in Qatar, and the Companies Act 2013 
in Kuwait. Other laws apply only to listed companies and are enforced by the capital 
market authorities in the respective countries, such as the FCA in the UK.
61
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 Financial Reporting Council (FRC) Development (n 24) 3. 
61
 For example, according to Article 1 of the Kuwait Companies Act 2013, this act shall apply to 
companies incorporated in Kuwait or headquartered in Kuwait. Consequently, non-Kuwaiti listed 
companies are subject only to laws, rules and codes of the Kuwaiti Stock Exchange. If a UK company is 
listed on the Kuwaiti Stock Exchange, it must comply with the rules of the Kuwait Stock Exchange. The 
company’s activities are in the UK even though it is listed on the Kuwaiti Stock Exchange. As a result, its 
activities must follow Kuwaiti company laws, although its listing must comply with the laws, rules and 
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All the above laws address issues of corporate governance either directly or indirectly. 
For example, the liabilities of directors and the rights of shareholders are usually 
contained in corporate law, while other aspects of corporate governance form part of 
statutory instruments, such as rules and codes, and legislation affecting listed 
companies. Sometimes there is an overlap between the two types of legislation namely 
corporate and securities legislation. When a company is listed in the same country as it 
is incorporated, the company will be subject to both sets of legislation. However, if a 
company is listed on a stock exchange in a jurisdiction other than where it is 
incorporated, the jurisdiction in which the stock exchange is located can hold it 
accountable only according to statutory instruments that apply to that stock exchange.
62
 
This chapter will narrow its scope to the governance issues handled by capital market 
authorities, especially the codes. 
 
5.6.2 Kuwait, Qatar and Saudi Codes 
 
In the UK, securities regulation contains the Corporate Governance Code published by 
the FRC and enforced by the FCA, formerly by the FSA. The UK adopted a principles-
based approach to corporate governance rather than a rules-based approach. Sometimes 
there is an overlap with other rules, such as disclosure rules, or the principles needed to 
add separate rules, such as risk management, which will be discussed later. This means 
that companies whose shares are listed on the main markets of the London Stock 
Exchange Limited do not have to comply with the Code. However, if they decide not to 
                                                                                                                                               
code of the London Stock Exchange. Consequently, the Kuwaiti company does not have to comply with 
the UK Company Act 2006. 
62
 In Saudi Arabia, there are different laws, rules and codes, such as Shari’ah Law, the Companies Law 
1965, the Capital Market Law 2003, listing rules, and the corporate governance regulations (the Code) 
2006 that deal with corporate governance areas; Gonzalo Puig and Bader Al-haddab, ‘The Protection of 
the Minority Shareholders in the Gulf Cooperation Council’ (2013) 13(1) JCLS (123-149) 3. 
Qatar has the Commercial Companies Law 2002, Law No. (8), the Qatar Financial Markets Authority 
2012 listing and the Qatari Corporate Governance Code 2009 that deal with corporate governance areas. 
Kuwait has the Companies Law 2013, the Securities Law 2010 and listing rules, disclosure rules and the 
Corporate Governance Regulations 2013 (the Code) that deal with corporate governance areas.   
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comply, they must explain to their shareholders the reasons for non-compliance. 
Furthermore, they must include in their annual report and accounts two statements: (1) 
an explanation about how the company has applied the main and supporting principles; 
and (2) a statement about whether the company has complied with the provisions 
throughout the year covered by the report. If the company has not complied with all 
provisions or has complied with them for only part of the year, the company must state 
its reasons for non-compliance. See Appendix 2 for an example of such a statement.   
 
The ‘comply or explain’ approach is a key feature of the UK 2012 Code. However, the 
GCC countries have different approaches to corporate governance and its enforcement. 
In Kuwait, compliance is mandatory, and failure to comply is a breach of Securities 
Law No 7 of 2010. Moreover, a company must send a quarterly report to the Kuwaiti 
Capital Market Authority confirming that it has complied with all of the corporate 
governance provisions. Qatar has adopted a ‘comply or explain’ approach, but the 
explanation must be provided to the Qatari Financial Market Authority (QFMA), not the 
shareholders, in the form of an annual report. Nevertheless, the filing enables the 
company’s shareholders and the public to assess the company’s commitment to the 
principles of corporate governance.
63
 In 2006, the Saudi Corporate Governance Code 
was introduced based on the ‘comply or explain’ approach. However, over time, certain 
of the original provisions have become mandatory. For instance, in 2008, 2010, 2011 
and 2012, Articles 8, 15, 10 and 5 respectively were changed to compulsory rules. It 
would have been better if mandatory and voluntary provisions had not been mixed in 
the same code. Explanation for non-compliance with the voluntary provisions must be 
made to the shareholders, although the company must include a corporate governance 
statement in its annual board report.
64
 
 
Although the codes of Kuwait, Qatar and Saudi have principles, supporting principles 
and provisions, they are not the same in each country.  
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 Qatari Code 2009, Article 2. 
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 Saudi Code 2009, Article 1 part C, Article 9 part A.  
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5.6.2.1 Corporate Governance Principles in Kuwait, Qatar and Saudi 
 
No common corporate governance principles are enforced in all of the states. These 
principles differ from country to country. For example, the principles of corporate 
governance mentioned in the Qatar Rules 2009 are intended to protect the interests of 
minority shareholders and to govern the responsibilities of the board of directors, 
accounting and auditing, transparency of ownership and control, and the regulatory 
environment. However, in Kuwait, the Corporate Governance Code is extensive. 
Resolution No 25 of 2013 includes eleven principles that strengthen board composition, 
establish clear roles and responsibilities, recruit highly qualified candidates for boards 
of directors and senior management, safeguard integrity in financial reporting, require 
sound systems of risk management and internal controls, promote ethical standards and 
responsible conduct, ensure timely and high quality disclosure, recognise the legitimate 
interests of stakeholders, encourage enhanced performance, stress the importance of 
social responsibility
65
 and finally protect the rights of shareholders.
66
  
 
However, the Saudi 2006 Corporate Governance Code has fewer principles than Kuwait 
and Qatar. It focuses on three areas according to Governance Code 2006. Part 2 of the 
Code mentions rights of shareholders and the general assembly, part 3 requires 
disclosure and transparency, and, finally, part 4 provides board of director principles. 
 
Under each of the main principles are supporting principles. For instance, in the UK, 
under the first main ‘leadership principle’, there are four supporting principles, namely 
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 That could happen, for example, when the company is working to achieve a balance between the 
objectives of the company and the community in the context of assistance in providing job opportunities, 
supporting small projects, protecting the environment from pollution, contributing to the reduction of the 
negative phenomena in society, etc. according to Kuwaiti Corporate Governance Code 2013.  
66
 An example of such protection is not to have shareholder funds expropriated by the managers of a 
company.  
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the role of the board, division of responsibilities, the chairman and finally non-executive 
directors. 
 
5.6.2.2 Corporate Governance Sub-Principles in Kuwait, Qatar and 
Saudi 
 
There are differences in the sub-principles among the GCC countries, such as those 
relating to board committees. One of the most important supporting principles under 
corporate governance codes is to form committees.
67
  
Kuwait requires the formation of five committees, while Qatar requires only three and 
Saudi Arabia requires two. According to Kuwaiti Corporate Governance Code 2013, 
each board must form five different types of committee:  
(1) Audit Committee: According to principle 4/2, the board of directors must 
form a committee concerned with internal audit. Its primary role is to ensure the 
integrity of the financial reporting and internal control systems and to 
                                                 
67
 Examples of committees: 
A. Audit Committee 
In modern business, internal audit plays a significant role in corporate governance, because the 
management does not have sufficient knowledge and time it delegates some tasks to an internal auditor. 
This is simply an internal job, which is part of the management’s tasks. The audit committee, acting on 
behalf of the board, monitors the quality of both external and internal audits; Andrew Chambers (n 9) 
380-38.  
One problem that could be solved by the audit committee is to require the committee to report the way 
they are selected by the external auditor; Financial Reporting Council (n 24) 19. 
B. Remuneration Committee 
More transparency is required in the remuneration committee report in terms of the remuneration plan, 
company policy, the risk and the link among these things; ibid 19. 
c. Nominations committee 
Nomination is an important point, because a person could be loyal to the person who appointed him, so 
that he could give that person information from the board.  
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recommend the nomination of the external auditor to the board. Thereafter, the 
general assembly appoints the external auditor in accordance with the 
nomination of the board of directors.  
(2) Risk Management Committee: The company must form a committee 
concerned with risk management according to principle 5/2.  
(3) Governance Committee: The board of directors must form a committee 
concerned with the application of governance according to principle 5/4.  
(4) Nomination Committee: According to principle 3/1, the board of directors 
must form a committee concerned with nominations for appointment. Its 
primary role is to prepare recommendations on all proposed nominations to 
achieve the perfect selection of competent people with professional expertise 
and technical capacity for the board of directors and senior management.  
(5) Remuneration Committee: According to principle 3/2, the board of directors 
must form a committee concerned with bonuses, its primary role being the 
development of policies and regulations for granting compensation and bonuses.  
 
It should be noted that, in Kuwait, the formation of committees is the responsibility of 
the board of directors and is not limited to the above committees. The board of directors 
can form any other committees that it deems necessary for the company in accordance 
with principle 2/2 of the Kuwaiti Corporate Governance Code 2013, which states that 
the board of directors must form specialised and independent committees to help the 
board achieve its tasks.  
 
According to Article 5 of the Qatar Corporate Code 2009, the board is allowed to 
delegate some of its powers and to form special committees to do specific operations, 
although the board remains responsible for all of the powers and authority that it 
delegates. The board shall form three committees, which are the Nominations 
Committee, the Remuneration Committee and the Audit Committee, as provided in 
Articles 15, 16 and 17 respectively.  
 
 195 
 
In Saudi Arabia, the board determines the suitable number of committees that are 
needed, although two committees are required. In 2008, an audit committee was 
required, and, in 2010, a nomination and remuneration committee was required. Kuwait 
and Qatar separate the nomination and remuneration committees, while Saudi Arabia 
puts both in one committee.  
 
5.6.2.3 Corporate Governance Provisions in Kuwait, Qatar and Saudi  
 
The corporate governance codes in Kuwait, Qatar and Saudi not only differ at the 
principle and sub-principle levels, but they also differ in terms of the provisions that 
make up the principles and sub-principles. The differing provisions relating to board 
composition will be highlighted below. 
 
One of the corporate governance principles is to strengthen board composition, which 
contains a number of points, including diversity (directors with different experience and 
attributes and even gender), independence (including independent and non-executive 
directors), and board election.
68
 To achieve this goal, a number of provisions must be 
followed, including, for example, ensuring that directors are independent.
69
   
 
In Kuwait, provision 1.1.C of the 2013 Code provides that the majority of the members 
of the board of directors must be non-executive members and that the board must 
include independent members, although the number of independent directors cannot 
exceed half the number of board members. In Qatar, Article 9, provision 2, states that a 
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 In Kuwait, one of the principles that is taken into account when forming the board of directors is 
diversity in experience, professional and competent skills, and members also have to know the laws, 
regulations, and the rights and duties of the board of directors, according to Rule One of the Kuwaiti 
Corporate Governance Code 2013.  
69
 An independent member is a member who is not under the influence of anything that limits his ability 
to make decisions objectively and impartially, based on the facts only. For example, an independent 
member does not work in the company and is not a relative of one of the members of the senior 
management executive, according to article 1 of the Qatari Corporate Governance System 2009. 
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third of the directors must be independent directors. In Saudi Arabia, Article 12, 
provision (e), states that the board includes two independent directors or one-third of the 
board, whichever is greater.  
 
In the UK, provision B.1.2 distinguishes between the FTSE 350 companies, which are 
large companies, and small companies. The board of the latter is required to contain at 
least two independent non-executive directors, while at least half of the former board 
must be comprised of independent directors. 
 
Another example of differences among Kuwait, Qatar and Saudi concerns the re-
election of directors. Kuwait provision 1.1.b and Saudi Article 12, provision 2, provide 
for the same re-election period not to exceed three election years and that a director may 
be re-elected unless the Articles of Association provide otherwise. In the UK, an annual 
re-election is required according to provision B.7.1 of the 2012 code.   
 
The third example concerns the number of directors. In Saudi Arabia, Article 12, 
entitled ‘Formation of the Board’, has nine provisions. For example, a provision 
mentions that the number of directors shall not be fewer than three and not more than 
eleven, as specified in the Articles of Association. In Kuwait, there must be at least five 
directors according to provision 1.1.A of the Kuwait code. The codes in Qatar and the 
UK do not specify a required number of directors.  
 
 
Sometimes agreement is reached about a provision, such as the ban against combining 
the positions of chairman of the board and chief executive officer imposed in Qatari 
Code Article 7, Kuwaiti provision 1.1.D, Saudi Article 12 provision d, and UK 
provision A.2.1.
70
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 Qatar Corporate Governance Code 2009 mentions the traditional relationship between the board and 
executives by saying that it is assumed that the executives shall prepare plans for the functioning of the 
company and propose these plans to the board of directors for review, audit and application, which have 
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The country  Main principle  Supporting 
principle  
Articles  Provision  
UK 5  18        --------                                    53
Kuwait  11 32          ------- More than 235 
Qatar  5  ----------- 31  Around 85 
Saudi Arabia 3  ----------- 19 Around 63 
Table 5.1 Comparison of the Corporate Governance Codes 
 
Corporate governance code requirements do not distinguish between companies of 
different sizes. What is appropriate for a large company may not be appropriate for a 
smaller company, which may find it too costly to comply. One size does not fit all. In 
the UK, under the ‘comply or explain’ regime, such a company need not comply. 
However, where compliance is mandatory, all of the companies are the same.   
 
Under these circumstances, it seems that Kuwait needs two important things. The first is 
the creation of various bodies, as exist in the UK, to find a proper way to develop and 
enforce corporate governance principles. The second is deciding the balance between 
mandatory rules consisting of statutory requirements, such as securities laws and rules, 
and regulations backed by statute on one hand and principles that operate on a ‘comply 
or explain’ basis on the other hand.  
 
5.7 Enforcement of Corporate Governance  
 
Companies fail because they are poorly managed by the board of directors or because of 
external risks and factors (the economy, interest rates, exchange rates etc). Accordingly, 
                                                                                                                                               
been approved. Thereafter, the board of directors pursue the application of these plans and ask the 
executives for performance results. 
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the law aims to encourage good management by the board. Good corporate governance 
is a modern subject, and the optimal application of corporate governance helps to reduce 
these failures. The question here is how to avoid such failures to protect the investors in 
the long or the short term.  
 
The traditional ways of enforcing corporate governance principles are not suitable for 
the real world today. The world needs a new framework for the enforcement of 
corporate governance principles. Through rules and codes, the securities laws can help 
to form this framework. There is a diversity of enforcement methods. Different aspects 
of corporate governance are enforced in different ways. Some are enforced by corporate 
law,
71
 while others are dealt with by securities laws
72
 and delegated legislation in the 
forms of rules
73
 and voluntary
74
 and mandatory codes.
75
   
 
Although a takeover bid is part of securities regulations in Kuwait, and it is an important 
principle related to corporate governance, it is beyond the scope of this study. This 
section will look at an example of mandatory rules related to risk management and at 
the voluntary corporate governance code. Lawmakers have different ideas about how to 
enforce corporate governance principles. Some prefer to enforce these principles by 
law, while others prefer to enforce them via a ‘comply or explain’ regime.76 
                                                 
71
 Kuwait Companies Law 2013; UK Company Act 2006.  
72
 UK FSMA 2000; Kuwaiti Law No. 7 of 2010. 
73
 Listing Rules; Disclosure Rules; FCA’s principles for business (the principles). 
74
 UK Corporate Governance Code 2012.  
75
 Kuwait Corporate Governance Code 2013.  
76
 Applying corporate governance by law has the potential to cause two problems. The first is that it can 
harm the growth of the economy. The other problem with applying corporate governance principles by 
law can occur if the company faces financial and administrative burdens as a result of applying all 
corporate governance principles and consequently needs to employ more staff, spend more money, or 
gain more legal knowledge about the way to apply these rules and how to bear the cost. Despite this, 
some countries in Europe have replaced the ‘comply or explain’ regime with law, because they believe 
that the board and managers are part of the problem, not part of the solution. 
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In Kuwait, according to the Corporate Governance Rules 2013, a company must comply 
and does not have the option of not complying by explaining why it has not complied. 
Voluntary compliance has advantages for businesses. The nature of business requires a 
flexible and easily developed means of enforcement, because one size does not fit all. 
Although the UK is one of the developed countries in the field of corporate governance, 
corporate governance principles could be enforced by law. However, the British oppose 
this idea. This can be clearly seen from the FRC opinion that applying the 2012 code by 
law would have some side effects on economic growth.
77
 It would be better if Kuwait, 
Qatar and Saudi followed the example of the UK in terms of applying all of the 
principles. 
 
Kuwait, Qatar and Saudi issued securities regulations on corporate governance in 2010, 
2012 and 2007 respectively. However, Kuwait, Qatar and Saudi securities regulations 
do not cover some of the corporate governance aspects, such as risk management, and 
there is no voluntary code which is different from mandatory rules as in the UK.        
 
Board responsibility extends to risk management in many countries. For example, in 
2010, the UK extended the board’s responsibility for risk to include the nature and the 
extent of its strategy by deciding the risk facing the business, in addition to the 
responsibility for the risk of management and control systems according to the 
Corporate Governance Code.
78
 Risk management is not confined to corporate 
governance code. It is also part of the mandatory principles of business. However, the 
later do not apply to all issuers. They only apply to certain firms defined as firms 
“Authorised” by the FCA to offer certain financial products and services including 
consumer credit firms, banks, investment managers and brokers, insurer and financial 
advisers. For example, on 9 September 2013, Morgan Chase Bank NA (JP Morgan) was 
fined £137,610,000 for serious failings related to its Chief Investment Officer (CIO) as 
a result of high risk taking and weak management causing a £6.2 billion trading loss in 
                                                 
77
 Financial Reporting Council (n 24) 2. 
78
<http://www.charteredaccountants.ie/en/Members/Technical/Corporate-Governance/Corporate-
Governance-Articles/Risk-Management-and-the-new-UK-Corporate-Governance-Code---Bevan-Lloyd-
FCA/> accessed 30 November 2013.   
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2012.
79
 The FCA believed that poor risk management harmed the integrity of the 
market, as demonstrated by the statement of the FCA’s director of enforcement and 
financial crime, Tracey McDermott,
80
 which described this incident as a lesson for all 
companies.
81
 Therefore, this diversity of enforcement (one size does not fit all) depends 
on the importance of a principle and its impact. 
 
The Corporate Governance Rules 2013 in Kuwait also increased the responsibility of 
the board of directors by including sound systems for risk management and internal 
control. This means that the board of directors has the ability to understand and analyse 
the nature and level of risks to enable the company to reduce them as much as possible. 
The company is required to provide a number of principles, including creating a 
department or unit or an independent office of risk management to identify and measure 
the risks to the company according to Principle 5/1 of the Kuwaiti Corporate 
Governance Code 2013. The company must also form a committee concerned with risk 
management according to Principle 5/2 of the Kuwaiti Corporate Governance Code 
2013. Saudi Article 10, part (b) 3 of the Code 2006 provides that one of the main 
functions of the board of directors is to control and forecast the risk management and to 
disclose risks with transparency. Comparing Kuwaiti and Saudi codes reveals that the 
Kuwaiti Code 2013 provides the way to manage the risk by forming a committee and 
creating a department dedicated to risk management, while the Saudi code leaves to the 
board of directors the freedom to fulfil its obligations to risk management. Under the 
‘comply or explain’ system, compliance is voluntary. A company cannot face sanctions 
for non-compliance, only for not explaining its non-compliance. For example, some 
contend that the UK Corporate Governance Code lacks teeth. Moreover, the UK code 
                                                 
79
 <https://www.fca.org.uk/news/jpmorgan-chase-bank-na-fined> accessed 25 June 2015 
80
 She stated:  
When the scale of the problems at JP Morgan became apparent, it sent a shock-wave 
through the markets. Maintaining the integrity of markets is a key part of our wholesale 
conduct agenda. We consider JP Morgan’s failings to be extremely serious such as to 
undermine the trust and confidence in UK financial markets.  
81
 <https://www.fca.org.uk/news/jpmorgan-chase-bank-na-fined> accessed 25 June 2015  
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allows the company’s board a wide discretion for compliance. This idea will be 
discussed in more detail in the next chapter.  
 
In Article 1 of its 2006 Code, the Saudi legislature clarifies mandatory application by 
separating principles into optional and mandatory principles and using the ‘comply or 
explain’ regime. During the period between 5 October and 7 November 2013, four 
companies were fined for breaching Article 9, which is entitled ‘Disclosure in the Board 
of Directors’ Report’, because their board reports did not include the ‘comply or 
explain’ system of corporate governance principles.82 The Saudi code requires 
disclosure to the shareholders in the boards’ reports, as does UK law, while Qatar 
Article 30 of the 2009 code requires disclosure once a year, and Kuwait requires 
disclosure four times a year to the Authority.  
 
The Qatari legislature has also adopted the ‘comply or explain’ regime. Article 2 of the 
Qatari Corporate Governance Rules 2009 mentions ‘the principle of comply or explain 
non-compliance’, which means that the company should disclose the extent of its 
compliance with the provisions of corporate governance; otherwise, in the case of non-
compliance, the company has to determine the material that did not comply and explain 
the reasons therefore.   
 
In Kuwait, in accordance with part four of Decision No 25 of 2013, the listed companies 
must provide the Kuwaiti Authority with a report on a quarterly basis about the 
implementation of these rules, and, if they fail to comply with the rules, the Authority 
can hold an offender accountable according to Law 7 of 2007. After passing the new 
rules about corporate governance in 2013, some people in Kuwait revealed the 
occurrence of intensive contact between listed companies at the highest levels to prepare 
for a meeting to lobby against this decision, because everyone was convinced about the 
impossibility of practical application.
83
 The Kuwaiti 2013 code runs to 70 pages, is very 
detailed and places a heavy compliance burden on companies. 
 
                                                 
82
 <http://www.cma.org.sa/ar/News/Pages/default.aspx> accessed 11 October 2013. 
83
 <http://alwatan.kuwait.tt/ArticleDetails.aspx?Id=296959> accessed 12 August 2013. 
 212 
 
Part of the enforcement of the corporate governance code can be accomplished through 
listing rules. For example, the British legislature uses listing rules to apply these 
principles. Therefore, in the UK, if a company does not mention why it did not comply 
with the rules of governance in its report, it is in violation of the listing rules.
84
 The 
British use this style because the UK Corporate Governance Code is arranged by the 
Financial Reporting Council (FRC), although the FRC has no power to enforce 
corporate governance.
85
 As a result, some say that one of the real problems with 
applying corporate governance is how to close the gap between actual implementation 
and the formal provisions.
86
 Diversity in enforcement, including rules and codes, could 
help.   
 
The best solution for Kuwait to prevent the corporate failures that have afflicted large 
companies all over the world in terms of securities regulation is, firstly, by creating a 
new body. Its task should be to develop a corporate governance code over time, such as 
the FRC in the UK,
87
 because corporate governance needs to develop and be reviewed 
over time.
88
 Secondly, Kuwait can use a mix of mandatory and voluntary enforcement 
mechanisms.   
 
 
 
                                                 
84
 Financial Reporting Council (n 24) 15. 
85
Andrew Chambers (n 11) 455.  
86
 Fianna Joesover and Grant Kirkpatrick (n 27) 11-12. 
87
 The Corporate Governance Code in the UK is updated every two years. < http://www.frc.org.uk/Our-
Work/Codes-Standards/Corporate-governance.aspx> accessed 31 October 2013  
88
 The head of the primary markets on the London Stock Exchange, Alastair Walmsley, emphasised that 
saying that ‘we firmly believe that high standards of corporate governance make an important 
contribution to companies’ long term performance. By regularly reviewing and developing appropriate 
corporate governance practices whatever the prevailing macro-economic conditions’; Alastair Walmsley, 
‘Corporate Governance for Main Market and AIM Companies’ (2012) White Paper,  London Stock 
Exchange 3. 
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5.8 Conclusion  
 
This chapter has addressed the third aspect of protection of individual investors in 
shares in quoted companies, namely corporate governance codes that apply to 
companies whose shares are listed on a stock exchange. This chapter has focused 
specifically on these securities laws and regulations as they affect investors in listed 
companies. This chapter has not attempted to discuss the various theories, such as the 
agency theory, because the chapter focuses on the real world, which is not adequately 
explained by any of the theories. In reality, some actions of managers harm investors 
and other stakeholders, including local communities. 
 
This chapter has compared the provisions of corporate governance in the UK and those 
in Saudi Qatar and Kuwait, where, unlike the UK, there is a mixture of mandatory and 
voluntary rules. By comparing the UK, Saudi and Qatar codes with the Kuwaiti code, 
some important differences have been found. While the UK uses a principles-based 
approach, Kuwait uses mandatory rules. The question here is whether voluntary rules 
would work properly in Kuwait. That will be discussed in the next chapter to determine 
which rules are better, voluntary or mandatory.  
 
Although the Kuwaiti code could be made voluntary, much work would still be required 
to explain non-compliance rules. Consequently, one needs to look at how the number of 
provisions can be reduced. The UK, for example, has 53 provisions, as compared to 
Kuwait, which has more than 235 provisions. The size of the code is another problem. 
Some provisions that are in company law are also needed in the code, because an 
overseas listed company would not be subject to Kuwaiti company law. Kuwait might 
need a different code for national and international companies. In addition, the Kuwaiti 
code should distinguish between large and small companies in some provisions, as is 
done in the UK. Changing the code will take time. However, the financial culture also 
needs to be changed, which cannot be achieved without having a sound regulatory 
authority, as will be discussed in the next chapter.   
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Chapter Six 
Sound Regulatory Authority 
 
 
6.1 Introduction   
 
The previous three chapters discussed the problems encountered in protecting investors. 
However, this chapter will focus on a sound regulatory authority as a solution. Most 
countries have a regulatory authority
1
 to regulate their capital market. In the UK it is 
called the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA); in the GCC countries it is called the 
Capital Market Authority. In this chapter, the words ‘regulatory authority’ mean any 
regulatory capital market authority. A regulatory authority can be defined as an 
administrative body created by a special law or secondary legislation to supervise 
industrial, financial, or commercial activities. It has financial independence and does not 
rely on the state for funds.
2
  
 
Robert Shiller likens a regulatory authority to a referee in sporting events, because both 
the referee and the regulatory authority can enforce rules by deciding when the rules are 
broken and when people should be punished. Everyone agrees about the importance of 
the referee in sporting events. Players sometimes argue with the referee, but they need 
him, because without him it would not be a good game. For example, dangerous players 
could hurt other players. Whilst sometimes taking risks is the key to winning the game, 
the referee will stop players from taking dangerous risks. Shiller emphasises that people 
in sports and business ask for regulations. This is the idea of this chapter, namely how 
                                                 
1
 In the UK, the regulations use the term ‘regulatory’ (Financial Services Act 2012) instead of the term 
‘authority’. 
2
 Zaid Aboa, Management of Public Institutions: Foundations of the application of administrative 
functions (Dar Al Shorouk 2009) 19. 
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to build a regulatory authority that will serve as an effective referee in the business 
world.
3
 
 
Establishing a regulatory authority can help to eliminate red tape ,or excessive 
bureaucracy, in the public sector, provide better regulation and enforcement, ease the 
introduction of modern methods in management and administration, provide stability, 
and ensure the appropriate climate is free from political exploitation.
4
 The term ‘red 
tape’ has been used since the sixteenth century to describe the negative effects of bad or 
excessive rules, regulations and procedures, many of which are ongoing and adversely 
affect the performance of public organisations.
5
 Such a regulatory authority needs to be 
effective and efficient to protect investors. Effectiveness differs from efficiency. 
Effectiveness is about achieving the authority’s goals; efficiency is about the good use 
of resources.
6
 Resources include human, financial, and material resources, as well as 
information and ideas. Therefore, a good regulatory authority can achieve its objectives 
in an efficient way.  
  
For a regulatory authority to protect investors effectively, it needs to: (1) have 
independence; (2) introduce sound regulation; and (3) create strong investors.  
 
6.2 Sound Independent Regulatory Authority 
Securities authorities in Kuwait, Qatar and Saudi were established only recently. To 
assess their adequacy, it is helpful to compare them with a system like the one in the 
UK, which has existed for much longer, but which has undergone a number of change.  
                                                 
3
 Robert Shiller, ‘Behavioral Finance and the Role of Psychology’ (2011) Lecture, Open Yale University 
Courses I Tunes. 
4
 Zaid Aboa (n 2) 20. 
5
 Gene Brewer, Richard Walker, ‘Red Tape: The Bane of Public Organisations?’ in Richard Walker, 
George Boye and Gene Brewer (eds) Public Management and Performance: Research Directions 
(Cambridge University Press 2010) 110-111.  
6
 Zaid Aboa (n 2) 36.  
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 6.2.1 Regulatory Authority in the UK 
 
The development of the regulatory authorities in the UK has passed through four 
important phases. 
 
6.2.1.1 No-Statutes Era  
 
Before the 1980s, the regulation of the financial services industry was limited largely to 
self-regulation, because the Investment Act 1958 was limited as a regulatory tool. It 
covered only a small part of the financial services market.
7
 Therefore, regulation was ad 
hoc and attempted by largely unenforced industry codes of practice.
8
   
 
6.2.1.2 Period between 1986 and2001  
 
In 1986, the original Financial Services Act was enacted, which created the Securities 
and Investment Board (SIB).
9
 The SIB was the first self-regulatory organisation under a 
statutory framework, which gave it the power to oversee other organisations that 
regulated themselves, called self-regulating organisations (SROs). One such SRO was 
the Securities and Futures Authority, which regulated stock exchanges. Therefore, a 
mixture of the state and SROs specified, administered and enforced the regulations, with 
the SIB acting as an umbrella to oversee a number of SORs, such as the Securities and 
Futures Authority.  
                                                 
7
 Financial Markets and Services Bill, 6. 
<http://www.parliament.uk/documents/commons/lib/research/rp99/rp99-068.pdf> accessed 13 January 
2014.  
8
 Steve Bloor, ‘After 25 Years of Regulation are consumers better protected?’ (2013) 
<http://www.ifaonline.co.uk/ifaonline/opinion/2258975/after-25-years-of-regulation-are-consumers-
better-protected> accessed 14 January 2014. 
9
 Its structure is a company limited by guarantee, which was incorporated in 1985.  
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Accordingly, a number of organisations were responsible for the financial services 
industry in the UK, including the SIB and several SROs, which resulted in less efficient 
and effective regulation.
10
 As a result of the lack of rapid response to problems and the 
occurrence of costly overlaps, a number of scandals occurred, such as mis-selling 
pensions.
11
 In 1995, Barings Bank which had been established in 1762, collapsed 
causing losses of approximately £827 million. The losses were caused by the trading of 
one bank employee who was working in the bank’s office in Singapore.    
 
It was thought that creating a single regulatory body would avoid such problems in the 
future. Consequently, the Financial Services Authority (FSA) replaced the SIB in 1997. 
The FSA combined nine separate agencies
12
 to regulate the whole financial services 
industry in the UK.
13
 The FSA was a company limited by guarantee.
14
 The Financial 
Services and Market Act 2000 (FSMA) gave the FSA its objectives and its powers. The 
new statutory system provided more protection to investors. The FSA was given more 
enforcement power and was authorised to impose strong fines.
15
 
 
6.2.1.3 Period between 2001 and 2012 
On 30 December 2001, Chancellor of the Exchequer Gordon Brown agreed to the 
independence of the FSA from the government, although it had to be properly 
                                                 
10
 Moreover, prudential regulation was given to the FSA. The banking supervision functions were 
transferred from the Bank of England to the FSA by the Bank of England Act 1998; Dalvinder Singh, 
Banking Regulation of the UK and the US Financial Markets (Ashgate 2007) 15. 
11
 Steve Bloor (n 8). 
12
 1- Building Societies Commission; 2- Friendly Societies Commission; 3- Insurance Directorate; 4- 
Registry of Friendly Societies; 5- Bank of England’s Supervision and Surveillance Division; 6- 
Investment Management Regulatory Organisation; 7- Personal Investment Authority; 8- Securities and 
Future Authority; 9- Securities and Investment Board.  
13
 <http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200809/ldselect/ldeconaf/101/10108.htm> accessed 11 
January 2014. 
14
 Company NO 1920623. 
15
 Financial Markets and Services Bill (n 7) 21.  
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accountable to the government, Parliament and to other stakeholders. He emphasised 
the advantage of having such an independent body for business and for consumers, 
according to a letter sent to Sir Howard Davies, the Chairman of the FSA.
16
 
 
To sum up, in 2001, self-regulatory organisations (SROs) were replaced by a single 
statutory regulatory authority called the FSA. The FSA’s responsibility was for 
regulating banks and providers of financial services. Theoretically, it had two roles. One 
was the prudential regulation of all of the above institutions; the other was the 
regulation of how they conducted their business. The FSA was an independent body and 
was accountable to Parliament. However, the FSA was not part of the Bank of England 
which was solely responsible for making financial policy, and the Treasury was 
responsible for passing the necessary statutory instruments to empower the FSA. The 
financial crisis of 2007-2008 highlighted some failings in these arrangements. The FSA 
had focused on the conduct of business at the expense of prudential regulation. This 
prompted the government to introduce a different structure for the regulation of 
financial activities in 2012. 
 
The regulatory model in the UK has evolved over many years. The diagram below 
(Figure 6.1) shows the milestones in the development of the regulatory authority system 
in the UK. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
16
 <http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http://www.hm-
treasury.gov.uk/newsroom_and_speeches/press/2001/press_144_01.cfm> accessed 11 January 2014. 
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Figure 6.1 Milestones in the Development of Regulatory Authority System in the UK. 
 
6.2.1.4 Period After 2012 
Under the new structure, the responsibility of the Bank of England
17
 would no longer be 
limited to financial policy, but would also include the micro-prudential regulation of 
                                                 
17 In addition, the Banking Act 2009 gave the Bank of England the responsibility for financial stability, 
which would not work effectively without allocating to it the responsibility for micro-prudential 
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insurers, deposit takers and major investment firms through the creation of a Prudential 
Regulation Authority (PRA)
18
 to promote their safety and soundness and minimise 
adverse effects on the stability of the financial system. In addition, the macro-prudential 
regulation of the financial systems as a whole would be undertaken by the newly created 
Financial Policy Committee (FPC). The PRA is now a subsidiary of the Bank of 
England, unlike the FSA. 
 
The Financial Services Act 2012 created two regulators, the FCA and the PRA.
19
 
Although the FCA is not part of the Bank of England, the PRA is, and it is responsible 
for the supervision and the prudential regulation of banks, major investment firms, 
building societies, credit unions and insurers, promoting safety and soundness to those 
firms and protecting policyholders.
20
 The chair of the PRA is the Governor of the Bank 
of England, and the chief executive is the Deputy Governor for Prudential Regulation.
21
 
 
The Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) has been created as a separate institution from 
the Bank of England to regulate the conduct of financial services firms. The FCA’s 
duties include preventing market abuse and ensuring that financial firms treat their 
customers fairly. Its three major objectives are 1) protecting consumers; 2) promoting 
the integrity of the financial system; and 3) promoting effective competition. It is also 
responsible for the micro-prudential regulation of those financial services that are not 
supervised by the PRA, such as, for example, asset managers, hedge funds, many 
brokers, dealers, independent financial advisers, and listed companies. See Figure 6.2.   
  
                                                                                                                                               
supervision. Its augmented responsibilities and corresponding authority clearly put the Bank of England 
in charge. See Figure 6.1. 
18
 Emma Murphy and Stephen Senior, ‘The Changes to the Bank of England’, 
<http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Documents/quarterlybulletin/2013/qb130102.pdf> 
accessed 16 January 2014.  
19
 Financial Services Act 2012 sch 3A part 2. 
20
 <http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/pra/pages/default.aspx> accessed 11 January 2014. 
21
 Financial Services Act 2012 Schedule 1ZB s2. 
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4. After 2012  
Figure 6.2 Regulatory System in the UK 
 
Figure 6.2 shows the regulatory responsibility of the Financial Policy Committee (FPC), 
the Prudential Regulation Authority (PRA) and the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA).  
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Bloor argues that the latest regulatory arrangements are not dissimilar to those of 1988, 
which were subsequently changed in 2001, saying, ‘if it did not work before what are its 
chances this time?’22 Arguably, in this case no one can guarantee that this new 
arrangement will be more effective – it has to be tried and tested. 
 
6.2.2 Regulatory Authority in Kuwait, Qatar and Saudi 
 
Kuwait, Qatar and Saudi describe their regulatory authorities as independent bodies. In 
Kuwait, the law states that the authority is an independent body having a legal 
personality and that it is overseen by a Minister of Trade and Industry.
23
 In Saudi 
Arabia, the law mentions that the authority has financial and administrative autonomy 
and must report to the President of the Council of Ministers and that it has a legal 
personality.
24
 In Qatar, according to Article 4 of Qatari Law 2012, the Authority has 
financial and administrative independence and a legal personality. The Authority must 
report to the Governor of Qatar’s Central Bank.25 
 
Although the term ‘independence’ is used, careful analysis of the text hereunder will 
show the extent to which this is true. To that end, the soundness and independence of 
the regulatory authorities in Kuwait, Qatar and Saudi will be assessed in terms of their 
composition, funding arrangements, accountability and freedom of action from political 
and commercial interference. 
 
6.2.2.1 Composition  
The following section discusses the members of the board of the Authority. 
                                                 
22
 Steve Bloor (n 8). 
23
 Capital Market Law 2010, Article 2. 
24
 Capital Market Law 2003, Article 4. 
25
 Qatar Financial Market Authority Law No 8 of 2012, Article 3. 
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The regulatory authority is administered by a board called the Board of Commissioners. 
In Kuwait, the board consists of five full-time members. An Emiri Decree is issued to 
appoint them, and it specifies the chairman and the deputy chairman.
26
 Article 12 
mentions that the Emiri Decree determines the board’s salaries and benefits. In Saudi, 
the board of the Capital Market Authority (five members) is appointed by Royal Order. 
It determines their salaries and financial benefits and specifies the chairman and the 
deputy chairman.
27
 
 
The Qatari legislation is unlike Saudi and Kuwaiti legislation regarding the appointment 
of the board. Although Qatari Law 2012 mentions in Article 6 that the appointment of 
the board has to be determined by Emir Decree, the majority of the board’s seven 
members are known in advance, so that the Emiri Decree has no real impact. Article 6 
states that the chairman of the board and the deputy chairman are the Governor and the 
Deputy Governor of the Qatar Central Bank. The Governor selects two experienced 
people. Two further members represent the Ministry of Economy and Finance and the 
Ministry of Business and Trade, respectively. The last of the seven members is the chief 
executive officer of the Qatar Financial Centre Regulatory Authority (QFCRA).  
 
Clearly, the Qatar legislation has realised the effects of shadow bank institutions (non-
bank financial intermediaries that provide services similar to traditional banks) on the 
financial systems as a whole, thus giving the central bank more power by appointing the 
governor and the deputy governor of the central bank as the chairman and deputy 
chairman of the board of the authority, which could affect the conduct of business. It 
would be better if the GCC countries had separate bodies, such as the FCA and the PRA 
in the UK for the reasons explained earlier in this thesis. 
 
Qatari legislation is also unlike Saudi and Kuwaiti legislation in that the members of the 
authority board are not full-time. They perform their duties in addition to their main 
                                                 
26
 Capital Market Law 2010, Article 6. 
27
 Capital Market Law 2003, Article 7. 
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employment functions,
28
 while in Kuwait and Saudi they are full-time. Qatari legislation 
is also unlike Saudi
29
 and Kuwaiti
30
 legislation regarding the post of the chairman and 
the chief executive. In the Qatari authority, they are separate posts, while in Kuwait and 
Saudi, they are the same. According to Article 17 of the Qatari Law 2012, since the 
chief executive shall not be a member of the board appointed by Emiri Decree upon a 
proposal from the governor, the chairman of the board suggests the name of the chief 
executive. 
 
Despite the fact that Qatari legislation has successfully separated the chairman from the 
chief executive, two important points have been ignored. First, the members of the 
board are not full-time, which may cause a conflict of interest and a lack of complete 
knowledge of the nature of their functions. Second, the chief executive is not a member 
of the board, which may cause poor communication with the board.  
 
In the UK, by comparison, the board that governs the FCA is appointed by several 
parties.
31
 A chair (non-executive member), a chief executive
32
 and at least one other 
member are appointed by the Treasury. The Bank of England Deputy Governor for 
prudential regulation is a non-executive member of the board. Two members are 
appointed jointly by the Secretary of State and the Secretary of the Treasury (non-
executive members). The majority of the board members must be non-executive 
members.   
 
                                                 
28
 Qatar Financial Market Authority Law No. 8 of 2012, Article 6. 
29 In Saudi, according to Article 11 of the 2003 Law, the same person holds the positions of chairman of 
the board and chief executive. 
30 In Kuwait, according to Article 8 of Law No. 7 of 2010, the same person holds the positions of 
chairman of the board and chief executive. 
31 Financial Services Act 2012, Schedule 1ZA s2.  
32
 The chief executive of the FCA is also a member of the PRA governing body under the Financial 
Services Act 2012 Schedule 1ZB s3.  
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The appointment of the board members is subject to the Code of Practice for Ministerial 
Appointment to Public Bodies 2012.
33
 The GCC countries have no such code, and there 
is no limit to the numbers on the board. Currently, the FCA board is made up of four 
executive members and eight non-executive members.
34
 The roles of the chair and the 
chief executive are not exercised by the same person.
35
 The 2012 Act does not explicitly 
provide for the separation of the two posts, but section 3 of Schedule 1ZA mentions that 
the chair is to be a non-executive member. In the UK, the Treasury determines the terms 
of service of the board members
36
 and has the power to remove the appointed members 
in some circumstances.
37
 The remuneration in the UK for non-executive board members 
is determined by the Treasury, while the remuneration for the executive board is 
determined by the FCA.
38
  
 
With regard to the age of retirement of the board members, Kuwait’s Article 10 of the 
2010 Law states the reasons for a board member vacating a position as death, disability 
or resignation. It also mentions a number of circumstances that will require a person to 
vacate his or her position, one of which is the issuance of a final judgment about the 
person’s bankruptcy. Therefore, the article does not include the age of retirement, which 
is a subject of dispute. While Kuwaiti law extends the age of retirement of judges, 
                                                 
33
 Sir David Normington, the Commissioner for Public Appointments, who is independent of the civil 
service and the government and is appointed by the Queen, says: ‘My role as a regulator is to ensure the 
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36
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38
 Financial Services Act 2012, Schedule 1ZA s7. 
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prosecutors, and the Fatwa and Legislature,
39
 the situation is not same for the board 
members. As a result, there is no extensive regulation of retirement age, and the age of 
retirement is not included as a reason for vacating a position. It could be said that there 
is no retirement age for the board members in Kuwait, and the age is subject to the 
Emir, since he appoints them. The retirement age in Kuwait is 60. Experienced people 
over 60 still have a lot to offer and can fulfil a useful role.  
 
6.2.2.2 Funding Arrangements 
 
The following discussion concerns the regulatory authorities’ budget, financial 
resources and maintaining reserves. 
 
In Kuwait, the Authority has an independent budget
40
 that does not need to be adopted 
by the relevant minister. However, in Saudi, according to Article 14 of Law 2003, the 
Authority has a separate annual budget that is submitted by the Minister of Finance. In 
Qatar, the Authority’s budget is part of the state’s general budget.41 Therefore, the 
budgets of the Saudi and Qatari authorities are part of the government budget system, 
while in Kuwait, the authority has an independent budget, because it is not part of the 
government’s general budget and does not need any approval. However, some argue 
that this is not the case with other authorities, such as the Youth and Sport Public 
Authority
42
 and the Public Authority for Investment.
43
 The full independence of the 
regulatory authority budget is resented by some people, who feel that it should be 
subject to some of the same restrictions as other authorities. An example is discussed in 
an article published on 10 November 2013 entitled ‘Budget war is renewed between the 
                                                 
39
 According to the Emiri Decree No 124 of 1992 concerning degrees and salaries of judges, prosecutors, 
and the Fatwa and Legislature.    
40
 Capital Market Law 2010, Article 18. 
41
 Qatar Financial Market Authority Law No. 8 of 2012, Article 2. 
42
 Emiri Decree No 43 1992, Article 10. 
43
 Emiri Decree No 47 1982, Article 10. 
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Authority and the Ministry of Finance’. The Kuwaiti Ministry of Finance insists that the 
Authority’s budget should be approved by the Minister of Finance, while the Authority 
asserts that its budget is not subject to the approval of the Ministry of Finance.
44
  
 
In Kuwait, the financial resources of the Authority mentioned in Article 19 of the 2010 
Law include (1) fees and (2) all other resources that are raised from exercising its 
activities or recruiting its reserves. Consequently, in Kuwait, there is no funding by the 
government. However, the Saudi authority is partly funded by the government and 
partly by industry. Article 13 of Law 2003 determines the financial resources of the 
Authority, including (1) fees for services and commissions charged by the authority; (2) 
fees for using its facilities; (3) a return on its funds and proceeds from the sale of its 
assets; (4) fines and financial penalties for breaching the 2003 Law; (5) funds provided 
by the government; and (6) all other resources determined by the board. The Qatari 
Authority is also partly funded by the government and partly by the industry. Article 23 
of Law 2012 determines the financial resources of the authority, including (1) financial 
assistance by the government; (2) fees for services charged by the Authority; (3) fines 
and financial penalties for breaching the 2012 Law; and (4) all other resources that are 
raised by the Authority from the exercise of its activities or from recruiting its reserves.   
 
In Saudi, the Authority should maintain a general reserve that is equal to double the 
amount of the previous annual budget. Surplus funds should be remitted to the Finance 
Ministry.
45
 In Kuwait, Article 21 of the 2010 Law gives the Authority the power to 
maintain sufficient monetary reserves to ensure its financial stability over the long term 
without any limitation and transfer the surplus to the state public treasury. In Qatar, 
Article 23 of the Law 2012 gives the Authority the power to maintain sufficient 
monetary reserves to ensure its financial stability over the long term without any 
limitation. Unlike Kuwaiti and Saudi law, the Qatari legislation does not mention 
transferring the surplus to the state public treasury.  
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 <http://www.alraimedia.com/Articles.aspx?id=464717> accessed 10 February 2014.  
45
 Capital Market Law 2003, Article 14. 
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The Kuwaiti and Qatari authorities are allowed to use their reserves, while this is not 
allowed in Saudi.
46
 In Kuwait, this is inconsistent with the text of Article 24, which 
states that the Authority shall not engage in any commercial activities, lend money, or 
issue or invest in securities. Therefore, how can it use its funds?   
 
In comparison, in the UK, the financial services companies, which are regulated, 
completely fund the FCA. It also has the power to keep sufficient reserves.
47
 It does not 
receive any government funding. However, civil penalties go to the Treasury after 
deducting the enforcement costs.
48
 In Saudi and Qatar, the funding from civil penalties 
is part of the financial resources, which could cause a conflict of interests because the 
authority might be tempted to increase the number of financial penalties prompted not 
by a civil wrong but by the need to boost its revenue for budgetary reasons.  
 
6.2.2.3 Accountability 
 
In this context, independence does not mean freedom from accountability. The 
following section addresses to whom a regulatory authority reports. 
 
In the UK, the FCA is an independent body, but it is accountable to the Treasury. For 
example, the FCA must prepare a report for the Treasury at least once a year, and the 
Treasury must then submit this report to Parliament.
49
 
 
                                                 
46
 According to Article 4 of the Capital Market Law 2003, the Authority does not allow any of the 
following four actions: (1) engaging in any commercial activities; (2) acquiring, owning or issuing 
securities; (3) lending or borrowing funds; and (4) being part of any project to earn profits. 
47
 FCA Article ‘Power to raise fees’ <http://www.fca.org.uk/about/how-we-are-funded/fees>   accessed 2 
January 2014. 
48
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49
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In Qatar, the regulatory Authority must report to the Governor of the Central Bank.
50
 In 
Saudi, the Authority has to report to the President of the Council of Ministers
51
; in 
Kuwait, the Authority is overseen by the Minister of Trade and Industry
52
 and must 
report once a year to the relevant minister and submit the report to the cabinet.
53
 
 
While some may consider reporting to someone to be different to being overseen by that 
person, this is not the case in Kuwait. For example, the Youth and Sport Public 
Authority is overseen by a minister,
54
 while the Public Authority for Investment also 
reports to a minister.
55
 
 
In Kuwait, according to Article 22 of the 2010 Law, the Authority is committed to 
keeping its accounts and records. This is also the situation in Qatar.
56
 In the UK, the 
FCA is responsible for recording and safe-keeping all decisions made in the exercise of 
its functions,
57
 and a record of each governing body meeting must be published.
58
 It 
would be better if Kuwaiti law required publication of the Authority’s meeting reports 
to achieve transparency. There is a saying that ‘sunshine is the best disinfectant’.  
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53
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Qatari Law 2012 Article 27 says that the Authority is subject to control by the Audit 
Bureau; in Kuwait, the Authority is subject to control by the Audit Bureau
59
 after the 
event and not prior to the event.
60
 The Saudi law does not mention any prior or 
subsequent control. In the UK, the FCA must send its annual accounts to the 
Comptroller and the Auditor General to be examined, certified and a report made about 
these accounts, after which the Comptroller and the Auditor General must send a copy 
of the report to the Treasury, after which the Treasury submits a copy of the certified 
accounts and the report to Parliament.
61
 
 
In conclusion, Kuwaiti law gives the Kuwaiti Capital Market Authority financial and 
administrative independence, especially with respect to board appointments and its 
budget and financial resources. In contrast, Saudi law gives administrative 
independence in terms of appointing the board, while the financial resources and its 
budget remain under government control. Qatari law does not give the Authority 
complete independence in terms of appointing the board, its budget and its financial 
resources.  
 
6.3 Sound Legal Framework  
 
A regulatory framework that protects investors must have laws, rules and codes, which 
have been defined in Chapters 3, 4 and 5 respectively. The regulatory framework needs 
to have a legal basis (laws, rules, codes) and effective monitoring or policing of 
compliance and enforcement of any breach of the laws, rules or codes. These two roles 
are usually in the hands of a specialised body or a regulatory authority. In the UK, these 
roles are performed by the FCA and the PRA. In the Gulf, such a body is usually 
referred to as a Capital Market Authority.  
                                                 
59
 The Kuwaiti Audit Bureau reports to Kuwait’s Parliament, aiming to maintain effective control over 
public funds. Article 3 of Law No 30 of 1964 concerning establishing the Audit Bureau states that 
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60
 Capital Market Law 2010, Article 23.  
61
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Generally speaking, when a financial system works well, it will help people. However, 
sometimes bad behaviour, deliberate or unintentional, occurs that includes action in the 
market, such as market abuse; action by a business itself, such as bad behaviour by one 
or more managers; and action by others, such as majority shareholders, who have more 
power than the small consumers, including minority investors on the stock exchange.  
 
A regulatory authority that oversees the capital market has a further role to play in that it 
can suggest continuous improvements in securities legislation as companies and others 
find more ways to circumvent the law at the expense of the investors. In addition to 
suggesting improvements to the law, a regulatory authority can make ‘rules’ that have 
the force of law.
62
 This is also known as secondary legislation.
63
 In the UK, there are 
two categories of legislation. Primary legislation consists of ‘statutes’ that are enacted 
by Parliament. The second category consists of secondary legislation, known as 
‘delegated or subordinate legislation’, which occurs when the law-making power is 
delegated by Parliament to a minister or local authority or semi-public organisation.
64
 
The legislation that gives the rule-making power is called the Parent Act.
65
 
 
Therefore, there is primary and secondary legislation, and a regulatory authority can 
recommend changes to primary legislation and implement secondary legislation. 
 
                                                 
62
 The law gives the regulatory authority in the GCC countries the power to make rules similar to the UK. 
In Kuwait, Article 4 Part 1 states that the authority board shall issue rules and regulations that are 
necessary to implement this law. In Saudi, Article 6 Parts 2, 12, and 13 of Saudi Law 2003 mentions that 
the authority shall issue regulations, decisions, and instructions and shall set procedure. In Qatar, the 
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6.3.1 How Can A Regulatory Authority Help to Improve the Law?   
 
In Chapter 3, entitled ‘Insider Dealing’, this thesis discussed securities law as one 
example of financial crime. This section will consider how a regulatory authority can 
improve the quality of the law to combat this crime effectively.  
 
Several improvements can help the enforcement system, such as expert judges and 
criminal authorities who are expert in financial matters
66
 and case settlement. These are 
the key to effective enforcement that increases the level of confidence and credibility.
67
 
These three issues: expert legal professionals, the court system,
68
 and private 
enforcement are beyond the scope of the thesis. 
 
One feature of financial crimes is the difficulty involved in enumerating them, because 
they vary from state to state and from time to time.
69
 Many activities can be classed as 
financial market crime, one of which is market abuse. Furthermore, market abuse covers 
a wide range of illegal deeds.
70
 Therefore, an authority should suggest improvements to 
the law that are as wide-ranging as possible to protect investors. 
 
This is the situation in the GCC countries. In Kuwait, Article 4 Part 1 mentions that the 
board shall issue recommendations and studies to develop laws that help to achieve 
authority objectives. In Qatar, according to Article 8 Part 8 of Law 2012, the board shall 
suggest laws that assist the authority’s goals. In Saudi, although Saudi Law 2003 does 
                                                 
66 Ana Carvajal, Jennifer Elliott, The Challenge of Enforcement in Securities Markets: Mission 
Impossible? (International Monetary Fund (IMF) working paper 2009 18. 
67 ibid 21.  
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 223 
 
not mention any power to suggest laws, Part 4 of Article 6 allows the authority to give 
advice and recommendations that would protect investors in securities.  
 
The situation is different between the GCC countries and the UK. In the UK, the 
regulation is not limited to securities. Banks, insurance companies and financial 
advisers are all regulated. In contrast, in the GCC countries regulation is limited to the 
securities market alone.  
 
One function of a regulatory authority is intelligence, which is a two-part task. One part 
is alerting the authority about potential concerns; the second is gathering evidence.
71
 
The first part, which is supervisory in nature, means discovering breaches of 
regulations. Supervision programmes aim to identify, deter and prevent problems. 
Sometimes, it is hard to distinguish among these tasks. The term ‘enforcement to 
compliance’ is used for the two parts of the authority’s task. 
 
A clear mandate to enforce the laws and regulations should be granted to the authority 
by the securities law.
72
 In the UK, the FCA has a wide range of enforcement powers, 
including the imposition of criminal, civil or administrative sanctions against companies 
or individuals who do not meet the required standards.
73
 This is not the case in the GCC 
countries. Each will be considered in turn.  
 
It is not helpful to list all possible abuses in financial markets. In the UK, dealing with 
financial crime is a very important objective of the FCA authority. One way is to 
involve the firms in fighting this crime by monitoring, detecting and preventing 
financial crime, such as fraud, money laundering, bribery and corruption, and disclosing 
                                                 
71 ibid 67.    
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73
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false or secret information.
74
 In addition, an enforcement programme aims to detect and 
punish non-compliance and to deter such action in the future. This includes 
investigating, obtaining evidence and interviewing witnesses, gathering information 
from third parties such as telephone companies and Internet providers, and accessing 
bank accounts. All of these actions require that the regulatory authority have the legal 
power to carry them out.  
 
In the UK, the power of investigation includes such varied action as sanctions for failure 
to comply under section 177 of the FSMA 2000, gathering information under section 
165, obtaining search warrants under section 176, and interviewing witnesses. For 
example, in an insider dealing investigation, two kinds of persons can be interviewed. 
The first is a potential witness. The interview with such a person can be compulsory or 
voluntary. The second kind of person is the subject of the investigation.
75
 In addition, 
although disclosing the details of customer accounts is not generally allowed in the UK, 
section 175 FSMA 2000 allows it in certain circumstances. A study of these 
circumstances is beyond the scope of this thesis. 
 
Unlike the UK, the situation in the GCC countries needs to be improved. The situations 
in Saudi, Qatar and Kuwait are all different. In Saudi, Article 5 Part c of Saudi Law 
2003 gives the Authority the power to investigate, take evidence, and subpoena 
witnesses. Part 12 of Article 6 gives the Authority the power to conduct inquiries and 
investigations. However, these powers are for enforcement of the 2003 law’s provisions, 
regulations and rules. Therefore, the scope of the power is limited to applying Law 
2003. It would be better if these powers were applicable for every breach of the 
financial markets. In Qatar, the Authority has the right to investigate, inspect
76
 and 
prove by all means, including electronic devices.
77
 In Kuwait, Article 3 Part 6 of Law 
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2010 mentions that the Authority aims to ensure compliance with laws and regulations 
related to securities activities. However, Kuwaiti Law 2010 distinguishes between the 
Authority’s right to bring a civil or commercial case and referring the complaint to a 
public prosecutor. The complaint is for any law, while the former is limited to the Act 
2010. It would be better if the authority’s powers were extended to all laws that apply to 
the financial markets and not just securities laws. 
 
6.3.2 Rule Making by a Regulatory Authority 
 
Rules are part of the legal and regulatory framework.
78
 Chapter 4 of this thesis, entitled 
‘Fair Disclosure’, discussed rules in detail. This section will talk about the advantages 
and disadvantages of rulemaking.  
 
Secondary legislation has advantages:
79
  
1) Saving parliamentary time, since rules are made without Parliament’s 
involvement. Rules are an alternative to Acts of Parliament. Accordingly, they 
reduce the statutory burden.
80
  
2) Speed, by avoiding the lengthy stages involved in parliamentary procedures. 
Whilst having the force of law, rules are quicker to pass than a statute.  
3) Expertise needed in complicated areas. For example, making rules that 
regulate the economy requires an understanding of how the economy operates.  
Alexander Justham, the chief executive of the London Stock Exchange, emphasised the 
importance of rules by saying that ‘one of the crucial roles any regulator plays is to 
                                                 
78 Paul Nelson (n 63) 3-4. 
79
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examine the marketplace and potentially intervene through rule changes to ensure that 
an appropriate equilibrium is consistently achieved’.81 
 
In addition to these advantages, a regulatory authority can impose civil fines for 
violations. For instance, in the UK, the FCA can impose a fine of any amount for 
breaching the rules. It is a disciplinary function. However, in Kuwait, the authority 
cannot impose any civil sanctions. Both civil and criminal sanctions should be available 
for effective enforcement,
82
 because the burden of proof required to impose a criminal 
sanction is higher than the burden to impose a civil sanction. Administrative (civil) 
sanctions differ from criminal fines sanctions. For example, in Kuwait the Capital 
Market Authority has to refer to the court in order to impose fines. However, there is a 
limit of 100,000KD for criminal fines. This difference can be clearly seen from the case 
in February 2014 against the Chairman of Al Ahli Bank who traded based on inside 
information related to the shares of Al Ahli Bank. The first instance court fined him 1.5 
million KD, but the appeal court reduced this to 100,000 KD.
83
 
 
The disadvantage is that delegated rule-making power could have a negative effect in 
terms of accountability according to the separation of power.
84
 Generally, to prevent 
abuse of power, the executive, legislative and judiciary’s powers should be separate.85 
Rule-making power results in legislation which has not been fully debated in 
Parliament.
86
 Generally, the process of passing a law involves the legislature enacting 
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the law, the executive carrying out the law, and the judiciary resolving disputes about 
the law. If the law is not clear, judges must interpret the law and, if there is an 
ambiguity, determine the meaning of the law.
87
 However, courts will not question a law 
enacted by Parliament if the law is clear and unambiguous.  
 
However, the situation with secondary legislation is different. The courts are not 
competent to interpret rules, because the courts would need to understand the regulatory 
authority’s views, intentions and policy.88 However, a court has the power to strike 
down a secondary regulation if the regulator exceeds its sphere of competence.
89
 
 
6.3.3 ‘Comply or Explain’ Regime  
 
Thus far, this section has discussed what is sometimes referred to as ‘Hard Law’. This 
means that the law is binding, authoritative and effective, with penalties for its breaches. 
However, a regulatory authority can also use so-called ‘Soft Law’,90 which is the name 
given to statements of principles, codes of conduct, codes of practice and guidance.
91
 It 
is possible to mix hard and soft law, as in the corporate governance code in the UK. 
Although complying with the code is voluntary, listed companies are required to explain 
every instance of non-compliance.
92
 This is referred to as the ‘comply or explain’ 
regime. This was discussed in detail in Chapter 4.  
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A ‘comply or explain’ regime can be described as an alternative way to achieve strong 
regulation. It strikes a balance between soft law and hard law that can be suitable in 
today’s complex economic world. The ‘comply or explain’ approach has both 
advantages and disadvantages. Michelle Edkins, who works in the field of corporate 
governance as Managing Director of Corporate Governance and Responsible 
Investment at BlackRock Inc., summarises the advantages and disadvantages of this 
system by saying that:  
…“comply or explain” has its limitations, poor explanations, differences 
of opinion between management and shareholders, different views as to 
the right approach amongst shareholders, lack of resources for 
engagement, and limits on the scope of some shareholders to be 
pragmatic. Nonetheless, “comply or explain” offers more flexibility than 
the alternative. Companies have the opportunity to set out their case and, 
whether agreement is reached or not, engagement helps build mutual 
understanding. Communication about the future involves indicating 
plans to adopt and improve, which, for shareholders - the institutions and 
the private savers among our clients - provides reassurance that 
companies are being run for the long-term and in the interests of the 
shareholders.
93
 
 
In addition to investors, companies would benefit from a corporate governance code. 
According to the chairman of the London Stock Exchange, Chris Gibson-Smith, 
‘Companies benefit from visible, strong corporate governance practices by attracting 
more investors and so reducing the cost of capital for all’.94 
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‘Comply or explain’ means more flexibility in the application of the set of rules with no 
free passes for avoiding these rules. Companies are required to provide an explanation, 
and others, such as future investors and institutional investors, will judge and monitor. 
Although there is no action from a regulatory authority if the explanation is insufficient, 
the market forces the shareholders to take action. The share price will force the 
shareholder to engage. Investing is about taking risks. An investor who buys stock in a 
company with high standards of corporate governance is less likely to lose money. This 
is discussed more fully in Chapter Five. Investment advisers will also take the statement 
of a code into account when giving advice.  
 
The market in general and the shareholders specifically, force the companies to follow 
the code.
95
 Simply, the process for shareholders is that if no one wants to buy the 
company’s shares, then the price will decrease, which prompts the shareholders to try to 
correct the situation. Consequently, the decline in the share price encourages the firm to 
adopt good corporate principles. The process is similar to the idea of market power on 
competitive policy that drives firms to improve their prices and services.
96
 Shareholders 
will consider this noncompliance when deciding to buy, vote, hold and sell their 
shares.
97
 
 
The Code is under development. The Chairman of the Financial Reporting Council, 
Baroness Sarah Hogg, acknowledged that although the UK Code benefits the market, 
such as making a difference in the corporate culture, there is still work that needs to be 
done to develop the Code further.
98
 Andrew Keay criticised the ‘comply or explain’ 
regime, because no regulatory body assesses the companies’ statements and there is no 
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way to measure the extent to which these principles actually work, such as statistics. 
Shareholders do not really engage in monitoring their companies.
99
 He suggested 
introducing regulatory oversight to examine whether each company complies and 
whether the explanations are adequate.
100
 
 
One response to Keay’s comment is that the content of the explanation is not important. 
For example, in Germany, the corporate governance code works under the ‘comply or 
disclose’ approach, under which the firms comply with the recommendations or disclose 
their noncompliance.
101
 In the ‘comply or disclose’ approach, firms comply or just say 
they will not comply. Secondly, some provisions of the code are already in rules or law 
and are mandatory. The ‘comply or explain’ regime is part of a large regulatory system. 
The code can be used as clear evidence of not complying with other rules and laws. The 
third point is that there is already a mechanism for judging the adequacy of an 
explanation under the Stewardship Code, under which institutional investors must take 
action if they deem that an explanation is inadequate and they have to comply or explain 
any failure to take action. The Stewardship Code aims to help institutional investors (on 
behalf of clients and beneficiaries) to exercise their responsibilities properly under the 
‘comply or explain’ regime. Therefore, institutional investors will monitor their investee 
companies under a ‘comply or explain’ regime by, for example, giving a timely written 
explanation if, after careful consideration, they do not accept the company’s position.102 
There is no stewardship code in the GCC countries. It would be better if there were a 
code under a ‘comply or explain’ system in these countries, which would rely on family 
companies to take action. The fourth point concerns enforcement of compliance by a 
regulatory authority. More rules will affect market competition. This is discussed in 
more detail in Chapter 4. 
 
                                                 
99
 Andrew Keay (n 95). 
100
 ibid. 
101
 David Seidl, Paul Sanderson, John Robert (n 97). 
102
 According to Principle 3 of the UK Stewardship Code 2012; ‘Institutional Investors Should Monitor 
Their Investee Companies’ <http://www.frc.org.uk/Our-Work/Publications/Corporate-Governance/UK-
Stewardship-Code-September-2012.pdf>  accessed 19 January 2014. 
 231 
 
6.4 Creating Strong Investors 
 
The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) recommended 
education and complaints handling principles to be part of high-level principles in terms 
of protecting financial consumers.
103
 
In Principle Five the OECD mentions that:
104
  
Financial education and awareness should be promoted by all relevant 
stakeholders and clear information on consumer protection, rights and 
responsibilities should easily accessible by consumers. Appropriate 
mechanisms should be developed to help existing and future consumers 
develop the knowledge, skills and confidence to appropriately 
understand risks, including financial risks and opportunities, make 
informed choice, know where to go for assistance, and take effective 
action to improve their own financial well-being.  
It goes on to state that:
105
  
Jurisdictions should ensure that consumers have access to adequate 
complaints handing and redress mechanisms that are accessible, 
affordable, independent, fair, accountable, timely and efficient. Such 
mechanisms should not impose unreasonable cost, delays or burdens on 
consumers. In accordance with the above, financial services providers 
and authorised agents should have in place mechanisms for complaint 
handling and redress. Recourse to an independent redress process should 
be available to address complaints that are not efficiently resolved via the 
financial services providers and authorised agents’ internal dispute 
resolution mechanisms. As a minimum, aggregate information with 
respect to complaints and their resolutions should be made public. 
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Investors should take some responsibility for protecting themselves either through 
education or by using a complaints process or both. A regulatory authority can play a 
significant role in ensuring that investors receive clear and adequate information about 
the market, the risk and their rights. This also includes increasing investors’ ability to 
receive financial advice in an easy way. In addition, enhancing public awareness and 
understanding of financial systems is a key to protecting investors.  
 
Education is not just limited to investors, but should also include various parties, such 
as firms’ managers, advisers, brokers, and the like, because many people do not know 
the effects of their actions. For example, although insider dealing is a crime and has 
many negative effects on the market and on people’s lives, some people think that there 
is nothing wrong with insider dealing. Chapter 3 has more on this point.  
 
Having an adequate complaints handing and redress mechanism is a key point in terms 
of protecting investors. If the voice of investors is heard in a quick and fair way by 
taking into account the complex financial markets, the degree of protection will 
improve. Despite the success of arbitration in the private sector, the principle of 
inviolability of the sovereignty of the state presents an ongoing barrier to arbitration. It 
has been proven that countries are reluctant to use it.
106
 However, protecting investors 
by alternative civil law resolution of disputes is compulsory for firms, while it is 
optional for investors.  
 
Before looking at the Kuwait, Qatar and Saudi systems of education and complaint, it 
would be useful to have a brief look at the UK system as an example of the system used 
in a developed country. 
  
6.4.1 Investors’ Complaints and Education in the UK  
Ease of lodging complaints and education are the keys to enabling investors to protect 
themselves. The following is a discussion of the complaint and advice systems in the 
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UK and the role of the FCA in this respect. Accordingly, this section will not go into 
further details on how the scheme of complaint and education is operated. It looks at 
regulation and supervision with help from the FCA.  
 
6.4.1.1 Financial Complaints in the UK   
 
The Financial Ombudsman Service (FOS) was set up by Parliament to solve problems 
for individuals. The FOS has a statutory function. Its main role is, as an alternative to 
the civil court,
107
 to resolve disputes quickly, fairly, reasonably and informally. The 
scheme includes three jurisdictions:
108
 the first is the compulsory jurisdiction; the 
second is the consumer credit jurisdiction; and the third is voluntary jurisdiction.  
 
The compulsory jurisdiction covers complaints against authorised firms to settle 
individual disputes between consumers and businesses that provide financial services. 
The investor is always free to go to court instead of accepting the FOS decision, which 
is binding on the firm if the investor accepts it.  
 
The role of the FOS is to investigate individuals’ complaints and to deal with them on 
behalf of individual consumers; the FCA cannot do such things. The FCA ensures that 
the regulated firms meet the standards set by the FCA’s objectives, and it takes action 
against these firms for any breaches. This means that the FOS handles individuals’ 
cases, and the FCA takes supervisory and regulatory action.  
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The FOS offers a free service without taking sides and gets involved if the firm is not 
able to resolve a dispute. Consequently, the firm is given a chance to solve the dispute 
itself. In addition, various matters can be referred to the Financial Ombudsman 
Services, such as stocks, shares, units and bonds, banking and pensions. The FOS does 
not pass rules or impose fines.
109
 
 
According to the Memorandum of Understanding between the FCA and the FOS, the 
FOS is responsible for operating the Ombudsman Scheme and for appointing the 
ombudsmen, while the FCA is responsible for appointing the FOS board, making the 
rules and approving the FOS budget.
110
 The FOS operates independently from the FCA, 
but the FCA ensures the capability of the FOS to exercise its functions.  
 
According to the Annual Report 2012/2013, the number of cases handled by the FOS 
each year has increased over the last decade from 62,170 new cases in 2003 to 508,881 
cases in 2013.
111
 This indicates that people increasingly trust this method of resolving 
disputes.  
 
The FOS is funded by levies and case fees paid by financial businesses. It is free for 
investors, and for firms it is free for the first 25 cases. Thereafter, firms are charged 
£550 per case.
112
 The FOS is a public body that provides a service to the public. The 
FOS was created to put things right for consumers with valid complaints against 
businesses providing financial services. It has two primary functions. The first is to 
impose ‘Money Awards’, which are the compensation that businesses violating the rules 
must pay to the financial consumers. The FOS decides the amount of money required to 
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resolve the complaint. The second consists of ‘Directions’, by which the FOS tells 
businesses to put things right by taking particular steps.  
 
There are a number of ways that the FOS settles complaints:
113
 Nine out of ten disputes 
are settled informally. One and sometimes both parties want to rely upon the official 
power of the FOS to solve the disputes. If the consumer does not accept the decision 
within the time allowed by the FOS for this purpose, the decision is not binding. If the 
decision is accepted by the consumer, this decision is binding on both parties. It is a 
final stage for the firms, because there is a legal requirement with a parliamentary 
function to comply with the decision as quickly as possible. If the business is unable to 
pay, the matter may be referred to the Financial Services Compensation Scheme (FSCS) 
as a final safety net when businesses are not able to pay what they owe.  Businesses may 
refuse to comply with final decisions, although, in practice, this cannot happen. 
Although the FOS has no power to enforce the decision if a business refuses to pay an 
award, a) the FCA has the power to force businesses to comply; and b) the court has the 
power to force the businesses, because the decision is legally enforceable in court 
according to Schedule 17. The court will not re-open the case if it is just for 
enforcement. The consumer will have to go to court to enforce the decision. This 
indicates that the consumer is free to go to court until he has accepted the decision. 
However, there is a debate over the right to go to court after accepting the offer but this 
debate is beyond this thesis.  
 
6.4.1.2 Financial Education in the UK 
 
In 2010, a new body was established, the Consumer Financial Education Body (CFEB). 
One of its functions is to help members of the public to understand financial matters and 
to manage their finances better.
114
 The CFEB is an independent body that provides 
information, advice and education.  
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The CFEB was established on 1 March 2010, although it changed its name to the 
Money Advice Service on 4 April 2011 for the year ending 31 March 2013, according 
to the Annual Review, the Director’s Report and Financial Statements.115 The Money 
Advice Service is different from Citizens Advice in that the latter provides free, 
independent, confidential and impartial advice to everyone who faces any problem, not 
just a financial one. Section 4 of the FMSA 2000 mentions that promoting public 
understanding of the financial systems is the objective of public awareness. However, in 
2012, the Financial Services Act replaced the FMSA 2000 to enhance the public’s 
understanding and knowledge of financial matters.
116
 The Financial Services Act 2010 
provided that, in particular, the CFEB must enhance the provision of information and 
advice to the public.
117
 Through the twin statutory objectives, the Money Advice 
Service (formerly the CFEB), which was launched in April 2011 as a company limited 
by guarantee, dealt with 2.1 million customers during one year from 1 April 2012 to 31 
March 2013.
118
  
 
Although the Money Advice Service has statutory functions, it is accountable to the 
FCA on some points. According to a framework document that was signed in 2013 by 
the Money Advice Service, the FCA, and the UK Treasury, the FCA has different 
responsibilities from the Money Advice Service, such as appointing and removing the 
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Type of Service Number of customers 
Face-to-face meetings with customers    100,000 
Telephone contact    81,000 
Web chats    15,000 
Action plans delivered    1.2 million  
Debt advice sessions funded through partners in 
England and Wales 
   158,000 
Total Number of customers     2.1 million  
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board, approving the annual budget, levying sums and receiving an annual report. The 
FCA is able to monitor some of the Money Advice Service’s activities, such as 
providing the FCA with sufficient information, its capability of exercising its functions 
and having regular meetings.
119
 The primary source of funding is from industry. The 
FCA raises and collects the money on behalf of the Money Advice Service.  
 
Education in financial skills could affect individuals, families and society as a whole. 
For example, education and improving financial capability could help to eliminate child 
poverty by early intervention and financial support.
120
 Education in financial skills is 
not limited to making good financial decisions. Mark Taylor says that financial skills 
could affect people’s psychological wellbeing and their mental health, savings 
behaviour, living standards, and household income.
121
 
 
6.4.2 The Situation in Kuwait, Qatar and Saudi 
 
After looking at the situation in the UK, the following concerns the situation in Kuwait, 
Qatar and Saudi.  
 
6.4.2.1 Individuals’ Dispute Resolution in Kuwait, Qatar and Saudi 
Under financial regulations, various regulatory instruments can be breached, including 
laws, rules, and codes. (1) If the law is breached by a firm or an individual, the case is 
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sent to the criminal court. It would be better if there were special judges for this court. 
The special judges, the court system and private enforcement of laws are beyond the 
scope of the thesis. (2) If an individual’s rights are breached by a firm or an individual, 
the case is sent to the civil court. (3) It is important to find an alternative to civil court 
litigation to resolve disputes, because an alternative resolution body would help to 
resolve disputes that arise in a complex financial market, such the FOS in the UK. (4) If 
the Authority’s rules are breached, the case is sent to a disciplinary committee. 
Sometimes, the case will be sent to the upper tribunal. (5) If the code (a combination of 
soft and hard law) is breached, there are two possibilities. If the breach was of the 
Authority’s rules and, for example, the company does not disclose or explain under the 
UK Code 2012, it will be referred to the disciplinary committee; if the disclosure or 
explanation is made, but the explanation is not sufficient, the market itself will punish 
the company by playing a role in enforcement. In the alternative, the UK Stewardship 
Code provides that, in the ‘comply or explain’ system, institutional investors can take 
action against an insufficient explanation. 6) If a soft law was breached, no financial 
penalties are assessed. Therefore, one of the mechanisms for protecting individual rights 
is to have an alternative resolution body. 
 
In Saudi, the Authority must establish a committee to resolve securities disputes.
122
 It is 
specialised in civil and criminal cases. It receives complaints from the Authority or from 
individuals. It has three responsibilities: (1) as a civil and criminal court; (2) as a 
disciplinary committee for breaching the law and the rules; and (3) as a dispute 
resolution committee relating to individuals. It is a competent court in disputes 
involving securities. However, its scope is limited to the 2003 Law and its regulation 
and rules are provided in Article 25 of the 2003 Law.  
 
It would be better if the Saudi legislature had created a committee for disciplinary 
sanctions that did not include criminal sanctions and had established a separate 
operational body to resolve individual disputes relating to securities transactions that 
would work as an alternative to a civil court, similar to the UK’s FOS. It would also be 
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better if there were no limit to pursuing those who breach the Law 2003 or its 
regulations and rules.  
 
Qatari Law 2012 Article 30 Part 10 mentions that the board shall introduce all 
regulations, rules and decisions regarding the establishment of mechanisms to resolve 
disputes that may arise from securities activities. This includes two mechanisms, the 
first of which involves the committee settling disputes by arbitration or other methods 
of alternative dispute resolution. The second mechanism is a disciplinary committee for 
violations of the provisions of the Law 2012 and the rules and regulations. Qatari law 
has succeeded in distinguishing between the disciplinary committee and the committee 
on dispute resolution. However, both are part of the Qatari Authority. It would be better 
if the committee on dispute resolution were not operated as part of the Qatari Authority 
to ensure impartiality. 
 
In Kuwait, Article 5 Part 2 provides that the Authority shall receive complaints about 
the violations provided under Kuwaiti Law 2010, which means that complaints should 
be limited to breaches of the law. However, the law extends the scope of complaint in 
the Kuwaiti Act 2010 Article 15, which mentions that the Authority creates a committee 
to receive complaints and grievances and that every interested individual has the right to 
submit a complaint to the committee.  
 
The above shows that the complaint scheme is part of the Kuwaiti Authority. It would 
be better a separate body were introduced to do this work, as in the UK. 
 
In Kuwait, failure to comply with Article 148 of the 2010 Law can be settled through 
arbitration in disputes related to transactions on the capital market. The Kuwaiti 
Authority has issued a dispute settlement system, which entered into force in April 
2014. This system is voluntary and does not include a compulsory jurisdiction system, 
which is an alternative to civil litigation and a factor for investor protection. The scope 
of the Kuwaiti system is limited to commercial and investment disputes that the 
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consumer wishes to resolve, and the dispute is related to the 2010 Law and other laws 
about capital market transactions. 
 
6.4.2.2 Education in Kuwait, Qatar and Saudi 
 
Before looking at the situation in the GCC countries, an example will show how a good 
education can affect financial markets and help to change behaviour regarding finance.  
 
Anna Bernasek compared the milk industry and the financial market. She observed that, 
in the past, people fell ill and some died as a result of milk, but they no longer do so. 
People drink milk without even thinking about whether the milk is safe.
123
 She thinks 
that this is because people rely on other people and their integrity to ensure that milk is 
safe. In addition, the farmer thinks about the long term, and people’s integrity is much 
more important than personal benefits.
124
  
 
In a lecture entitled ‘Behavioral Finance and the Role of Psychology’, Robert Shiller 
expressed his belief that the successful business focuses on long-term advantage instead 
of concentrating on the weak points of people’s behaviour.125 From this, it can be 
learned that the regulatory authority can educate people to use the power of thinking 
about the long term instead of short-term value. In addition, education can improve 
people’s integrity in business. For example, some people still think that there is nothing 
wrong with some types of market abuse, such as insider dealing. However, if they knew 
that people are hurt by insider dealing, they might change their opinion.  
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In Kuwait, Article 3 Part 2 of Kuwaiti Law No 7 of 2010 states that one of the 
regulatory authority’s aims is to educate the public on securities’ activities, risks, and 
liabilities associated with investing in securities and to encourage development. In 
addition, Article 5 Part 6 of the Kuwaiti Act 2010 mentions that the regulatory authority 
shall print and publish materials relating to securities’ activities. The education scheme 
is part of the Kuwaiti Authority, but it would be better if the Authority adopted a 
separate body to do this work as in the UK. 
 
In Qatar, raising public awareness regarding securities activity and developing the 
investment in such activities are two of the Authority’s aims according to Article 5 Part 
3 of Qatari Law 2012. It seems that the law associates development with public 
awareness, and the goal to raise public awareness is intended to develop the market and 
not protect the investor. It would be better if there were separate ideas for public 
awareness and for market development. 
 
In contrast to Kuwait and Qatar, Saudi legislation does not mention public awareness in 
the regulatory authority’s aims.  
 
To sum up, the creation of strong investors in Kuwait, Qatar and Saudi is still in its 
infancy. Their regulatory authorities can play a significant role by creating an education 
and complaints body and by passing rules or suggesting laws to the legislature, as is 
done by the FOS and the Money Advice Service organisations in the UK. One problem 
is that the legislation in the GCC countries is limited to securities markets, while in the 
UK, the role extends to other areas of the financial market. It would be better if one 
body were responsible for education and for facilitating the lodging of complaints about 
the financial systems as a whole in the GCC, as happens in the UK.  
 
6.5 Conclusion  
This chapter has dealt with the protection of investors from the view of having sound 
regulatory authority under the 2010 Act. Most countries have a regulatory authority to 
regulate their capital market. This chapter has discussed how to have a sound regulatory 
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authority, which must be effective and efficient to protect investors. For a regulatory 
authority to protect investors effectively, it must be independent, introduce sound 
regulation, and create strong investors. Each of these three points has been reviewed.  
 
A regulatory authority for securities in Kuwait was established only recently. To assess 
its adequacy, this thesis compared it with the system in the UK, which has existed for 
much longer. The Kuwaiti Act describes the regulatory authority as an independent 
body. Although the term ‘independence’ is used, careful analysis of the text showed the 
extent to which this independence is true. 
 
The regulatory framework that protects investors must have laws, rules and codes, and it 
must have effective monitoring and policing of compliance and enforcement of 
breaches of the laws, rules and codes. This thesis looked at the advantages and 
disadvantages of rule-making. In addition to ‘Hard Law’, which means that the law is 
binding, authoritative and effective, with penalties for its breaches, a regulatory 
authority can also use ‘Soft Law’, which refers to rules, regulations and codes that are 
not binding. It is possible to mix hard and soft law, as in the corporate governance code 
in the UK. Although complying with the code is voluntary, listed companies are 
required to explain every instance of non-compliance. Some advantages and 
disadvantages of the comply-or-explain approach have been discussed.  
 
This chapter also discussed the role that a regulatory authority can play in ensuring that 
investors receive clear and adequate information about the market, the risks and their 
rights. This also includes increasing investors’ ability to receive financial advice in an 
easy way. In addition, enhancing public awareness and understanding of the system is a 
key to protecting investors. 
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Chapter Seven 
Conclusion and Recommendations 
 
 
This last chapter completes the thesis. The following is a summary of the main findings, 
recommendations for reform and recommendations for further research. 
 
7.1 Findings of the Study 
 
It has been the primary motivation of this thesis to investigate and discover whether 
Law No 7 (the Kuwait Capital Markets Act 2010) has given individual investors more 
protection than previous laws and, if appropriate, suggesting amendments to the law. A 
secondary aim has been to improve the Kuwaiti people’s knowledge about securities 
and to serve as a basis for further research within this field. To answer this question, the 
following areas have been analysed. The paper consists of seven chapters. 
 
7.1.1 Chapter 1: Introduction 
Chapter One identified the way to achieve the thesis’s aims in terms of the 
methodology, the thesis structure and limitations, and the scope of the thesis, which was 
limited to the protection of individual investors on the Kuwaiti Stock Exchange under 
securities law. This chapter found that although some people believe that there is no 
need to regulate the stock exchange, the reality is that there is a greater move toward 
intervention in and regulation of the markets. For example, in Kuwait in the 1980s the 
government believed in a free market, but this resulted in the Suq al-Manakh Crisis, 
following which it passed several laws to regulate the stock exchange, the most recent 
being the 2010 Act. 
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A stock exchange is a type of self-regulatory organisation. There are several models for 
regulating stock exchanges. Self-regulatory organisations (SROs), such as stock 
exchanges that govern themselves without outside interference, have been developed 
over time. This research has found that many developed countries regulate their 
financial markets using the ‘Government Model’, in which securities regulation lies 
with a public authority, and the exchanges’ supervision of their markets is limited. The 
UK uses this model, whereby the London Stock Exchange is self-regulating and the 
FCA regulates securities. Kuwait adopted the same model in 2010.  
 
Even though the system of law in the UK is different from that in the GCC countries, 
the financial legislation relies on statutory provisions and not case law; thus, it is similar 
to the codified systems in the GCC, including Shari’ah law. This enables a direct 
comparison to be made between the financial regulations of the UK, Kuwait, Qatar and 
Saudi Arabia. 
 
Economists are dedicated to formulating theories, in this case of markets and their 
regulation. The need for regulation has been demonstrated, for example, by numerous 
financial crises and scandals, from which Kuwait has not been immune. Regardless of 
the theories, the reality is that financial crises have occurred, and people have suffered 
as a result. The crises in Kuwait could probably have been avoided by having sound 
regulation in place. 
 
7.1.2 Chapter 2: The concept of protecting investors under securities 
laws 
 
The 2010 Act does not state how to protect investors and does not even define 
‘investors’. Therefore, Chapter Two analysed the concept of protecting investors under 
securities laws by looking at the areas of investors, securities, securities law and 
protecting investors. This thesis has explained that there are several types of investors, 
such as individuals, institutions.. The scope of the thesis was narrowed to protecting 
individual investors regardless of their nationality or whether they are minority or 
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majority investors. See figure 7.1 below. It is not appropriate to consider sophisticated 
and unsophisticated investors since the thesis is about investors in shares and not other 
more risky instruments where the level of sophistication is important.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7.1: Types of investor 
 
Chapter Two also defined securities and compared them with commercial paper. 
Securities law is part of financial regulation. However, some countries, such as the UK, 
regulate securities as a part of the whole financial system called ‘Financial Regulation’, 
while other countries, such as the GCC, regulate securities through separate and special 
laws called ‘Securities Laws’. Regulations for protecting investors are not limited to 
securities law. There are other sources of laws that protect investors, such as bribery 
law, company law and accounting law. This thesis defined securities law and introduced 
financial regulation and other laws that protect investors. Chapter Two also compared 
securities markets with traditional markets.  
 
As mentioned above, in this thesis, the definition of investors does not include 
speculators or businesses but is restricted to ordinary persons, who try to ensure a good 
future for themselves and their families by improving their standard of living, obtaining 
a good education for their children and protecting the value of their savings. An 
individual investor in the UK is viewed as a consumer of financial products or services 
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(See Figure 7.2 below). In contrast, Kuwait, Qatar and Saudi do not define individual 
investors. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Figure 7.2: Investors as a type of financial consumer in the UK. 
 
There is no clear statement of what ‘protecting investors’ means. This thesis addressed 
the problems from the view of what investors are looking for. The first task is to find a 
fair price that has not been influenced by market abuse, as addressed in Chapter Three. 
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The second task is to provide equal opportunities to learn important information. The 
third task is to protect investors from bad behaviour by managers and the fourth is to 
have sound securities regulation that protects investors. Investors can be divided into 
different types, for example individual investors and institutional investors, each of 
which requires a different form of protection. In the UK, individual investors in listed 
companies, which are the subject of this research, are classed as consumers of financial 
products and services. This gives them more protection than institutional investors. 
However, in Kuwait, no distinction is made between individual and institutional 
investors.  
 
Generally, the securities markets need special regulation because of their nature. In 
developed countries, the methods used to protect the securities market differ from those 
used to protect the traditional market for goods and services. This was what the Kuwaiti 
legislature intended when they passed a new act in 2010 to regulate the securities 
market.  
 
The banking crisis in the UK has led to a change in the way regulation was viewed by 
creating two types of regulation, namely prudential regulation and regulation of the 
conduct of business. Prudential regulation is about controlling the solvency and 
liquidity of participants in financial markets. Regulation of the conduct of business 
focuses on the relationship between firms and customers and includes preventing 
market abuse and ensuring that firms treat their consumers fairly. Prudential regulation 
can be separated into macro-prudential regulation and micro-prudential regulation. In 
the UK, before and during the financial crisis of 2008 there was a conflict between 
prudential supervision and conduct of business supervision. It was difficult for one body 
to reconcile them. The diagram below (Figure 7.3) shows the key improvements in 
financial market regulation in the UK. 
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Figure 7.3 stylised diagram of Key Improvement in Financial Market Regulation in the 
UK. 
 
Regulations for protecting investors are not limited to securities law; there are other 
laws. Protection is also provided under bribery law (such as the UK Bribery Act 2010), 
company law (such as the UK Companies Act 2006) and accounting law. In terms of 
accounting law, the concept of protecting investors requires there to be fair 
representation and professional judgement by having good accounting legislation. This 
should cover three points, namely: good accounting reporting standards, professional 
auditors that express their opinion and state any misstatement and a single independent 
body to set and enforce accounting standards.   
  
7.1.3 Chapter 3: Insider Dealing 
 
Chapter Three dealt with the first aspect of investor protection – insider dealing. Insider 
dealing has a long and controversial history with regard to securities laws, because some 
people believe that insider dealing should not be banned by law, such as Professor 
Manne. However, nearly every country bans insider dealing, although it is done in 
different ways. This chapter discussed the two principal arguments for and against 
insider dealing. The argument in favour of insider dealing, known as the ‘Manne 
Argument’, is an economic argument, while the argument against insider dealing is 
based on moral and fairness principles. 
1- Prudential Regulation is about controlling the solvency and 
liquidity of banks & investment firms. 
2- Conduct of business regulation focuses on conduct, 
compliance and promoting competition & integrity with the aim 
of protecting consumers. 
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This chapter discussed the existing legal framework for the regulation of insider dealing 
in the Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi and the UK stock markets. It also looked at American law, 
because the United States has a long history and extensive experience in this regard. 
Three important issues were identified that must be addressed to deal effectively with 
insider dealing: defining the activity, sanctions, and enforcing civil or criminal liability. 
 
Information is very important when buying or selling in the stock market, because 
information can materially affect the value of the securities. Decisions whether to buy or 
sell are based on information collected from the market. Insider dealing involves the use 
of information that is not disclosed to the public. 
 
The key to passing effective legislation against insider dealing is to define it properly. 
The definition of insider dealing has to cover the following four areas: who is an 
insider; what is inside information; how is inside information transferred; and what 
action is banned. In the past, ‘insiders’ were divided into two categories, primary 
insiders and secondary insiders. Nowadays, much of the legislation defines insiders 
differently as it does not distinguish between primary and secondary insiders.  
 
The insider dealing laws of the US and the UK are quite different and both were used as 
a comparison with the Kuwait Act 2010. The US situation is complicated by the 
evolution of many theories over time and by the complex manner in which the 
American legal system addresses insider dealing with common law, statutes and SEC 
rules. In the US, establishing insider dealing requires proof of breach of a fiduciary 
duty. In the UK, however, a fiduciary duty does not have to be breached. Insider dealing 
is defined more clearly than in the US. One overriding difference between the American 
and English regimes governing insider dealing is in the promulgation and application of 
the law. The US has a general statute that does not define insiders or inside information. 
Consequently, judges are allowed to develop common law prohibitions. In contrast, the 
UK has a statute with a specific prohibition. To improve their own legislation, it is 
suggested that the GCC countries should follow the example of the UK rather than that 
of the US. 
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The main advantage of the 2010 Act is that it provides criminal sanctions through 
provisions set out in Chapter 11, which makes insider dealing a crime. However, there 
are still shortcomings, such as the lack of a clear definition of insider trading. Moreover, 
the Act provides up to seventeen different kinds of administrative penalties, including a 
caution or warning, but it does not include any financial penalty. By comparison, the 
sanctions available to the FCA in the UK include an unlimited financial penalty. 
Applying administrative sanctions is easier than applying criminal sanctions. However, 
a criminal sanction is a major deterrent to insider dealing. Therefore, there is a need for 
both types of sanctions. 
 
In conclusion, to answer the research question in terms of insider dealing, the 2010 Act 
partly succeeds in protecting investors by banning insider dealing. However, the Act 
does not define insider dealing properly, and there are some problems in enforcing 
insider dealing, as mentioned above. 
 
7.1.4. Chapter 4: Fair Disclosure 
 
The 2010 Act gives the regulatory authority the power to pass disclosure rules. 
However, the Act does not mention how to improve such disclosure rules. Therefore, 
Chapter Four discussed the second aspect of protecting individual investors, which 
involves ensuring fair disclosure by listed companies, because informed investors are 
protected investors. The chapter discussed the idea of having fair disclosure to protect 
investors to ensure that all investors have equal opportunity to access and know about 
inside information in an appropriate time and manner. 
 
Chapter Four also examined the existing disclosure rules that apply to equity shares in 
Kuwait as compared to Qatar, Saudi and the UK’s disclosure regimes as examples of 
developed countries. Regulation in the UK and an introduction to regulation in Kuwait 
Qatar and Saudi were reviewed in this chapter.  
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This study has found that the disclosure of inside information is governed by several 
rules that often overlap, such as listing and disclosure rules. Listing rules play an 
important role in the protection of investors. Before securities can be listed, the 
authorities must ensure that disclosure requirements are met. In order for the securities 
to continue to be listed and to facilitate the orderly operation of the stock exchange 
market, a complete and exact disclosure of relevant information must be made on a 
timely basis. The chapter also reviewed the definition of disclosure rules, how to control 
them and delays in full disclosure, limited disclosure, initial and final disclosure and 
exemption from disclosure.   
 
This thesis has found that it is not enough simply to draft disclosure rules. Disclosure 
rules must also be capable of implementation. Chapter Four discussed a number of rules 
that have the potential to assist, namely the listing principle, director responsibilities, the 
insider list, the reasonable investor standard, the adviser and holiday disclosures. 
 
Since laws must punish those who breach the information disclosure regime, the civil 
liability, criminal liability and administrative sanctions available have been considered. 
Broadly speaking, sanctions may include administrative, civil or/and criminal sanctions. 
The sanction framework consists of three optional penalties. Each of these sanctions has 
advantages and disadvantages. It is better to have a combination of these three sanctions 
to fight against different types of breaches.  
 
Criminal sanctions is a deterrence model (loss of reputation or stigma) with the need for 
a high standard of proof. While civil and administrative sanctions are less of a deterrent 
with a lower standard of proof and they are not required to meet a burden of proof that 
is beyond reasonable doubt. Criminal liability allows the authorities to take legal action 
against those who have failed to comply with disclosure rules, for violation or non-
compliance. Criminal sanctions should be used in certain actions such as fraud, 
misleading or giving false information with the intention of non-compliance with 
disclosure requirements. Criminal sanctions include fines and imprisonment in the most 
serious cases. 
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Civil liability governs the relations between persons or organisations. In civil liability, 
some laws require conditions to be met such as who will bring the evidence. The 
claimant has the right to take a private action through the civil court to recover 
compensation from persons who have breached the disclosure rules. Public enforcement 
can also be used when the authority files the case on behalf a company or a person. 
Civil sanctions include financial penalties. 
 
Administrative sanctions are imposed by an administrative body for violation of its 
rules. Administrative sanctions do not involve a judicial court process and usually 
involve a disciplinary committee. A regulatory authority is given judicial powers to 
impose sanctions by law. An administrative body is not required to respect procedural 
guarantees such as the right to fair trial. Administrative sanctions include fines, 
suspension or cancellation of listing in stock markets; there is no threat of 
imprisonment.  
 
Disclosure of inside information plays a significant role in protecting investors, because 
they rely on this information to make their investment decisions. Consequently, having 
fair disclosure protects investors by ensuring that all investors have equal opportunity to 
access and know about such information in a timely and appropriate way. Several forms 
of disclosure are required from listed companies, such as notification of transactions by 
persons discharging managerial responsibilities (disclosure of dealing); periodic 
reporting (annual and half-yearly reports); notification of acquisition or disposal of 
major shareholdings, including, for example, acquisition or disposal by issuers; and 
finally, disclosure of inside information. 
 
Disclosing inside information is governed by several rules that often overlap. The first 
set of rules consists of listing rules for equity shares, which impose a continuing 
obligation for listed companies to disclose meaningful information. The second set of 
rules is comprised of disclosure rules, such as exist in the UK and Kuwait. The third set 
is comprised of market abuse rules. The fourth set is comprised of the criminal offences 
associated with disclosure. Like the UK, Kuwait relies on listing rules and disclosure 
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rules to control the disclosure of information. However, Qatar and Saudi Arabia rely 
solely on their listing rules to control disclosure. 
 
Nowadays, international competition exists among stock exchanges in different 
countries. Importantly, the fewer the companies in the stock market, the lower are the 
profits realised by the stock exchange. History has shown that the conversion of stock 
exchanges themselves to listed companies in their own right has resulted in an increase 
of competition for profits, which has affected the regulation of stock exchanges. What 
happened in Kuwait after the passing of the 2010 Act, is that a number of companies 
tried to find another stock exchange for their listing with fewer listing rules.  
 
In reality, it is a difficult challenge to identify material inside information and to 
determine the appropriate time to disclose it. This discussion revealed a number of 
criticisms of the system of continuous disclosure. It affects competition because early 
disclosure can reveal the company’s plans and future projects to a competitor in the 
market. Rumours can result from delay in disclosure and from the disclosure of false 
information. The best way to combat rumours is to require the issuer to judge whether it 
needs to make a disclosure. 
 
In conclusion, to answer the research question in terms of fair disclosure, the 2010 Act 
partly succeeds in protecting investors by mentioning fair disclosure as one of the Act’s 
objectives and by giving the regulatory authority the power to promulgate rules. 
However, the Act does not specify how to achieve that aim, and there are some 
problems in enforcing disclosure rules, as mentioned before. 
 
7.1.4 Chapter 5: Corporate Governance 
 
Although the 2010 Act does not mention corporate governance, the regulatory authority 
has used its power to promulgate rules by adopting a corporate governance code. 
Therefore, Chapter Five addressed the third aspect of protecting investors, which 
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involves good corporate governance. Chapter Five narrows the scope to the governance 
issues handled by capital market authorities, especially the codes. 
 
This study has found that there is no clear definition of corporate governance. The 
literature refers to different components of corporate governance. For example, 
corporate governance is dealt with in corporate law and as part of securities laws and 
regulations. Chapter Five focused specifically on these securities laws and regulations, 
as they affect investors in listed companies. It compared the provisions of corporate 
governance in the UK and in the three GCC countries, where, unlike the UK, there is a 
mixture of mandatory and voluntary rules.  
 
Although the term ‘corporate governance’ is used every day in the financial press, it is a 
complex term. It relates to various fields, such as law, economics, management, 
accounting and others, and each field has its own developments. Poor corporate 
governance is a multifaceted subject that involves risk management, bribery, fraud, and 
poor board practice, all of which can affect listed companies. Some say that the core of 
the problem is the separation of ownership and control in managing other people’s 
money, which is an agency theory. The need for effective corporate governance rules is 
greater than ever before. Good corporate governance not only aims to protect investors, 
but it also has the potential to affect both company success overall and the success of 
the nation. In recent years, a number of scandals and collapses have not only reduced 
shareholders’ financial investment, but have also affected other stakeholders, such as 
employees who have lost their jobs and, in many cases, their pension funds. Better 
enforcement methods of corporate governance compliance can limit future lapses in 
corporate governance and can boost investor confidence, economic efficiency and 
growth. It is clear that no country is immune from such scandals and collapses, 
including Kuwait.  
 
This study has found that applying corporate governance principles by means of the law 
can cause two problems. First, it can harm the growth of the economy. Second, a 
company faces financial and administrative burdens as a result of applying all corporate 
governance principles and, consequently, needs to employ more staff, spend more 
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money, and gain more legal knowledge about the way to apply these rules and how to 
bear the cost. Corporate governance needs to be developed over time. Corporate 
governance principles do not remain static, but evolve with time and must continue to 
develop. 
 
Sometimes there is an overlap between the two types of legislation, namely corporate 
and securities legislation. When a company is listed in the same country as it is 
incorporated, the company will be subject to both sets of legislation. However, if a 
company is listed on a stock exchange in a jurisdiction other than where it is 
incorporated, the company will be held accountable in the jurisdiction where the stock 
exchange is located according to statutory instruments that apply to that stock exchange. 
 
In the UK, the Finance Reporting Council (FRC) is responsible for publishing the 
Corporate Governance Code and for promoting high quality corporate governance. The 
FRC is an independent regulator. However, in Kuwait, the Regulatory Authority is 
responsible for publishing the code. The ‘comply or explain’ approach is a key feature 
of the UK Code. A company cannot face sanctions for non-compliance, only for not 
explaining its non-compliance. If the company does not mention why it did not comply 
with the rules of governance in its report, it is in violation of the listing rules. 
 
The majority of the necessary corporate governance rules already exist in Kuwait, but 
they are not sufficiently wide ranging and have not always adequately protected 
investors. The securities law could enhance the enforcement of corporate governance 
principles that can protect investors. Corporate governance in Kuwait is lacking in two 
areas. First, coverage of various areas of corporate governance, such as risk 
management, is inadequate. Second, the methods of enforcement of the corporate 
governance provisions that do exist need to be improved. In Kuwait, compliance with 
the corporate governance code is mandatory, and failure to comply is a breach of 
Securities Law No 7 of 2010. Qatar has adopted a ‘comply or explain’ approach, but the 
explanation must be provided to the Qatari Capital Market Authority, not the 
shareholders, in the form of an annual report. In 2006, the Saudi Corporate Governance 
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Code was introduced based on the ‘comply or explain’ approach. However, over time, 
certain of the original provisions have become mandatory. 
 
In conclusion, to answer the research question in terms of corporate governance 
principles, the 2010 Act partly succeeds in protecting investors by giving the regulatory 
authority the power to promulgate rules. However, there are some problems in enforcing 
disclosure rules, as mentioned previously. In Kuwait, the corporate governance code 
requirements do not distinguish between companies of different sizes. What is 
appropriate for a large company may not be appropriate for a smaller company, which 
may find it too costly to comply. However, where compliance is mandatory, all of the 
companies are the same. The Kuwaiti 2013 Code contains 70 pages, is very detailed, 
and places a heavy compliance burden on companies.   
 
7.1.6 Chapter 6: Sound Regulatory Authority 
 
The 2010 Act created the Kuwaiti Regulatory Authority, but the question is whether it is 
a sound regulatory authority. A sound regulatory authority is an important solution, as 
discussed in the previous three chapters in the context of the problems encountered in 
protecting investors. Each of these problems needs sound regulation, one method of 
which is establishing a sound regulatory authority that helps to solve these problems and 
others.  
 
Like many other countries, Kuwait has an authority that regulates its capital market. 
However, this chapter discussed how to have a sound regulatory authority. Such a 
regulatory authority needs to be effective and efficient to protect investors. This requires 
independence (See Figure 7.4), the introduction of sound regulation, and the creation of 
strong investors. Each of these three points was reviewed. 
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Figure 7.4 stylised diagram of an independent regulatory authority.  
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regulatory authorities as independent bodies. Although the term ‘independence’ is used, 
careful analysis of the text was discussed to show the extent to which this is true. 
 
The regulatory framework that protects investors must have laws, rules and codes, and 
have effective monitoring and policing of compliance and enforcement of all breaches 
of these laws, rules and codes. This thesis looked at the advantages and disadvantages of 
the rulemaking. In addition to ‘Hard Law’, which means that the law is binding, 
authoritative and effective, with penalties for its breaches, a regulatory authority can 
also use so-called ‘Soft Law’, which is the name given to statements of principles, codes 
of conduct, codes of practice and guidance. It is possible to mix hard law and soft law, 
as in the Corporate Governance Code in the UK. Although complying with the Code is 
voluntary, listed companies are required to explain every instance of non-compliance. 
Some advantages and disadvantages of the ‘comply or explain’ approach were 
discussed.  
 
Chapter Six also discussed the role that a regulatory authority can play in ensuring that 
investors receive clear and adequate information about the market, the risks and their 
rights. This also includes increasing investors’ ability to receive financial advice in an 
easy way and providing an easy way to complain.  
 
Most countries have a regulatory authority to regulate their capital markets. In the UK, 
it is the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA); in the GCC countries, it is the Capital 
Market Authority. For a regulatory authority to protect investors effectively, it must 
have independence, have enforcement power (See Figure 7.5), have legislative duty, 
and create strong investors.  
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Figure 7.5 stylised diagram of enforcement powers. 
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rules is part of the legal and regulatory framework; such rules are known as ‘secondary 
legislation’. They have advantages and disadvantages. The first advantage is saving 
parliamentary time, since rules are made without parliament’s involvement. The second 
advantage is speed, by avoiding the lengthy stages involved in parliament. The third 
advantage is expertise in complicated areas. The disadvantage of rulemaking power is 
that delegated rulemaking power can have a negative effect in terms of accountability 
according to the separation of power. Generally, to prevent abuse of power, the 
executive, legislative and judiciary powers should be separate. Rulemaking power 
results in legislation that has not been fully debated in parliament. A regulatory 
authority can also use soft law. It is possible to mix hard law and soft law, as in the 
Corporate Governance Code in the UK. A ‘comply or explain’ regime is an alternative 
way to achieve strong statutory regulation. It strikes a balance between hard law and 
soft law that can be suitable in today’s complex economic world. 
 
Investors should take some responsibility for protecting themselves. A regulatory 
authority can play a significant role in facilitating their task by ensuring that investors 
receive clear and adequate information about the market, the risks and their rights and to 
have a complaints procedure that is easy to use is a key point in terms of protecting 
investors. If the voice of investors is heard in a quick and fair way by taking into 
account the complex financial markets, the degree of protection will improve. This 
means that easy lodging of complaints together with appropriate education are keys to 
enabling the investors to take some responsibility for protection. 
 
In the UK, the appointment of the board members is subject to the Code of Practice for 
Ministerial Appointment to Public Bodies 2012. Kuwait has no such code. As a result, 
there is no extensive regulation of the retirement age for board members, and the age of 
retirement is not included as a reason for vacating a position. It could be said that there 
is no retirement age for board members in Kuwait, and their age is an issue for the Emir, 
since he appoints them. 
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In terms of securities legislation, Saudi, Qatar and Kuwait are similar in the level of 
investor protection. Therefore, the comparison with Saudi and Qatar did not add more 
value to this research. 
 
In conclusion, to answer the study question in terms of having a sound regulatory 
authority, the 2010 Act partly succeeds in protecting investors by creating the Kuwaiti 
Regulatory Authority. However, there are some problems in enforcing laws and rules. 
In addition, the Act did not establish other organisations that would assist the Kuwait 
Regulatory Authority. Thus, the Act has partly succeeded in protecting individual 
investors. On the one hand, the Act is a major step in the right direction. On the other 
hand, there is much room for improvement.  
 
7.2 Recommendations for Reform in Kuwait 
 
This research aims to assist the Kuwaiti legislature in reforming legislation to benefit 
those who invest in the stock market, so as to revitalise investing by protecting investors 
against sudden fluctuations due to fraud in the market and other threats. It may be useful 
to conclude by offering some important recommendations. 
 
7.2.1 Recommendations on the concept of protecting investors 
 
 7.2.1.1 Definition of investor 
In Kuwait, it would be wise to have a clear definition of an investor that is similar to 
that contained in the UK legislation. In the UK, the term ‘consumer’ is used instead of 
‘investor’. Consumers include persons who have invested or may invest in financial 
instruments or who have relevant rights or interests in relation to those instruments. The 
securities law in Kuwait does not distinguish between individual and institutional 
investors and nor does it distinguish between individual investors who use financial 
services and those who invest in financial instruments. This needs to be addressed. 
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 7.2.1.2 Discretionary power to Authority 
In identifying the types of securities that are regulated under securities law, the Kuwaiti 
legislature should emulate the Saudi legislation, which gives discretionary power to the 
Authority board to determine what a security is. This avoids the need to amend the 
legislation to take into account future developments involving the creation of new types 
of securities. 
 7.2.1.3 Specific legislation covering bribery and accounting standards 
In Kuwait, there is a need to pass the kind of special legislation regarding bribery that 
exists in the UK. Kuwait also needs to pass specific legislation regarding accounting 
activities that covers three issues, namely high accounting standards, professional 
auditors and an independent body to set up and oversee accounting activities such as the 
FRC in the UK.  
 
7.2.2 Recommendations on insider dealing 
 7.2.2.1 Definition of insider dealing 
This thesis offers a number of recommendations related to the crime of insider dealing, 
the regulation of which must be improved in Kuwait. In Kuwait, there are some 
shortcomings in the definition of insider dealing. It is important to have a clear 
definition of insider dealing. The optimum definition must cover the following four 
areas: who is an insider; what is inside information; how is inside information 
transferred; and what type of activity is banned. The UK’s Criminal Justice Act 1993 
(CJA) is a good illustration. Therefore, the definition should be improved by reference 
to English law, which has a fixed definition. Qatar and Saudi Arabia have defined the 
term, but since their definitions also have some shortcomings, it is better if the Kuwaiti 
legislature does not follow them. It would be beneficial for Kuwait to adopt a provision 
that is similar to the UK’s fourth reform relating to defining insider dealing. 
 
7.2.2.2 Fines 
Although article 146 of the Kuwaiti Act 2010 provides that the disciplinary board may 
impose any of seventeen different kinds of penalties, including a caution or warning, it 
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does not include any financial penalty. It would be beneficial to give the Kuwait Capital 
Market Authority (KCMA) the power to impose fines.  
 
7.2.2.3 Liability of third parties 
One of the most important shortcomings in Kuwaiti legislation is that no mention is 
made of criminal responsibility on the part of third parties (tippees), because they are 
not considered to be insiders. It would be better if Kuwaiti law considered a tippee to be 
an insider. There is no logical reason for treating a tippee differently from an insider and 
this has been recognised by countries such as the UK and the US. 
 
7.2.3 Recommendations on disclosure regime 
This thesis suggests a number of recommendations related to the disclosure regime. It is 
important to make ideal rules that suit the nature of the stock markets. 
 
7.2.3.1 Adopting UK listing principles 
It would be wise to have listing principles in Kuwait that are similar to those in the UK. 
The main objective of the listing principles is to aid listed companies in identifying their 
duties under DTR and Listing Rules. Saudi Arabia and Qatar do not mention these 
principles in their disclosure rules. 
 
7.2.3.2 More responsibility for the issuer  
The best solution for controlling the disclosure of inside information is to make an 
issuer responsible for a disclosure. This can be clearly seen from the listing principles in 
the UK, which mention that adequate procedures, systems and controls must be 
established by an issuer (Listing Principle 2) to comply with its obligations. It would be 
beneficial for Kuwait to adopt a similar provision. Saudi Arabia and Qatar do not 
mention such rules in their disclosure rules. 
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Another responsibility is to require that an issuer prepares a list of insiders. It would be 
better if Kuwaiti legislation were to require every issuer to prepare a list of insiders and 
to add such a requirement to its disclosure regime. Saudi Arabia and Qatar do not 
mention such rules in their disclosure rules. 
 
7.2.3.4 Fines  
In Kuwait, the KCMA can apply one of the administrative penalties included in Law No 
7 2010 if the issuer does not comply with the Disclosure Rules. However, 
administrative penalties do not include fines. It would be a good idea to add the 
imposition of a fine as an optional administrative penalty.  
 
7.2.4 Recommendations on corporate governance  
 
This thesis suggests a number of recommendations related to having a good corporate 
governance code. 
 
7.2.4.1 Developing a code 
An independent organisation should be established to develop a corporate governance 
code. For example, in the UK, the Finance Reporting Council (FRC) develops corporate 
governance rules, which are enforced by the FCA, formerly by the FSA. Kuwait would 
benefit from having an organisation like the FRC to develop a Kuwaiti code. 
 
7.2.4.2 New framework for enforcement code 
The traditional ways of enforcing corporate governance principles are not suitable for 
the real world today. The world needs a new framework for the enforcement of 
corporate governance principles. Through rules and codes, the securities laws can help 
to form this framework. There is a diversity of enforcement methods. Different aspects 
of corporate governance are enforced in different ways. Some are enforced by corporate 
law, while others are dealt with by securities laws and delegated legislation in the forms 
of rules and voluntary and mandatory codes. This thesis has shown that Kuwait needs to 
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balance the mandatory rules consisting of statutory requirements, such as securities laws 
and rules, and regulations backed by statute on one hand and the principles that operate 
on a ‘comply or explain’ basis on the other hand.  
 
7.2.5 Recommendations on a sound regulatory authority 
This thesis suggests a number of recommendations related to a sound regulatory 
authority.  
7.2.5.1 Structure 
For a financial system as a whole to be sound it needs the right structure in terms of 
responsibilities. The right structure in the UK is considered to be one that has separate 
authorities for prudential risks and the conduct of companies. Each of these bodies 
needs to have requirements to operate in a sound manner. Figure 7.6 shows a regulatory 
model for a sound financial system which is recommended for Kuwait.  
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      Regulatory Model for Sound Financial System   
 
  
1) The correct structure to tackle all direct & indirect risks should have: 
 
 
 
 
 
2) Operational requirements for a sound regulatory authority for conduct of business 
  
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7.6 shows regulatory model for sound financial system 
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7.2.5.2 Publishing meeting reports 
In the UK, the FCA is responsible for recording and safe-keeping all decisions made in 
the exercise of its functions and a record of each governing body meeting must be 
published by the FCA. It would be better if Kuwaiti law required the publication of the 
authority’s meeting reports. 
 
7.2.5.3 Educating investors and facilitating complaints 
The creation of strong investors in Kuwait is still in its infancy. In the UK, the 
regulatory authority can play a significant role by creating an education and complaints 
body and by passing rules or suggesting laws to the legislature, as is done by the FOS 
and the Money Advice Service organisations. In Kuwait, it would be better if the 2010 
Act established such organisations to assist the regulatory authority in educating 
investors and facilitating complaints to resolve disputes.   
 
Furthermore, it would be better if one body were responsible to educate and to facilitate 
the lodging of complaints about the financial systems as a whole in Kuwait, as happens 
in the UK. The regulatory authority’s responsibility in Kuwait is limited to securities 
markets, while in the UK, the role extends to other areas of the financial market.    
 
7.2.5.4 Reforms of financial system as a whole 
Regulation of the financial system in Kuwait at this moment is similar to the UK prior 
to the changes of 2012. Previously, the Financial Services Authority and the Central 
Bank were jointly responsible for financial regulation. However, as the crash of 2008 
demonstrated, this did not work well because neither of the two bodies foresaw the 
event. As result of that crash, two distinct authorities were created to manage the 
financial system. Although one of the authorities is a subsidiary of the Bank of England 
it is still a separate authority. In Kuwait, there is a Capital Market Authority, which is 
partly responsible, and the Central Bank, between them they are supposed to regulate 
the financial system. This is different from the UK where the FCA is at least responsible 
for all financial services, whereas in Kuwait the Capital Market Authority is only 
responsible for securities and the Central Bank is supposed to regulate everything else. 
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It is likely that this will be more problematic in the future than it was in the UK. Table 
7.1 shows a comparison between regulatory authorities in the UK and Kuwait and what 
the financial system in Kuwait needs in order to be at the same level as the UK financial 
system. 
 
      Table 7.1 Comparison of Regulatory Authorities in the UK and Kuwait 
 
7.3 Recommendations for Further Research  
 
Few studies have considered securities law in Kuwait. This thesis is one of the first 
studies to investigate the 2010 Act from the perspective of protecting individual 
investors. Therefore, more research is needed in different areas. Some recommendations 
for future research regarding securities law in Kuwait are as follows: 
 UK Kuwait 
Prudential & Conduct 
Regulation 
Two Separate Authorities One Authority 
Markets Regulation All Financial Markets Securities Market 
only 
Who is Protected Financial Consumer Investors 
Imposing Fines Unlimited No 
Advice & Education Money Advice Service body No 
Resolution of 
Dispute 
Financial Ombudsman 
Services Body 
No 
Using Business 
Culture (Voluntary 
Codes) 
Corporate Governance Code No 
Objectives Clear Not Clear 
 269 
 
 
1. International cooperation 
International cooperation between foreign regulatory authorities is an important subject 
that needs more research in terms of the type of regulations the world needs, such as a 
treaty that forces countries to cooperate.   
 
2. Constitutionality of the Capital Market Authority 
Further research could be undertaken into the constitutionality of establishing a Capital 
Market Authority in Kuwait (KCMA) and the extent to which such an Authority would 
conflict with Article 123 of the Kuwaiti Constitution. Article 123 mentions that ‘the 
Council of Ministers has control over the department of the state’. However, Chapter 
Six of this thesis showed that the KCMA is beyond the control of the Council of 
Ministers on some points.  
 
3. The structure of financial regulatory authorities 
Good organisational structure that includes broad structural features and clear 
managers’ activities can lead to good coordination and control within the organisation. 
This will achieve the organisation’s goals in the correct way, free from individual 
influences.
1
 Therefore, the structure of a financial regulatory authority is important to 
achieving its objectives. The type of structure needs more research.  
 
4. Control of investor behaviour 
Sometimes investors need to be protected from themselves. According to financial 
behaviour studies, taking risks becomes a calling. It is human nature. Sometimes, it is 
like a force or a movement of strong will to take risks without stopping to think of the 
results.
2
 It is a good idea to study ways to control an investor’s behaviour on a stock 
exchange in the field of psychology.  
 
                                                 
1
 Rhys Andrews, ‘Organisation Structure and Public Service Performance’ in Richard Walker, George 
Boye and Gene Brewer (Eds) Public Management and Performance: Research Directions (Cambridge 
University Press 2010) 90-91. 
2
 Robert Shiller, Finance and the Good Society (Princeton University Press 2012) 139-142. 
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5. Stewardship Code 
In the UK, it was felt necessary to introduce a stewardship code for institutional 
investors. It would be useful to research the feasibility and desirability of introducing 
such a code in Kuwait.  
 
6. Corporate governance 
Corporate governance of a regulatory authority is an important subject that needs further 
research. Good corporate principles lead to a number of benefits in managing the 
organisation. In the UK, the corporate governance framework relating to the FCA can 
be defined as the way in which the board is constituted, directed and controlled by the 
FCA.
3
 The Financial Services Act 2012, part 2 of 3C, states that one of the FCA’s 
duties is to follow principles of good governance.
4
 It would be better if Kuwait had such 
a law.  
 
7. Operation and powers of self-regulatory organisations 
Self-regulatory organisations (SROs), such as stock exchanges, govern themselves 
without outside interference and are responsible for the operation of the exchanges. This 
includes:  
1) regulation of market transactions, which means ensuring that the members’ 
actions are in accordance with pre-agreed rules;  
2) regulation of the market participants by ensuring that they do not breach their 
obligations by maintaining over time the value of their capital, not taking 
excessive risk, and not breaching ethical behaviour, and, if they breach their 
obligations, they will face sanctions from the SRO itself; 
3) dispute resolution and enforcement actions that include private mechanisms 
that enforce good conduct.  
The operation of SROs and their powers needs more research in Kuwait. 
                                                 
3
 Report entitled ‘Corporate Governance of the Financial Conduct Authority’ (2013) 
3.<http://www.fca.org.uk/static/documents/fca-corporate-governance.pdf> accessed 9 January 2014. 
4‘In managing its affairs, each regulator must have regard to such generally accepted principles of good 
corporate governance as it is reasonable to regard as applicable to it’.   
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8. Political interference 
Politics is one of the challenges to a regulatory authority.
5
 A strong decision-making 
ability is sometimes a political risk. Therefore, freedom from political interference is 
necessary to enable strong decision-making.
6
 In addition, a politically and commercially 
independent regulatory authority needs support from senior politicians.
7
 Political 
interference needs more research in Kuwait.  
 
9. Financial compensation schemes 
In the UK, the Financial Services Compensation Scheme (FSCS) is an organisation 
independent from the government and the financial industry that assists private 
individuals if a company is unable to pay certain claims against it, because it has 
stopped trading or is in default. For example, if a financial institution becomes 
insolvent, and an individual has investments with that institution, the FSCS would pay 
some compensation.
8
 This is also the case if an investor pays a broker who then defaults 
although the amount of the compensation in this case is lower. There is no such scheme 
in Kuwait. It would be a good idea to compare the situation in the Kuwait with the UK 
on this issue.  
 
          10. Protection of investors in securities other than shares 
The scope of this thesis was limited to the protection of investors who trade in shares. 
Protecting investors in securities other than shares needs more research.  
          11. The UK and the USA Comparison 
A comparison between the UK and the USA in order to find the most appropriate 
solution for Kuwait is a subject for further research. 
 
                                                 
5
 Ana Carvajal, Jennifer Elliott, ‘The Challenge of Enforcement in Securities Markets: Mission 
Impossible?’ (International Monetary Fund working paper 2009) 4. 
6
 ibid 25. 
7 ibid 26.  
8
 <http://www.fscs.org.uk/what-we-cover/about-us/ > accessed 18 May 2014.  
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12. Financial education 
One of the serious problems faced when establishing a regulatory regime is the shortage 
of suitably qualified staff, such as specialist judges, lawyers and investigators. For 
example, Principle 5 of the IOSCO Objectives and Principles of Securities Regulation 
2010 emphasises that ‘The staff of a regulatory authority should observe high 
professional standards’.9 It would be a good idea to establish a programme to teach 
securities law as a main subject, whether as part of a diploma course (one or two years), 
a bachelor’s degree course (three or four years), or a master’s programme. Research is 
needed regarding the optimal course content in such fields as accountancy, law, and 
economics. 
 
 
7.4 Final observation  
 
This research and thesis have made proposals which will provide better protection for 
individual investors by making the authorities aware of a number of shortcomings in the 
current legislation in Kuwait. Hopefully, too, it has added more knowledge to the body 
of literature in the securities law field, especially for Kuwaiti scholars. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                 
9
 <http://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD323.pdf> accessed 26 February 2014. 
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The FCA enforcement 
procedure for disciplinary 
cases1
                                                 
1
 <https://www.fca.org.uk/static/documents/enforcement-information-guide.pdf> accessed 15 September 
2014.  
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Appointment of Investigators 
We appoint investigators and, if appropriate, send a Notice Appointment of Investigators to 
the firm or individual. We do this as quickly as practicable. 
Scoping discussion 
Our initial discussions with the firm or individual are intended to provide a clear indication 
of the scope of the investigation, including how the process will unfold and the individuals 
and documents the investigators will initially need to access to.  
Private Warning  
We may issue a private 
warning at any stage in the 
procedure, and in doing so 
we close the investigation. 
Settlement discussions  
The parties can seek to 
resolve the issue by having 
settlement discussions with 
us at any stage in the 
procedure. 
Closure  
If we find there is no case 
to answer, we close the 
investigation at any stage in 
the procedure 
If the RDC finds there is no 
case, either before or after 
representation, the FCA 
closes the investigation.  
If after representations the 
RDC finds there is no case, 
a Notice of Discontinuance 
will be issued. 
 
Investigation Work 
The appointed investigators carry out the investigation. The investigation may include, 
for example, requests for documents or information and interviews of witnesses and 
subjects. Following the investigation work, there is an internal legal review of the case by 
a lawyer who has not been part of the investigation.  
Preliminary Investigation Report (PIR) 
If appropriate, we send a PIR to the firm or individual, who has 28 days to respond. They 
can apply for extra time to complete their response. 
Submission to the FCA Regulatory Decisions Committee (RDC) 
If, following their investigation, our staff believe action is justified they submit case 
papers to the RDC. This includes an Investigation Report, which takes account of the 
firm or individual’s response to the PIR. The RDC considers the submission. The 
Regulatory Decisions Committee comprises practitioners and non-practitioners, who all 
represent the public interest. The FCA staff who handle cases before they go to the RDC 
will not be involved in the RDC’s decision making. Members of the RDC are appointed 
by, and are accountable to, the FCA board.  
Warning Notice 
If the RDC decides it is appropriate, it will send out a Warning Notice informing the 
person concerned that the FCA intends to take further action. The firm or individual has 
the right to access material relied on by the RDC in taking its decision, together with 
secondary material which might undermine that decision. The firm or individual has 14 
days to make oral or written representations to the RDC and can apply for extra time.  
 
Oral and written representation to the RDC 
After it receives the Warning Notice, the firm or individual may take written or oral 
representation to the RDC. The RDC will then meet again to consider the facts of the 
case, including the firm’s or individual’s written representation and any new information 
that may have come to light. If the firm or individual has chosen to make oral 
representations, they are made before the RDC at this stage.   
Published information  
We may, if appropriate, 
publish information about 
certain Warning Notices 
(having consulted the 
person to whom the notice 
is issued). 
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Decision Notice 
RDC makes its decision and, if appropriate, issues a Decision Notice. 
The firm or individual has 28 days to make a referral to the Upper 
Tribunal (Tax and Chancery Chamber) 
Upper Tribunal (Tax and Chancery Chamber): a fresh look 
Following the Decision Notice, the firm or individual has the 
right to refer their case to the Tribunal. The Tribunal is entirely 
independent of the FCA and will consider the entire case afresh. 
A Tribunal hearing is normally held in public. 
Final Notice 
If no referral is made to the 
Tribunal following the 
Decision Notice, a Final 
Notice is issued to the firm or 
individual concerned.  
Published information 
We will publish such 
information about the matter 
to which a Decision or Final 
Notice relates as we consider 
appropriate. 
Tribunal’s determination 
The Tribunal decides what 
action the FCA should take in 
relation to the matter referred 
to it (including issuing a 
Notice of Discontinuance if 
the case is not made out) 
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     Appendix 2 
 
 
 
The FCA Corporate Governance   
statement for the year ended 31 March 
20131 
 
                                                 
1
 <https://www.fca.org.uk/static/documents/annual-report/fsa-annual-report-12-13-section-9.pdf > accessed 15 September 2014. 
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The FSA was a company limited by guarantee and was therefore not obliged to 
comply with the UK Corporate Governance Code (the Code). However, the FSMA 
required the organisation to have regard to generally accepted principles of good 
corporate governance as applicable. The Board was committed to meeting high 
standards of corporate governance and decided to comply with the Code as far as 
appropriate. This report sets out how the FSA was governed in line with the Code’s 
principles. 
 
The FSMA required the FSA to have a number of accountability mechanisms, 
including an Annual Public Meeting, and to report on the extent to which its 
regulatory objectives were met. The FSA was funded by the industry it regulated 
through its statutory fee-raising powers and it operated independently of Government, 
but was accountable to Parliament through obligations set out in the FSMA. 
Consultation with consumers and practitioners on rules and general policy was 
undertaken through the Consumer, Practitioner and Smaller Businesses Practitioner 
Panels. 
 
The FSA was led by a Board, which developed its strategy and approved and 
monitored the annual operating plan and budget. Certain responsibilities were 
reserved to the Board for its decision and these were set out in the schedule of matters 
reserved to the Board. There was also a governance memorandum detailing the 
functions that had been delegated by the Board. The majority of the FSA Board 
comprised non-executive directors who, in addition to their statutory responsibilities 
under the Companies Act 2006, had specific obligations under the FSMA. The Board 
was of sufficient size to ensure that the requirements of the business could be met 
and that changes to the Board composition and any of its committees could be 
managed without undue disruption. FSMA required that there was a non-executive 
directors’ committee (NedCo), which kept certain functions under review. 
Information on NedCo’s work is set out in the non-executive directors’ report. 
 
The Board and Board Committees met regularly during the year and details of the 
number of meetings held and attendance at those meetings are set out in Table 1. The 
membership of the various committees can also be found in Table 1. 
 
Before Hector Sants resigned as chief executive with effect from 30 June 2012, the 
roles of the FSA chair and chief executive were separate: the chair, who was 
independent on appointment in September 2008, led the Board and ensured its 
effectiveness, and the chief executive was responsible for developing and delivering 
the strategic objectives agreed with the Board. Between Mr Sants’ resignation 
and legal cutover to the new regulatory system on 1 April 2013, Adair Turner 
acted as executive chairman. 
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In preparation for legal cutover, the FSA operated an internal ‘twin peaks’ 
structure during the year, with a Conduct Business Unit led by Martin Wheatley 
and a Prudential Business Unit led by Andrew Bailey. 
 
The non-executive directors of the Board had a variety of appropriate skills and 
experience. Apart from any contact they may have had with the FSA as a result of 
being connected with a regulated firm, or as consumers of regulated products, the non-
executive directors were judged by the Board to be independent of the FSA. Where any 
conflicts of interest arose relating to personal or business matters, procedures were in 
place to ensure that no director would be exposed and that decisions would be made 
without undue influence. 
 
The chair ensured, with the company secretary, that the Board’s agendas were set in 
line with the priorities of the organisation. The company secretary reviewed papers 
before their circulation to Board members to ensure that information was accurate 
and clear. Papers for Board and Committee meetings were usually circulated one week 
before meetings. 
 
Until legal cutover, one of the non-executive directors acted as chair of the non-executive 
directors’ committee and was viewed as the senior independent director. The non-
executive directors’ committee ceased to exist in the new regulatory framework. 
 
Directors of the FSA were formally appointed by the Treasury following a rigorous 
selection process. The selection panel comprised representatives of both the FSA and 
the Treasury and the procedures followed were in line with the principles in the code of 
practice issued by the Office of the Commissioner for Public Appointments. 
 
The company secretary arranged induction for new directors that was appropriate for 
their knowledge and experience. The Board also received ongoing professional 
development on relevant issues. During the last year this included training for non-
executive directors on consumer credit and platforms. Individual directors have also 
had personal briefings on other topics, such as interest-only mortgages, before Board 
meetings. 
 
Each director had access to the advice and services of the company secretary, who also 
advised the Board on all aspects of governance matters. The company secretary was 
responsible for providing access to external professional advice for directors, if 
required. 
 
Due to its statutory nature, the FSA benefited from immunity under the FSMA in 
respect of legal action, which it supplemented with indemnities in favour of individual 
directors. The Board therefore regarded insurance in respect of legal action against 
directors as unnecessary. 
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As reported last year, a number of evaluations relating to the Board, its members and 
committees that were started during 2011/12 were completed in the early part of 
2012/13. These were facilitated by external consultants and reviewed what lessons 
could be learned for the remaining tenure of the FSA and for the future operation of 
the FCA. In view of the changes to the regulatory framework and the transition of the 
FSA into two new regulatory bodies, it was agreed that it would not be appropriate to 
carry out further reviews of the effectiveness of the Board, its members or its 
committees during 2012/13. 
 
In September 2011, the Board established a sub-group to support the executive in 
the development of the FCA. The sub-group was initially chaired by Adair Turner 
as chair of the FSA and, from October 2012, by John Griffith-Jones as chair-
designate of the FCA. The other members of the sub-group were all non-executive 
directors. The sub-group was advisory in nature and had no delegated decision-
making duties or powers. It was responsible for providing support and challenge to 
the CEO designate of the FCA to ensure that the FCA was developed as a ‘fit for 
purpose’ successor to the FSA. 
 
 
 
 
 
Governance Structure of the FSA  
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In October 2012 the Board also established a sub-committee to oversee the FSA’s 
review of the failure of HBOS. 
 
       The Non-executive directors’ committee (NedCo)        
                                    
The functions of NedCo were set out in the provisions of Schedule 1 to the 
FSMA and, during the year, NedCo ensured that its statutory functions 
were being satisfactorily discharged by:     
 
• reviewing reports on the efficient and economic use of the FSA’s resources; 
• receiving reports on the Audit Committee’s (AuditCo) work in keeping under 
review the question of whether the internal financial controls secured the 
proper conduct of the FSA’s financial affairs (via reports made to the Board); 
and 
• receiving reports from the Remuneration Committee (RemCo) on the 
remuneration awards to the executive directors and the chairman; and the 
performance-related bonus payments made to the executive directors. 
   NedCo’s composition is shown in Table 1. 
 
Report of the non-executive directors 
                                                                                      
The Board was the FSA’s primary decision-making body. It also exercised a 
broad oversight of all policy, strategic and operational activities. The extent of 
the Board’s role and the information provided to it allowed NedCo to rely 
largely on the Board’s work while sharing other functions, including oversight 
of internal controls, with AuditCo. RemCo reported on its work to NedCo. 
 
Efficiency and economy 
 
During the year, NedCo reviewed whether the FSA was using its resources in the 
most efficient and economic way. Data relating to measuring efficiency and 
economy formed part of the management information presented to the Board 
quarterly, and was reviewed specifically by NedCo. NedCo challenged the 
information it received and sought further explanations when appropriate. During 
the year under review, NedCo monitored the implementation of the internal twin 
peaks system, which separated the FSA’s business into prudential and conduct 
divisions in preparation for legal cutover to the new regulatory framework on 1 
April 2013. One impact of internal twin peaks within the Conduct Business Unit 
was an initial shortage of experience of managers with their firms due to the split 
of staff following the introduction of the internal twin peaks structure and the 
previous focus on prudential issues. NedCo noted, however, that this was being 
addressed through training to ensure that staff were appropriately skilled. 
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Internal financial controls 
 
During the year, AuditCo reviewed audit progress reports from the National Audit 
Office and assessments from the Internal Audit Division on the relevant FSA key 
internal controls to obtain assurance that the internal financial controls secured the 
proper conduct of the organisation’s financial affairs. Feedback on this work was 
provided to the Board.  
 
Remuneration of the executive directors  
 
NedCo had delegated to RemCo the function of determining the remuneration of the 
chair, the chief executive, the executive directors and certain other senior staff. 
 
In addition to its statutory functions, NedCo discussed how the Board was involved in, 
and alerted to, issues of significant interest or issues that had significant reputational 
impact. This assisted in considering the design for the FCA governance structure to 
ensure that processes were in place to facilitate the most effective communication. 
 
Remuneration report 
 
This section of the remuneration report is not subject to audit 
 
Remuneration committee (Remco) 
RemCo was a committee of NedCo and was chaired by the chair of 
NedCo. 
During the year, RemCo met formally on seven occasions, and some 
decisions were initially made by email and later ratified. 
  
Remuneration strategy 
 
The FSA’s remuneration strategy was to provide a remuneration package that: 
• helped to attract, retain and motivate staff; 
• recognised its role and responsibilities as a public authority; 
• was as competitive as possible against the appropriate market; 
• encouraged and supported a culture aligned to achieving its statutory 
objectives; 
• was fair and transparent; and 
• was capable of being applied consistently across the organisation. 
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Remuneration policy 
 
To achieve the remuneration strategy, the remuneration policy aimed to: 
• set base salaries at, or around, the median of the relevant market 
competitive level; 
• target reward at those whose performance was strongest; 
• reward stretching performance; and 
• provide an appropriate balance between the need to attract, retain and 
motivate staff, while reflecting the constraints placed on a public authority. 
 
2012/13 Remuneration review 
 
The total remuneration package, which was common to all FSA employees, 
comprised: 
• basic pensionable salary; 
• eligibility to be considered for a performance-related annual individual 
incentive award; 
• additional flexible benefits; and 
• pension contribution. 
 
 
The information contained in the remuneration table has been audited by 
the external auditor. All individuals who held the post of executive director 
during the year had continuous contracts of employment providing for no 
more than 12 months’ prior notice of termination by either party. The chair 
was employed on a fixed-term contract, which began on 20 September 
2008 and was due to end on 19 September 2013, although, Adair Turner 
stepped down as chair and as a director of the organisation when the FSA 
ceased to exist at legal cutover. 
 
RemCo determined the remuneration of the executive directors. To help 
with this, RemCo received information on, and assessment of, their 
individual performance. Performance was measured against the 
achievement of the collective FSMA objectives by reference to the Business 
Plan, the objectives relating to the directors’ individual areas of 
responsibility and assessment of their leadership abilities. 
 
In considering executive remuneration, RemCo had advice from the 
Director of Human Resources and market data from Towers Watson, its 
external consultants. 
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Basic personable salary 
 
Salaries were reviewed annually in line with the policy. When making 
decisions on base salary, RemCo was mindful of the need for public sector 
organisations to continue to exercise restraint. 
 
In considering the pay review for the year, the committee noted the 
importance of remuneration packages being sufficient to attract and retain 
staff while awarding any salary increases in a responsible manner, ensuring 
careful use of the FSA’s resources. Some difficulties were experienced in 
attracting and retaining certain levels of suitably qualified professionals and, to 
retain the appropriate staff, it was important for the Executive to focus 
reward clearly on performance. This resulted in some staff receiving no pay 
increase, but the committee considered that the previous year’s exercise, which 
had aimed to give the majority of staff a pay rise and also to address key 
anomalies, went some way to ameliorating this issue. 
 
The Committee noted that the Executive had issued new equal pay 
guidelines and required clear indications of peer comparisons for all staff. 
The FCA Executive will look at the design of the pay bands for the new 
organisation and the need to ensure reward is linked to performance will 
continue to be emphasised. 
 
 
Annual incentive award 
 
During the period under review, the executive directors were eligible to be 
considered for a performance-related incentive award up to a maximum of 
35% of average base pensionable salary applying during the previous year. 
 
Last year, the organisation had an extended performance period of 15 
months (1 January 2011 – 31 March 2012) to enable the performance period to 
align with the financial year. This was a one off transition. For 2012/13, the 
performance year was 1 April 2012 – 31 March 2013. 
 
The chair was not eligible to be considered for an individual incentive award. 
When making its decisions, RemCo took proper account of all aspects of the 
FSA’s and the individual’s performance 
 
Other benefits 
 
A sum was available for each director, which could be spent against a range of 
benefits. The sum for the chair and executive directors is included in ‘other 
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emoluments’ in the remuneration table. The chair and executive directors also had 
access to a car and driver and, where appropriate, the relevant portion of these costs 
is included in ‘other emoluments’ in the remuneration table. 
 
Pensions 
 
The FSA Pension Plan (the Plan) has two sections, both of which are non-
contributory; a defined benefits section (closed to new entrants and any 
future accruals) and a defined contribution section. Adair Turner and 
Hector Sants are not members of the Plan and were entitled to receive a 
non-pensionable supplement. The sums paid to the chair and each of the 
executive directors, in respect of each component, are shown in the 
remuneration table. 
 
 
Remuneration Table 
 
 Board fee Salary Performance 
related bonus 
Other 
emoluments and 
benefits 
Contractual 
entitlements on 
termination 
Pension 2013 Total 2012 Total 
£ £ £ £ £ £ £ £ 
Chairman         
Adair Turner 1, 2, 4 - 446,250 - 33,353 252,000 53,550 785,153 500,474 
 
 
Executive 
        
Directors         
Hector Sants 2, 11 - 184,615 - 30,648 300,178 15,000 530,441 835,731 
Martin Wheatley 
2, 9
 
- 429,999 86,000 112,386 - 38,700 667,085 399,657 
 
 
Non-executive 
        
Directors 5         
Amanda  Davidson 35,000 - - - - - 35,000 35,000 
6, 13 
        Sandra Dawson 42,436 - - - - - 42,437 35,000 
Peter Fisher 7, 13 - - - - - - - - 
Brian Flanagan 12 32,083 - - - - - 32,083 35,000 
Karin Forseke 10 15,462 - - - - - 15,462 57,333 
John  Griffith-
Jones 
 
 
 
        
2, 3 99,167 - - 192 - 11,900 111,259 - 
Mick McAteer 35,000 - - - - - 35,000 35,000 
Brian Pomeroy 6, 8 62,436 - - - - - 62,436 55,000 
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Where Directors have served for part of the year only, the remuneration 
figures are shown as pro-rated. 
1. On becoming Executive Chairman with effect from 1 July 2012, Adair Turner’s salary was 
increased to £450,000 from £435,000 
2. Adair Turner, Hector Sants, Martin Wheatley and John Griffith-Jones are not members of the 
FSA Pension Plan and received a non pensionable supplement in lieu of pension 
contributions. 
3. John Griffith-Jones was appointed as a non-executive director and chairman designate of the 
FCA on 1 September 2012. 
4. Adair Turner’s total emoluments for service during the year were £533,153 (2011/12: 
£500,474). In addition Adair Turner received in April 2013 a payment of £252,000 as 
compensation for termination of employment as he was restricted in respect of taking paid 
employment for a period of six months from April 2013 to September 2013. Lord Turner had 
been employed on a fixed-term contract which was due to end on 19 September 2013 but which 
was terminated on 31 March 2013. 
5. The fee for non-executive directors was set by the independent panel, established with the 
approval of HMT, at £35,000 per annum with effect from 1 April 2011. This remained 
unchanged in 2012/13. 
6. An additional fee of £10,000 per annum is paid to any non-executive director who has been 
appointed to chair a committee of the Board. Andrew Scott was appointed to chair the Risk 
Committee from 19 January 2012. Brian Pomeroy was appointed as Audit Committee Chair 
with effect from 4 July 2012. Sandra Dawson was appointed as Chair of NedCo with effect 
from 4 July 2012. 
7. Peter Fisher and Paul Tucker both waived their Board fee in respect of the years concerned. 
8. Brian Pomeroy was appointed to chair the FSA Pension Plan Trustee Ltd from 1 June 2010. 
The   annual fee was set by the independent panel at £20,000 with effect from 1 April 2008. 
This remained unchanged in 2012/13. 
9. Martin Wheatley was appointed as an executive director from 1 September 2011 and 
accordingly his 
Andrew Scott 6, 13 45,000 - - - - - 45,000 37,012 
James Strachan 13 35,000 - - - - - 35,000 35,000 
Paul Tucker 7, 13 - - - - - - - - 
 401,584 1,060,864 86,000 176, 579 552,178 119,150 2,396,356 2,060,207 
 
Remuneration  as 
        
        executives       1,982,679 1,735,862 
Fees for service 
as 
        
Directors       413,677 324,345 
        
2,396,356 
 
2,060,207 
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remuneration for 2012 in the table above is only in respect of seven months. 
10. Karin Forseke discharged the role of Chair of Nedco and Senior Independent Director from June 
2010   until her resignation from the board with effect from 3 July 2012. She undertook 
additional work in relation to this and her appointment as Deputy Chair was formalised with 
effect from 1 June 2011. There was an adjustment to her fees to reflect the additional work to 
a total of £60,000 which comprised a non-executive director fee of £35,000, an additional fee 
for chairing AuditCo of £10,000, and an uplift as Deputy Chair of £15,000. The maximum 
amount for this position had previously been set by the independent panel at £69,000. 
11. Hector Sants resigned as chief executive and as a director with effect from 30 June 2012. In 
line with his contractual entitlement, on leaving the FSA he continued to be employed by 
the FSA for a further six months during which he received his full pay and benefits and was 
unable to take paid employment in another organisation. 
12. Brian Flanagan resigned as a director with effect from 28 February 2013. 
13. Sandra Dawson, Peter Fisher, Andrew Scott and James Strachan resigned as directors with 
effect from 31 March 2013 and Paul Tucker also left the board with effect from 31 March 
2013 when section 1A of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 took effect. 
14. Margaret Cole resigned as a director with effect from 31 March 2012. In line with her 
contractual entitlement, on leaving the FSA she continued to be employed by the FSA for a 
further five months during which she received her full pay and benefits totalling £250,897 
and was unable to take paid employment in another organisation. 
 
Non-executive directors 
 
It was not considered appropriate for the fees payable to the FSA’s non-
executive directors to be increased in the last year before the regulatory 
restructure and accordingly the level of fees remained unchanged during 
2012/13. 
The fees payable are shown in the notes to the remuneration table. 
 
                 Committees of the Board 
     
     Audit committee (AuditCo) 
 
AuditCo’s purpose within the FSA was to be responsible for reviewing and 
providing assurance to the Board on the effectiveness of the FSA’s internal 
controls and risk management systems, the integrity in the annual accounts of 
the financial statements that relate to financial controls and internal risk, and 
oversight of the external audit process. The review of external risks and the 
review of individual firms were outside the Committee’s terms of reference. 
The former lay with RiskCo and the latter with the supervisory process. 
Details of AuditCo members’ attendance at meetings can be found in Table 1. 
 
In view of the changes to the regulatory framework and the transition of 
the FSA into two new regulatory bodies, it was agreed that it would not be 
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appropriate to carry out a further review of the committee’s effectiveness in 
the 2012/13 financial year. The operation of AuditCo was, however, 
reviewed with respect to the way it will operate following legal cutover and 
the committee’s terms of reference have been amended as appropriate. 
AuditCo met on six occasions during the year; in addition to the four 
scheduled meetings, the committee also formally met twice to consider 
progress on the review being undertaken by Internal Audit in relation to 
LIBOR. The FSA chief executive attended one of the scheduled meetings 
before leaving the organisation and the FCA chief executive designate 
attended three of the scheduled meetings. The chief operating officer, the 
director of internal audit and the lead audit partner from the National 
Audit Office (NAO) or his alternate, attended each of the scheduled 
meetings at the request of the committee chair. Private sessions were held 
with the internal and external auditors during the year without 
management present. The committee also held private sessions with a 
number of members of the senior leadership team without management 
present. 
 
The committee reviewed and challenged the risk reporting proposals under 
the twin peaks model and expressed concern that operational problems 
could arise as a result of a vacuum during the transition process. Following 
discussion with the chief executive, however, the committee considered that 
the proposed way forward was sensible, but expressed concern that an FSA 
consolidated risk report was not available between the introduction of ITP 
and legal cutover. 
 
The committee also oversaw the review by Internal Audit of the extent of 
awareness within the FSA of inappropriate LIBOR submissions. 
 
 To discharge its functions AuditCo carried out the following during 
2012/13: 
• Monitored the integrity of the financial statements and challenged 
management on financial performance. 
• Reviewed the financial reporting judgments and disclosure issues. 
• Reviewed pension plan arrangements. 
• Reviewed the FSA’s financial policies. 
• Reviewed the chairman’s expenses. 
• Reviewed and challenged the identification of internal risks, including 
financial management risks, information systems risk and people risks (as 
reflected in the consolidated risk report), and managers’ mitigation of these 
risks. 
• Reviewed the operation of the FSA’s whistleblowing policy and received reports on 
specific issues. 
• Reviewed compliance by FSA staff with key internal policies and 
procedures, including the operation and management of the Staff Code of 
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Conduct. 
• Reviewed potential and actual litigation against the FSA. 
• Reviewed the audit universe (i.e. the internal audit framework) and 
approved proposals by Internal Audit for it to be more risk-focused. 
• Reviewed and approved the audit plans for internal audit. 
• Monitored and challenged managers on their responsiveness to internal 
audit findings. 
• Reviewed the quarterly reports from internal audit. 
• Reviewed the independence and effectiveness of the external auditor. The FSA 
aimed to protect the external auditor’s independence through its policy, which 
required that fees for non-audit services were limited to the charge for performing 
the audit of its annual accounts. Information on fees paid to the auditor is given on 
page 139. Moreover, there were no relationships between the NAO or its staff and 
the FSA that affected the NAO’s objectivity and independence. 
• Considered the external auditor’s audit strategy for the financial year. 
• Reviewed programme and project management in the FSA. 
• During the year the Audit Committee also commissioned a review of the 
adequacy and effectiveness of the Internal Audit function. This work was 
carried out by an external consultant who was specifically asked to ensure 
that the outputs from the review would be as useful as possible, both for 
the FSA and for the FCA in the new regulatory structure. The outcome of 
the review was very positive, noting that the Internal Audit function had 
strong leadership, a professional team and good execution of work. The 
report also made a number of recommendations meriting further 
consideration by the FCA Audit Committee and the FCA executive in due 
course. 
 
                  Risk Committee (RiskCo) 
 
 
RiskCo’s purpose was to help the Board review external risks to its statutory objectives.  
It did not review internal risks, which were the responsibility of AuditCo; nor did it 
review individual firms. 
 
Details of RiskCo members’ attendance at meetings can be found in Table 1. 
 
As the FSA would cease to exist following legal cutover, it was agreed that 
it would not be appropriate to carry out a further review of the committee’s 
effectiveness in the 2012/13 financial year. The operation of RiskCo was, 
however, reviewed with respect to the way it will operate in the FCA 
following legal cutover and the committee’s terms of reference have been 
amended to reflect its proposed purpose and duties as the FCA risk 
committee in the new regulatory framework. 
 
RiskCo had responsibility for review and oversight of the risks to the FSA’s 
statutory objectives, the FSA executive’s appetite for such risks, and the 
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management and mitigation strategies and systems used to control these risks. In 
discharging that responsibility, RiskCo received regularly during the year, 
information on the top risks as articulated by both the Conduct Business 
Unit and Prudential Business Unit Executives. These risks were reviewed by 
the Executives in the respective business units, who considered appropriate 
mitigation strategies. 
 
 
The committee sought assurance from the FSA Executive through debate and 
challenge in the following areas: whether the major risks to the FSA’s statutory 
objectives and its reputation had been identified and prioritised appropriately; 
whether the actions taken to address and mitigate the risks were effective; and 
whether the timescales for mitigation were appropriate. RiskCo reported to the 
Board on its consideration of the risk areas and reports from the Executive. 
 
During the year, RiskCo highlighted to the Board concerns that the move to 
an Internal Twin Peaks (ITP) model had led to some elements of the control 
framework being weakened. In particular, a separation of the way in which 
the FSA’s risk framework was being applied in the prudential and conduct 
business units. On balance, RiskCo believed this development of separate risk 
tolerances and frameworks in the new regulators, continued 
macroeconomic strains and the extent of internal change to the organisation 
elevated substantially risks to the FSA’s statutory objectives, although not 
necessarily to its successor organisations. RiskCo requested that the Executive of 
both the Conduct Business Unit and the Prudential Business Unit keep it informed 
of their developing new frameworks and that it be kept fully informed of issues 
emerging under these frameworks. 
 
RiskCo discussed with management the amount and detail of the information 
provided to it, as this had reduced following the introduction of ITP. For part of the 
year, RiskCo considered that it did not have enough information about new 
approaches being used to effectively challenge the Executive or to provide assurance 
to the Board that risks were being measured or mitigated appropriately. When 
additional information was requested and provided by the Executive on the top-down and 
bottom-up risks, this provided reassurance that key risks had been identified even if 
mitigation was difficult during the period of change and transition to the new regulatory 
structure. 
 
Being conscious of the risks of transition from the FSA to the FCA, RiskCo 
kept under review the coordination between the prudential and conduct business 
units of the FSA. The committee also considered a number of forward-looking 
risk scenarios and a diverse range of risks and mitigation strategies, 
including consideration of the FCA risk outlook; the development of the 
FCA’s approach to risk and business model and strategy analysis as a tool to 
identify potential conduct issues.  
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Internal controls 
 
The Board and NedCo (the latter under FSMA) were responsible for 
ensuring the FSA had a sound system of internal controls and risk 
management (internal risks being overseen by AuditCo and external 
regulatory risks by RiskCo). AuditCo reported at least quarterly to the 
Board on internal controls and internal risk management. AuditCo received 
regular reports from managers on financial, operational and compliance 
controls and the risk management systems. In addition it received and 
reviewed reports from the Director, Internal Audit summarising work 
undertaken, findings and actions by managers. 
 
 
The system was designed to provide reasonable but not absolute assurance 
against material misstatement or loss and to manage rather than eliminate 
risks to the FSA’s statutory objectives. The Board’s policy on internal controls 
and risk management included established processes and procedures for 
identifying, evaluating and managing significant risks. 
 
The internal control processes were in place throughout the year. Key 
features of the internal control system included the following: 
 
• Risk reporting that highlighted the key internal and regulatory risks faced. 
This facilitated discussion on the best course of action to mitigate the key 
risks and helped senior managers make decisions on priorities and resource 
allocation. This was regularly reviewed by the Executive Operations 
Committee and the Executive Committee and formally reported to 
AuditCo on a quarterly basis through the consolidated risk report. 
• A review of the framework of controls to mitigate the key internal (and 
regulatory) risks faced. 
• Internal Audit’s provision of independent assurance to the FSA Board and 
management on the effectiveness of risk management and controls over all of its 
activities. 
• The Audit Universe, which contained all the FSA’s activities, systems, projects 
and programmes. Each unit within the universe was assessed appropriately 
to prioritise review by Internal Audit and these priorities were revised 
periodically. Factors considered included risk, business criticality and 
materiality. 
• The terms of reference of the Internal Audit function were reviewed during 
the year. As noted in AuditCo’s report, a full review of the effectiveness of 
Internal Audit was also carried out during the year. 
• Clear reporting lines and delegated authorities, which were reviewed on a 
regular basis. 
• The external audit, including interim and final audit, which provided 
assurance to the Board and senior management in relation to financial 
controls. The independence and effectiveness of the external auditor was 
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reviewed by AuditCo and reported to the Board on an annual basis. 
• Clear segregation of the regulatory aspects of the FSA’s supervisory operations 
and those of the internal treasury function. In addition a third party was used 
to decide, from a list of approved counterparties, where best to place deposits 
for the optimum return. This enabled the FSA to adopt a robust ‘Chinese Wall’ 
arrangement in line with good market practice. 
• Ensuring appropriate policies and procedures were contained within the 
staff handbook. 
• The performance management framework, which included setting 
objectives on an annual basis and a formal appraisal process. 
• Directors’ and senior managers’ commitment to maintaining an appropriate 
control culture across the FSA, which was regularly communicated to all 
staff. 
 
 
           Regulatory Decisions Committee (RDC) 
 
The RDC decides whether the regulator should give the statutory and other 
notices described as within its scope by the Handbook, any regulatory 
guide or legislation. During the period under review, members of the RDC 
were appointed by the FSA Board. The FSA Board received quarterly 
reports from the RDC Chairman, who also attended Board meetings twice 
a year to discuss significant matters in those reports. 
 
Listing Authority Committee 
 
The Listing Authority Advisory Committee (LAAC), the membership of which 
comprises external practitioners, met three times during the year. The LAAC’s 
role was to advise the Board and review elements of the FSA’s function as the 
competent authority for listing in the UK. The chairman provided reports to 
the Board on relevant issues. 
 
The Listing Authority Review Committee, whose role within the FSA was 
as a technical appeal committee, was not called during the year. 
 
